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Preface
The field of cryptography as a separate discipline of computer science and communications
engineering announced its arrival onto the world stage in the early 1990s with a full promise
to secure the Internet. At that point of time, many envisioned cryptography as a great tech‐
nological equalizer that could put the weakest privacy-seeking individual on the same plat‐
form as the greatest national intelligence agencies with powerful resources at their
command. Some political strategists forecasted that the power of cryptography would bring
about the downfall of nations when governments would no longer be able to snoop on peo‐
ple in the cyberspace, while others looked forward to it as a fantastic tool for the drug deal‐
ers, terrorists, and child pornographers, who would be able to communicate in perfect
secrecy. Some proponents also imagined cryptography as a technology that would enable
global commerce in this new online world.
Even 25 years later, none of these expectations are met in reality today. Despite the phenomenal
advances in cryptographic algorithms, the Internet's national borders are more apparent than
ever. The ability to detect and eavesdrop on criminal communications has more to do with
politics and manual interventions by human rather than by automatic detection or prevention
by mathematics of cryptographic protocols. Individuals still don't stand a chance against pow‐
erful and well-funded government agencies by seeking protection under the shield of cryptog‐
raphy. And the rise of global commerce had more to do with open economic policies of the
nations than on the prevalence of cryptographic protocols and standards.
While it is true that cryptography has failed to provide its users the real security it prom‐
ised, the reasons for this failure have less to do with cryptography as a mathematical sci‐
ence. Rather, poor implementation of cryptographic protocols and algorithms has been the
major source of problems. Although to a large extent we have been successful in developing
cryptographic systems, what we have been less effective at is to convert the mathematical
promise and ideas of cryptographic security into a secure working system in practice.
Another aspect of cryptography that is responsible for its failure in real world is that there
are too many myths about it. There is no dearth of engineers who consider cryptography as
a sort of magic wand that they can wave over their hardware or software in order to achieve
the security level promised by the cryptographic algorithms. Far too many users impose
their full faith on the word "encrypted" in the products they use and live under the false
impression of magical security in their operations. Reviewers have also no exceptions, com‐
paring algorithms and protocols on the basis of key lengths and then falsely believing that
products using longer key lengths are more secure.
The literature of cryptography has also served no good in spreading the myths about cryp‐
tography. Numerous propositions have been made for increasing the key length of a partic‐
ular protocol to enhance its mythical security level without any concrete specification and
guidelines about how to generate the keys. Sophisticated and complex cryptographic proto‐
cols have been designed without adequate considerations about the business and social and
computing constraints under which those protocols would have to work. Too much effort
has been spent in promoting cryptography as a pure mathematical ideal working in an iso‐
lated magic box, untarnished by and oblivious of any real-world constraints and realities.
But it's exactly those real-world constraints and realities that make the difference between
the promise of cryptographic magic and the reality of digital security.
While the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is being embedded into more and more
devices and there are some interesting developments in the area of public key cryptography,
many implementation challenges confront the security researchers and engineers today.
Side channels, poorly designed APIs, and protocol failures continue to break systems. Per‐
vasive computing also has opened up new challenges. As computers and communications
become embedded invisibly everywhere in the era of the Internet of Things (IoT), the prob‐
lems that used to only affect the traditional computers have cropped up in all other devices
including smartphones, tablets, refrigerators, air-conditions, televisions, and other house‐
hold gadgets and devices. Today, security also interacts with safety in applications from cars
through utilities to electronic healthcare. Hence, it has become imperative for security engi‐
neers and practitioners to understand not only the technicalities of cryptographic algorithms
and operating systems but also the economics and human factors of the applications as well.
With the advent of ubiquitous computing and the Internet of Things, the issue of security
and privacy in computing and communications is no longer a problem challenging some
computer scientists and system engineers. Computer forensics is increasingly becoming an
important and multidisciplinary subject with many of the crimes today being committed us‐
ing servers, laptop computers, smartphones, and other specialized handheld digital devices.
It is becoming mandatory for lawyers, accountants, managers, bankers, and other professio‐
nals whose day-to-day job may not involve technicalities of computer engineering to have
working-level awareness of system and communication security, access control, and other
privacy-related issues in their computing systems so as to effectively perform their tasks.
Exponential growth in the number of users of social networking applications like Facebook,
Twitter, Quora, etc. and online services provided by companies like Google and Amazon
has changed the world too. Ensuring robust authentication and providing data privacy in
massively parallel and distributed systems have posed significant challenges to the security
engineers and scientists. Fixing bugs in online applications has become a critical issue to
handle as an increasingly large numbers of sensitive applications are launched in the web
and smartphones. Securing an operating system and an application software is not enough
in today's connected world. What is needed is a complete security analysis of the entire com‐
puting system including its online and mobile applications. In other words, we are witness‐
ing a rapidly changing world of extremely fast-evolving techno-socio-economic systems
without having much knowledge about how the evolution is being driven and who is in
control. The one incident of recent past that has brought about most significant changes in
the security industry by altering our perceptions and priorities in design and operations of
our systems is the tragic event of September 2001. Since then, terrorism is no longer being
just considered as a risk. It is now being treated as a proactive perception of risk and the
subsequent manipulation and mitigation, if not elimination of that risk. This has resulted in
security being an amalgamation of technology, psychology, politics, and economics. In this
current context, security engineers must contribute to political and policy debates so that
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inappropriate or inadequate reactions to acts of terrorism do not lead to major wastage of 
precious resources or unforced policy errors.
However, one must not forget that the fundamental problems in security are not new. What 
have changed over the years are the exponential growth in the number of connected devices, 
evolution of networks with data communication speed close to terabit/s in the near field, 
massive increase in the volume of data communication, and availability of high-performance 
hardware and massively parallel architecture for computing and intelligent software. Before 
the mid-1980s, mainframe and minicomputers dominated the market, and computer security 
problems and solutions were phrased in terms of securing files or processes on a single sys‐
tem. With the rise of networking and with the advent of the Internet, the paradigm changed, 
and security problems started to be defined in terms of not only securing the individual ma‐
chines but also defending networks of computing against possible attacks. The issues are 
even more complex today, in the era of Web 2.0 and the Internet of Things, and the problems 
of security and communication have undergone yet another paradigm shift. However, the 
fundamental approaches toward developing secure systems have not changed. As an exam‐
ple, let us consider Saltzer and Schroeder's principles to secure design, which was conceived 
of as far back as in 1975. They focused on three important criteria in designing secure sys‐
tems: simplicity, confinement, and understanding. However, as security mechanisms become 
too complex, attackers can evade or bypass the designed security measures in the systems. 
The argument that the principles are old, and somehow outdated, is not tenable when in real‐
ity the systems are vulnerable not due to bad design principles but simply because they are 
nonsecure systems. A mistake that is committed most often by security specialists is not mak‐
ing a comprehensive analysis of the systems to be secured before making a choice about 
which security mechanism to deploy. In many occasions, the security mechanism chosen turn 
out to be either incompatible with or inadequate for handling the complexities of the system. 
This, however, does not vitiate the ideas, algorithms, and the protocols of the security mecha‐
nisms. While the same old security mechanisms even with appropriate extensions and en‐
hancements may not be strong enough to secure multiplicity of complex systems today, the 
underlying principles will continue to live on for the next-generation systems and indeed for 
the next era of computing and communications.
The purpose of the book is to discuss and critically analyze some of the important challeng‐
es in security and privacy enforcement in real-world computing and communication sys‐
tems. For effectively mitigating those challenges, the book presents a collection of theoretical 
and practical research work done by some of the experts in the world in the field of cryptog‐
raphy and security in computing and communications.
The organization of this book is as follows: there are two parts in the book containing eight 
chapters in total. There are six chapters in Part I, which mainly focus on various challenges 
in several aspects of security issues in computing. Part II on the other hand, contains two 
chapters dealing with security issues in wireless communications and signal processing.
I am sure that the book will be very useful for researchers, engineers, graduate and doctoral 
students, and faculty members of graduate schools and universities, who work in the broad 
area of cryptography and security in networks and communications. However, since it is 
not a basic tutorial, the subject matters in the book do not deal with any introductory infor‐
mation on the field of cryptography and network security. The chapters in the book present 
in-depth cryptography and security-related theories and some of the latest updates in a par‐
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ticular research area that might be useful to advanced readers and researchers in indentify‐
ing their research directions and formulating problems for further scientific investigation. It 
is assumed that the readers have knowledge on mathematical theories of cryptography and 
security algorithms and protocols.
I express my sincere thanks to all the authors who have contributed their valuable work in 
this volume. Without their contributions, this project could not have been successfully com‐
pleted. The authors have been extremely cooperative during the submission, editing, and 
publication process of the book. I would like to express my special thanks to Ms. Romina 
Rovan, Publishing Process Manager of InTechOpen Publisher, Croatia, for her support, en‐
couragement, patience, and cooperation during the period of the publication of the volume. 
My sincere thanks also go to Ms. Ana Pantar, Senior Commissioning Editor of InTechOpen 
Publisher, Croatia, for reposing faith on me and delegating me with the critical responsibili‐
ty of editorship of such a prestigious academic volume. I would be failing in my duty if I 
don't acknowledge the motivation and encouragement that I received from my faculty col‐
leagues in Calcutta Business School and Praxis Business School, Kolkata, India. Prof. Tamal 
Datta Chaudhuri, Prof. Sanjib Biswas, and Prof. Indranil Ghosh of Calcutta Business School 
deserve special mention for being my wonderful academic colleagues and for being the 
sources of motivation for me always. Last but not the least, I would like to thank my mother 
Ms. Krishna Sen, my wife Ms. Nalanda Sen, and my daughter Ms. Ritabrata Sen, for being 
my pillars of strength and the major sources of inspiration always.
Professor Jaydip Sen
Department of Analytics and Information Technology
Praxis Business School, Kolkata
India
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Section 1
Computing Security

Chapter 1
Proactive Detection of Unknown Binary Executable
Malware
Eric Filiol
Additional information is available at the end of the chapter
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/67775
Abstract
To detect unknown malware, heuristic methods or more generally statistical approaches
are the most promising research trends nowadays, but their computing and detection
performances are generally not compatible with what users do accept. Hence, most com-
mercial AV products still heavily rely on signature-based detection (opcodes, control flow
graph, and so on). This implies that frequent and prior updates must be performed. May
their analysis techniques be fully static of dynamic (using sandboxing or virtual machines),
commercial AVs do not capture what defines malware compared to benign files: their
intrinsic actions. In this chapter, we focus on binary executables and we describe how to
effectively synthetize these actions and what are the differences between malware and
nonmalicious files. We extract and analyze two tables that are present in executable files:
the import address table (IAT) and export address table (EAT). These tables summarize the
different interactions of the executable with the operating system. We show how this
information can be used in supervised learning to provide effective detection algorithms,
which have proven to be very accurate and proactive with respect to unknown malware
detection.
Keywords: malware detection, program behavior, MZ-PE format, combinatorial
methods, learning theory
1. Introduction
To detect unknown malware (or at least malware that are unknown in the antivirus database),
heuristic methods or more generally statistical approaches are the most promising research
trends nowadays. However, innovative detection algorithms cannot be included in antivirus
software due to performance requirements. Among them, we generally face a relatively high
false-positive rate, a significant analysis time for a given sample or have memory limit con-
straints. Having a too high false-positive rate may be a critical issue regarding executable files
© 2017 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
which are essential for the operating system kernel, for instance. Reducing the risk of false-
positive detection by limiting the scope of efficient heuristic methods is still possible but it does
not constitute a realistic solution.
Most of commercial AV products rely on signature-based detection or equivalent techniques.
They all use the same scheme to detect malware while dealing with the above-mentioned limita-
tions. The classification about malware signatures by antivirus company can be the following:
• Object file header attribute in this case, the header of a portable executable is used to
detect whether the file is a malware or not, using combination of the different parts of the
file structure. Despite the fact that packers may be used, their identification is relatively
straightforward. A similar technique has been proposed in [28] by hashing object file
feature. The key advantage of this technique lies on the fact that the result is efficient.
Malware belonging to the same family (and written by the same programmer) are easy to
detect. On the other hand, if the malware has some modifications while compiled or
linked, due to compiler options, the header information may change.
• Byte level approaches There are three main possibilities about the byte level:
- File hashing: the concept is to obtain a hash of whole or part of the malware. This a very
common techniques which is quite systematically implemented in antivirus software,
especially because it is easy to implement and it does not require a lot of computing
resources with respect to the detection process. However, the major drawback comes from
the fact that anymodification of the binary code will result in a totally different hash value.
- Character String signatures: a static character string present in the binary code of all the
malware of the same family is used to detect the complete family. Griffin, Schneider, Hu
and Chiueh [14] had proposed a way to automatically extract strings signatures from a
set of malware.
- Code normalization: the most common approach consist in rewriting some parts of the
code using optimization techniques [1]. Junk code, dead code, and one-branch tests are
removed while expressions with algebraic identities are simplified. The final code is a
normal form that can be easily compared to other malware codes under the same form.
• Instructions distributions: the detection here is based on the distribution of the binary
executable opcodes [2, 10]. A statistical scheme can be created and used to detect a whole
family. Another way is to use N-gram analysis using the method given by McBoost [22].
• Basic blocks: the main technique with basic blocks deals with the description of the number
of insertions, deletions, and substitutions to mutate a string into another one [3, 12]. To classify
a malware from that, it is disassembled statistically and all its basic blocks are extracted. They
are then compared to other malware blocks in order to get the smallest differences from one
block to another.
• API calls: this technique consists into disassembling a full malware to extract the API call
sequence. This sequence is compared to that of other malware. The SAVE system [26] is
using this method.
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Even when heuristics are supposedly used, they do not capture and synthetize enough infor-
mation to be able to detect unknown malware accurately and proactively. This implies that 
frequent and prior updates must be performed. May their analysis techniques be fully static of 
dynamic (using sandboxing or virtual machines), commercial AVs do not capture what defines 
malware compared to benign files: their intrinsic actions.
In this chapter, we describe how effectively synthetize the essential differences (behaviors, struc-
ture, internal primitives) between benign files (or goodware) and malware. Aside a few features 
about the MZ-PE file header [7], we extract and analyze two tables that are present in executable 
files: the import address table (IAT) and export address table (EAT). These tables summarize the 
different interactions of the executable with the operating system. We show how this information, 
once it has been extracted, can be used in supervised learning (Sections 2 and 3) to provide an 
effective detection algorithm which has proven to be very accurate and proactive with respect to 
unknown malware detection.
As a main result, we achieve a very high detection rate with a low false-positive rate while our 
database has not been updated since 2014. All the techniques presented in this chapter have 
been implemented in the French antivirus project called DAVFI and presented in Section 4.
Because most of the malware are targeting Windows systems, our techniques are mostly designed 
for this operating system family. However, our approach has been similarly extended and applied 
to UNIX systems in the same way (up to the technical differences between ELF executables and 
MZ-PE executables). Even if we implemented our algorithms to be able to detect UNIX malware 
specifically as well, without loss of generality we will not present them in this chapter since it 
would be redundant with what has been made for Windows.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 explains which information to extract from the 
binary code IAT/EAT and how to use it to capture the essential differences between malware and 
benign files with respect to their intrinsic behaviors. From that, a very efficient and accurate 
detection algorithm is designed. To improve further the description of binary executable behav-
iors, we consider the correlation of order 2 or of order 3 between the different functions involved 
in the IAT. By considering generic combinatorial structure, we derived a second detection 
algorithm in Section 3. In Section 4, we present the practical implementation of the algorithms 
of Sections 2 and 3 in the French antivirus project denoted DAVFI. We conclude in Section 5 and 
explore the possible evolutions for the results presented in this chapter.
2. Heuristic and proactive IAT/EAT detection
2.1. Technical background: import address table (IAT) and export address table (EAT)
2.1.1. Introduction to IAT and EAT
Any executable file contains a lot of information in the MZ-PE header [21] but some informa-
tion can be considered more relevant than the others. Tables like import address table (IAT) 
and export address table (EAT) are, in our case, enough to describe what a program should do 
or is supposed to do. The IAT is a list of functions required from the operating system by the 
program. Technically there are two possibilities of importing functions on Windows. The first
Proactive Detection of Unknown Binary Executable Malware
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one is made explicitly through the IAT during the loading phase of the process before running 
it, and or during the running phase with the use of the LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress 
functions [19, 20]. The second possibility is used by a lot of malware to hide their real func-
tionalities by loading them without referencing them in their IAT. Nonetheless, the functions 
are used to load libraries and to retrieve functions during runtime and therefore constitute 
some unavoidable points of passage which can be referenced. In most of the cases, malware, or 
packers have enough significant IAT to be detectable.
All executable files need an IAT. Without IAT—if this one is empty—it would mean that the 
targeted program would have no interaction with the operation system. In other words, it is 
not able to display text or any information at screen, it is not able to access any file on the 
system and it cannot allocate any segment of memory. Except consuming CPU time — with no 
result exploitable — it is not supposed to do anything else. Such useless program can be 
considered as suspicious (since it is suspicious to launch useless programs) or as malware in 
the most common case. If executable files need IAT, dynamic linked library (Dll) can also 
provide an EAT. This table describes which functions are exported by a Dll (and which are 
importable by an executable). Dll generally contains IAT and EAT — except for specific 
libraries which only export functions or objects. An executable can contain both an IAT and 
an EAT (the kernel of Windows ntoskrnl.exe is a good example). The use of EAT and IAT 
is a good combination to discriminate most of the libraries since the export and import is 
quite unique.
However, there are some limits to this system. One lies on the fact that this system only uses 
and trusts function, executable or library names. If a malware is designed to change every 
name of function to unknown ones, the system will not be able to give any reliable information 
any more. In addition, samples which imitate IAT and EAT from real benign files are able to 
bypass this type of test. Of course, it is a true limit of our model but, surprisingly, in most 
operational case, such a situation is not common. Most of the packers which are used on 
malware provides reliable IAT and EAT based on the executable file packed or on the packer 
itself (which helps to discriminate which packer is used). This observation is extensible to 
setup programs which are sort of packers.
2.1.2. IAT and EAT extraction
Before we can extract the IAT and EAT, it is necessary to find whether they are present or not. 
For this purpose it is necessary to analyze the entries of each table in the DataDirectory array of 
the IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER (or IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER64 in x64) structure. 
These entries (whose type is IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY) are DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIR-
ECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT], and DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT].
For the IAT and EAT to be present, it is necessary that the VirtualAddress and Size fields in the 
associated structures are nonzero.
Upon confirmation of the presence of an IAT, it must then be read. Each DLL is stored as a 
structure of type IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR. From this structure we extract the Name 
field first. It contains the name of the DLL, then the OriginalFirstThunk field containing the
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address where is stored the primary function, the other being stored in sequence. Each func-
tion is stored in a structure of type IMAGE_THUNK_DATA, in which the field AddressOfData
(whose type is IMAGE_IMPORT_BY_NAME) contains:
• the hint value (or Hint field). This 16-bit value is an index to the loader that can be the
ordinal of the imported function [24],
• and the function name, if present (Name field), i.e., if the function has not been imported
by ordinal (see further in Section 2.1.3). In the case of imports by ordinal only, it is the
Ordinal field of IMAGE_THUNK_DATA that contains the ordinal of the function (if
the most significant bit is equal to 1 then it means that the least significant 16 bits are the
ordinal of the function [16]).
After getting the name of the function, a pair dll_name/function_name (function_name is the
name of the function or its ordinal otherwise) is formed and stored, and the next function is
played until all the functions of the DLL are read, and so on for each imported DLL. On
output, a set of pairs dll_name/function_name is obtained, which will go through a formatting
phase (see Section 2.1.4).
The format of the EAT, although also representing a DLL and all of its functions, is different
from that of the IAT. All of the EAT is contained in a structure of IMAGE_EXPORT_-
DIRECTORY type. From this structure are obtained the name of the DLL (which may be
different in the case of renaming) using the Name field, the number of functions contained in
the EAT (NumberOfFunctions field) and the number of named functions among them (since
some functions can be exported by ordinal only) (NumberOfNames field).
Then we recover the functions and their name/ordinal. For the named functions, we just have
to read two arrays in parallel, whose addresses are AddressOfNames and AddressOfNa-
meOrdinals: at equal index, one contains the name of a function, and the other, its ordinal. For
nonnamed functions, we must then retain all ordinals of named functions and then recover in
the table with address AddressOfFunctions— which is indexed according to the ordinals of the
functions it contains — all the functions whose ordinal has not been retained. After obtaining
the set of functions/ordinals, in a similar way to that for the IAT, a set of pairs dll_name/
function_name is built and then formatted (Section 2.1.4).
2.1.3. Miscellanous data
Let us now detail a few technical points that are interesting to understand IAT and EAT in
depth. Microsoft’s documentation [18] explains how to export functions by ordinal in a DLL:
ordinals inside a DLL MUST be from 1 to N, where N is the number of functions exported by
the DLL. This is interesting and leads us to think that maybe some malicious files do not
respect this rule. To go further, it is likely that this also applies to the hint of functions, although
no documentation about it could be found. However, the analysis of a few Windows system
DLL export tables like kernel32.dll and user32.dll shows that they comply to this rule. After
conducting tests on malicious files and benign files, it turns out that only one “healthy” file
(sptd.sys, a driver from alcohol120%) does not follow this rule, while a number of malicious
files do the same.
Proactive Detection of Unknown Binary Executable Malware
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2.1.4. Generation of IAT and EAT vectors
After getting all the dll_name/function_name pairs from a file, two vectors are created (one for
the IAT and one for the EAT). These vectors will the base object for our detection algorithm. In
order to generate those vectors, we must build a database containing all the known pairs. A
unique ID is associated to each unique pair. This database is populated by a base set of files
with a known classification (malicious or benign). The population process is the following:
1. EAT and IAT pairs are extracted from files.
2. For each pair, a unique ID is constructed. This ID is a 64-bit number with the 20 most
significant bits representing the DLL and the remaining 44 bits representing the function.
3. For the DLL ID: if the DLL is known, its ID is used. In the other case, a new ID is used,
corresponding to the number of currently known DLLs (the first is 0).
4. The function ID follows the same process with known functions.
This population process is only executed manually whenever we would update the database;
it is not run during file analysis. The two vectors are created according to this database. For
each pairs, its ID is recovered from the database. If it does not exist in the database, the pair is
discarded. All the 64-bit numbers are then sorted and stored in a file.
2.2. The detection algorithm
In this section we are now presenting our supervised detection algorithm which works on the
vectors built with the data extracted and presented in the previous section. Usually [17, 25, 29]
the database of known samples (training sets) must be built before writing the detection
algorithm, as far as supervised algorithms are concerned. Such a procedure is led by the
knowledge and the learning of what to detect (malware) and what not to detect (benign files).
So the training set contains two subsets summarizing the essence of what malware and benign
files really are.
2.2.1. How to build the algorithm
Our solution is quite different. Indeed, if we know beforehand which data to use to perform
detection, we did not know how to build the database to make it reliable and accurate
enough for our algorithm. Which data to select among a set of millions of malware samples
and of benign files, in order to get a representative picture of what a malware is (or is not) for
the algorithm, is a complex problem in itself. Our approach has privileged the operational
point of view. We have designed the algorithm as formal as possible and we have applied it
on sets of malware and on a set of benign files to allow it to learn by itself, building the
database after the creation of the algorithm. In other words, the algorithm is designed to use
a minimal database of malware and of benign files at the beginning and this one is able to
perform minimal detection helping to develop the database with samples undetected to
improve results. We thus consider an iterative learning process, somehow similar to boosting
procedure [15, 29].
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Such an approach privileges experimental results and design of algorithms to detect unknown
malware. Indeed, the algorithm uses subsets of malware samples which are the most repre-
sentative of their families. Derivatives and parts of known malware (or variants) can be
recognized since they have been learned previously. “Unknown” malware uses most of the
time old fashion technologies, with the same base behaviors, and hence our algorithm is able to
detect a lot of them with such a design and approach. For sake of clarity, the description of our
algorithm starts with building the detection databases (training sets). To help the reader, we
suppose in this part that we (already) have a known detection algorithm which is presented
right after in the chapter (refer to Section 2.2.3).
2.2.2. Building the detection database (training set)
The heuristic algorithm we have designed uses a database of knowledge to help it to make
decisions. Of course, algorithm databases are built with the two different types of files it is
supposed to process and decide on: benign files and malware. The use of a combination of
samples from malware and benign files gives the best results since they are suitably chosen.
The way the database is built is the key step of our heuristic algorithm, since it affects directly
the results we obtained. However, we must stress on the fact that we would obtain the
same results for different malware/benign files subsets, as long as those sets are representative
enough of their respective family. Somehow, this step can be seen as a probabilistic algorithm.
From a simple observation, more than the number of samples we could set in the database, the
diversity of samples helps better to get the widest possible spectrum of detection. Smaller and
more diverse the database is, faster and better are the results obtained. Indeed, if the database
is too big, searching inside will be too much time-consuming, thus resulting in the impossibil-
ity to use it in real time. Only the most representative malware of a family must be included in
the database (and similarly for the benign files).
First, we need a detection function which is the one used by our algorithm. At the beginning,
the database used by this function is composed only with a small set of malware arbitrarily
selected (denoted M) to be representative of the family we want to include. Such a detection
function can be defined as follows. From any sample S we want to analyze, we have a prior
detection function DM which is of the form
DMðSÞ ¼ 0 if S is a non malicious1 if S is a malware

ð1Þ
It is not required that function DM exhibits huge and optimal detection performances. So a
known and initial malware (respectively benign file) sample set is enough to initiate the
process. To expand the databases (malware and benign files), Algorithm 1 is used. This
approach is more or less similar to boosting methods such as Ada-Boost [11, 15].
Algorithm 1 Database creation algorithm (training set)
Require: A set of files Sf to analyze (which has n files) and a maximal error detection rate E.
Ensure: Database files Sd (malware) and Sud (benign files).
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while jSf jn < E do
for fsg∈Sf do
if DMðsÞ ¼¼ 1 then
Sd←fsg
else
Sud←fsg
end if
end for
M ¼ M∪Sud
if jSdj ¼¼ 0 then
break
end if
end while
Algorithm 1 also enables to control the error detection rate ε for a given malware family (with
E∈ ½0; 1�⊂R). Indeed, if ε is chosen too small, the algorithm can include all the files from Sf . Of
course, the representativeness of files in Sf is a key point to use the algorithm. Working with
several different samples of the same family is, most of the time, the best approach. Another
possibility of control is to use the rate of detected files such as jSdjSud < E with E close to zero.
The building of database is performed family per family (of malware). It is possible to make it
faster mixing multiple relevant samples from different families in one set. For example, to
build the benign file database, one can choose files among those coming from C:\ Windows. In
fact, the initial choice of incoming files defines the relevance and the diversity of the database.
Starting from a small set of these files, we launch Algorithm 1 on the remaining files until we
have got enough file detected by the database created on the fly.
One key advantage of this principle lies in the fact that we can increase the size of the database
in the future without prior knowledge of a malware family. At the first time we created the
database, if the diversity of malware families was enough good, it is possible to include new
samples of malware without knowing its type/family. In fact, malware share strong IAT and
EAT correspondences and similarities with many other families, in most of the cases. It means
that malware can be detected by the database previously built even if we never included any
sample from its family. In other words, we can use this property to increase the size of the
database by adding undetected malware coming from different families into the current
database. Taking a file defined as malware (which could be given by any trusted source or by
a prior manual analysis), if this one is not detected by our algorithm, we can include it in our
Advances in Security in Computing and Communications10
database in order to improve the detection of its family. It is a simple way to improve the
accuracy of the detection.
2.2.3. The detection procedure: the K-nn algorithm
Once the structural analysis is achieved and the database (training sets) has been built, then the
detection tests occur by using the IAT and EAT vectors which have previously generated. This
is the second part our module is in charge of, and which aims at deciding the nature of a file.
Detection tests are split into two sets: the IAT comparison test and the EAT comparison test.
The principle of those tests is: the unknown file’s IAT (or EAT) is compared to each element of
the base of benign files and to each element of the base of malicious files. The k = 2p + 1 files that
are closest to the unknown file are kept with their respective label (malware or benign file). A
decision is then made based on these k files to decide which label to give to the file under
analysis. This test thus uses the method of k-Nearest Neighbors [15, 29], which has been
modified for the occasion. In both cases, the input consists of the k closest training examples
in the feature space.
2.2.3.1. Vector format limits
While this format allows an optimized storage of the IAT/EAT, it faces several constraints that
limit its use. The first constraint is a space constraint, which actually is not an intractable
problem. Our encoding limits to 220 possible DLLs and to 244 functions per DLL. Today, this
is more than enough, but we must keep in mind that this limit exists, and could be a problem
in a (very far) future.
The second constraint lies in the fact that our vectors do not have a fixed length. It is a problem
if we want to use standard distance functions, like the Euclidean distance. We could have used
a similar vector format in which each possible couple was given a 0 or 1 number depending on
whether it was present in the file or not. But the length would have been around 106 (about the
current size of the database) instead of around 103 (for large files) with the current format. It
would have a bad impact on the performances of real-time analysis, and hence it would have
increased the time of analysis by too a high factor. In order to optimize the computation time,
all the vectors in the bases and generated during analysis are sorted.
2.2.3.2. The similarity measure
In order to determine the nearest neighbors, we need a function to compare two IAT/EAT
vectors of different sizes. The format prevents the use of standard distances (because to use a
standard distance, the IAT/EAT vectors should have the same size, i.e., always the same
number of imported/exported functions in each file, which is quite never the case). It was
therefore necessary to find a function fulfilling this role and to apply it our format. Let us
adopt a few notations:
• An IAT/EAT vector of size n is written as σ ¼ σ1σ2…σn where σi ∈ {0; 1}64 (64-bit integers).
The set of such vectors is denoted ΣU .
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• The inverse indicator function I : E;F ! {0; 1} is defined such that ∀x∈E;IFðxÞ ¼ 0 if x∈ F
and 1 otherwise.
• If υ is an IAT/EAT vector, Eυ ¼ {σi} (this notation describes the fact that vectors are
implemented as lists of 64-bit integers).
The function we use to compute the degree of similarity between IAT or EAT vectors is then
defined by:
∀a∈ΣU;∀b∈ΣU; f ða;bÞ ¼ 1jaj þ jbj
�Xjaj
i¼1
IEbðaiÞ þ
Xjbj
j¼1
IEaðbjÞ
�
ð2Þ
It is easy to prove that this function satisfies the separation, the symmetry and the coincidence
axioms as any similarity measure has to.
2.2.3.3. The decision algorithm
The detection algorithm to decide the nature of a file (malware or benign) is given by Algo-
rithm 2. It is composed of two parts in order first to reflect the importance of similarity
optimally and second to eliminate some neighbors who are there only due to the lack of data.
The first part consists in filtering the set of neighbors that the k-NN algorithm returns to refine
the best decision based on the neighbors that are really close. For this purpose, a threshold is
set (50% for now) and only neighbors with a higher degree of similarity (i.e., that the function f
returns a value less than 0.5) are kept. Then classical decision is applied to this new set: the file
is considered closer to the base with the most representative among the neighbors.
The second part is used in the case when an equal number of representatives in each base, is
returned (situation of indecision). All the neighbors are again considered, and again the file is
considered closer to the base with the most representatives among the neighbors. If k is odd, it
helps to avoid indecision (majority decision rule). It was therefore decided that all k are used
odd in order not to fall in the case of indecision.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm used to classify a file
Require: A vector X representing a file to analyze, a malware vector base BM and a benign
vector base BB.
Ensure: A Boolean value indicating whether the file is malicious.
i← 0
for fbg∈BB do
d = f(X, b)
if d ¼¼ 0 then
Return(false)
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Else
neighbors[i] += (d, brnidn)
i++
end if
end for
for fmg∈BM do
d = f(X, m)
if d ¼¼ 0 then
Return(false)
else
neighbors[i] += (d, malicious)
i++
end if
end for
ifMaxNeighbors(neighbors) == malicious then
Return(true)
else
Return(false)
end if
2.3. Detection and performances results
In order to test and to tune up our algorithm, we have defined many tests. On the one hand, we
have tested the modification of the number of neighbors’ parameter in the k-nn algorithm. This
test is made in order to observe for howmany neighbors the test is themost efficient. Then, on the
other hand, we performed tests on databases to measure results of the algorithm. Of course, the
detection algorithm is used with the most efficient number of neighbors obtained in the first test.
Increasing the number of neighbors by more than 9 does not change the results significantly. In
fact, keeping the number of neighbors as minimal as possible is a better choice since it has an
impact on the response time of the algorithm — a key point when we used it in real-time
detection conditions. The results about this test are displayed in Figure 1. For the final test, we
have put the algorithm to the proof with two sample sets. One is composed of 10,000 malware
(extracted from different families and unknown from our databases) and one composed of
legitimate files composed of executable files extracted from a cleanMicrosoft Windows operating
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system (around 131,000 files). The results are given in Table 1 These results show that the
algorithm is quite efficient to detect similarities between different executable files. Nonetheless,
it is not enough to use it for detection in real time only since the rate of false-positive detection is
too high to be acceptable. To prevent such a case, our algorithm in module 5.2 is chained with
other techniques (see Section 4). This is the most efficient approach since we succeeded in
making the residual false-positive rate tends toward 0.
3. Combinatorial detection of malware by IAT discrimination
As we did in the previous section, we now consider a mix between the object file header and
the API call. We are orienting our research toward the Import Address Table (IAT) and
especially the correlation between IAT functions that are used either by malware or by benign
files or used by both.
For this purpose, we use supervised learning techniques. The training models aims at building
vectors that capture the combined use of specific IAT functions. We have observed that the
subsets of specific functions significantly differ depending on the nature of the executable file—
Figure 1. ROC summarizing the detection algorithm performances.
Malware set Benign files set
Detected as malware 95.028% 4.972%
Detected as benign file 2.053% 97.947%
Table 1. Algorithm performances results.
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malware and benign files. Then, the testing phase enables to detect codes, even when unknown,
with a very good true positive rate while keeping the false-positive rate very low.
3.1. The IAT functions correlation model
To build our model (our training sets), we have to extract the specific IAT functions and to
build specific vectors that describe their combined use by malware, benign files and blacklisted
IAT functions. We thus build two vector sets, one set which models malware, the second the
benign files. The (unique) blacklist vector set describes specific IAT functions which must be
considered as used systematically by malware only (see further).
Each of our vectors is implemented as a multiprecision integer by using GMP [13]. Each bit of
this integer represents the presence or absence of a predefined (specific) function in its Import
Address Table. This implementation approach allows to perform vectorized computation with
simple bitwise logical operators. The predefined functions are derived from the extraction of
all the Export Address Table from the dynamic-linked library in the operating system. For
example, Table 2 summarized the occurrences of the predefined functions in both malware
and legitimate files.
The vector for the malware is: 001 0011) 19, the vector for the benign file 1 is: 101 0101) 85
and the vector for the benign file 2 is: 111 0100 ) 116. In this way, we can easily and quickly
detect which function from which dynamic-linked library is used by malware or benign files.
The Dll name:function name indices are arbitrarily ordered, provided the chosen ordering
remains the same for all vectors.
3.1.1. Creation of initial vectors
The different sets containing the vectors we generate are essential components in our detection
engine. We used a fresh install of Windows 7 professional with all update at January 1st, 2015.
Three vector sets are created: for benign files, malware and for the blacklisted functions. In
order to obtain a list of all functions, we extracted all of them in each dynamic link library
which was present in the Windows system. We obtained a total of 76,669 functions in 1568
dynamic link libraries.
Dll name Function name Malware Benign file 1 Benign file 2
dlli F1 1 1 0
F2 1 0 0
F3 0 1 1
dllj F1 0 0 0
F2 1 1 1
F3 0 0 1
dllk F1 0 1 1
Table 2. Vectors creation table (drawn from [8]).
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3.1.1.1. Malware vector set
The vectors are created by extracting the import address table from a set of 3567 malware. This
set covers 95% of the different families for the two last years. After analysis and cleaning steps
(especially for discarding duplicated vectors), we have obtained more than 1381 vectors. Let us
remind that many malware use packers to delay the analysis or to make it less straightforward.
Whenever a benign file packs its code a packer that is generally used by malware, we then
decide it as malicious.
3.1.1.2. Goodware vectors
Goodware vectors are created from the executable files on a clean installation of Windows 7.
We have obtained a set of 985 vectors.
3.1.1.3. Blacklist vector
This blacklist vector set is created by considering all undocumented functions contained by the
Microsoft dynamic-link library on a native Windows 7 professional, as well as a few functions
used by malware only. Development standards now make nowadays compulsory not to use
undocumented functions (may them be Windows functions or not). As a consequence, it is a
key point to keep in mind that there is no real reason for a legit program to rely on or to use
undocumented functions from the Microsoft dynamic-link library. Those functions can become
deprecated at any time without explanations from Microsoft. As a consequence, any legit
program does not have to use them. In order to add some other functions, we also take the
PeStudio blacklist [23] into account. The blacklist vector references around 47,040 blacklisted
functions.
3.1.2. Correlation between functions and function subsets
In order to improve the detection scheme presented in Section 2, we decided to use the
correlations between functions. Indeed, program behaviors can be described by a set of func-
tions, which are generally indexed by time (in order words, the order according to which
functions are called, matters). We thus intend to use the information describing the simulta-
neous occurrence of subsets of functions. Since a few years, compilers do no longer preserve
the time ordering of functions in the IAT. To retrieve this information either we have to reverse
the binaries and analyze the code or to perform a dynamical analysis from execution traces.
Hence, subsets can be considered in place of vectors (ordered subsets). To model this, we are
going to use all subsets of size 2 (pairs) or of size 3 (triplets). In other words, we intend to
capture more closely the behaviors by considering the call of any two (resp. three) possible
functions.
From the initial vectors of size n we then build pair-vectors or triplet-vectors.
Pair-vectors have size of n2
 
while triplet-vectors have a size of n3
 
. For an easy imple-
mentation, we will keep on representing these vectors as GMP integers.
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All possible function pairs and function triplets are ordered according to some arbitrary
ordering, for example, ð1; 2Þ, ð1; 3Þ,…ð1; nÞ, ð2; 3Þ,…, ðn� 1; nÞ. For example, when considering
data given in Table 2, we produce the data given in Table 3 (due to lack of space, we show
only pairs that are effectively present in the binary code of at least one of the files). For ease of
writing we call binomial sets the function subsets of size 2 and trinomial sets the function subsets
of size 3. We thus produce three new vectors sets.
3.1.2.1. Binomial set vectors
From the previous initial vectors produced in Section 3.1.1, we generate binomial set vectors
for both benign files and malware. For each vector and for any function binomial set, we check
whether this set is present (the corresponding vector bit is set to 1) in the executable or not (the
bit is set to 0). If again we consider the result of Table 3 drawn from [8], the malware file is
defined by the following binomial sets: (1;2), (1;5) and (2;5). Then the resulting binomial set
vector is 000000000000100001001 where the binomial (1;2) is the least significant bit and the
binomial (n – 1, n) is the most significant bit. Goodware are then similarly defined by the two
followings vectors: 010000101000000101010 and 111000111000000000000. There is only one
pair, (1;5), in common. Table 4 summarizes the number of subsets for each category.
Bit 1 Bit 2 Malware Benign file 1 Benign file 2
1 2 1 0 0
1 3 0 1 0
1 5 1 1 0
1 7 0 1 0
2 5 1 0 0
3 5 0 1 1
3 6 0 0 1
3 7 0 1 1
5 6 0 0 1
5 7 0 1 1
6 7 0 0 1
Table 3. IAT function pairs (example drawn from [8]).
Count
Goodware 1,753,640
Malware 2,036,311
Common 433,119
Table 4. Details of count in binomial sets.
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3.1.2.2. Trinomial set vectors
In the same way we did for binomial set vectors, we have produced three sets for the trinomial
sets (see Table 5).
3.1.2.3. Common sets
In order to make the analysis more accurate, we removed all the common sets for both the
binomial and trinomial sets. Since there are present at the same time both in malware and
benign files, they do not provide meaningful information. As an additional advantage, we also
reduce the size of the database and we spare time and memory (see Tables 4 and 5) [8].
3.2. The detection algorithm
We use a variant the K -nn algorithm [17] whose aim is to compute the distance of a given
vector (the file to analyze) to the sets of the training database. We then label the vector with
respect to the set which is at the shortest distance. In practice, to classify an executable as a
malware or a benign file, the detection algorithm consists in five tests. Three of them use
directly the initial vectors extracted from its Import Address Table. The last two tests use the
binomial and trinomial set vectors.
The detection algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 3 and implements several steps:
• The first test is a comparison with the blacklist vector. A simple bitwise AND is performed
between both vectors. If the result is different from zero (characteristic malware functions
are indeed shared by both vectors), then the executable is considered as a malware.
• The second test consists in performing a bitwise XOR between the file vector to classify
and all vectors from the malware and legitimate file sets. The label (malware or benign
file) will be determined by the shortest distance. We only keep the 2p + 1 best values
(usually p = 15) and apply a majority voting. Moreover, we also analyze whether there is
gap in these 2p + 1 distances. If we notice such a gap, we consider that the label for the file
must be the same than that of the family of the vector for the gap. For example if the best
value is 3 with malware label, and the second is 27 with the nonmalicious label, the file is
considered as a malware (since 27 – 3 = 24 is far greater that generally observed).
• In the third test, we compare vectors with a bitwise AND test. The classification label is
determined by the largest distance: the bigger the result, the closer is the vector to the
corresponding vector set. In the same way we do the XOR test, we use gap criteria to
discriminate a family in case of uncertainty. It is worth noticing that the AND and XOR test
Count
Goodware 373,026,049
Malware 336,423,103
Common 283,4537
Table 5. Details of count in trinomial sets.
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are not the same. While the XOR test enlightens the dissimilarities, the AND test favors
similarities. In fact, both tests are complementary to each other.
• The two last tests are based on the binomial and trinomial vector sets, we calculate which
set yields the most common matches and hence we decide the label accordingly.
Algorithm 3 IAT-based combinatorial detection algorithm (vectors and files are represented as
GMP integers; binary operators are computed bitwise over GMP integers)
Require: File f to analyze. Blacklit vector B, malware vector setM and benign file vector set G,
malware binomial set vectors MBS, malware trinomial sets vectors MT S, benign file bino-
mial set vectorsMBS, benign file trinomial sets vectorsMT S.
Ensure: File label (malware [1] or nonmalicious [0]).
type← 0
compute υ ¼ B AND f
if υ=¼ 0 then
type++
end if
compute the XOR distance of f with vectors inM and G
keep the 31 best vectors with their distance from f and their label (malware or benign file)
ifMalware labels are the most represented then
type++
end if
compute the AND distance of f with vectors inM and G
keep the 31 best vectors with their distance from f and their label (malware or benign file)
ifMalware labels are the most represented then
type++
end if
compute dMBS and dGBS (resp.)the distance of f with vectors inMBS and GBS)
if dMBS > dGBS then
type++
end if
compute dMT S and dGT S (resp.)the distance of f with vectors inMT S and GT S)
if dMT S > dGT S then
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type++
if type ≥ 2 then
return 1 (malware)
else
return 0 (nonmalicious)
end if
3.3. Results and performances
In this section, we now detail the results of those different steps of the detection algorithm.
With the initial sets only and without learning phase, we have a detection rate more than 98%
and a really small false-positive rate (less than 3%). The false positive is mostly due to legiti-
mate software, which uses packers that we can wrongly label as malware. However, by
combining with white listing techniques (as we did in the French AV project DAVFI, see
Section 4), the false-positive rate systematically tends toward zero. As explained before, only
a very few legitimate software are using code packing as malware usually do.
3.3.1. Blacklisted function vector
The result for this test is generally zero (in more than 97% of the cases). But whenever this result
is different (nonnull) we are certain that the file is a malware. This indicator about undocu-
mented functions from the Windows API is discriminant only if the executable uses one of these
functions.
3.3.2. XOR & AND tests
The tests for bitwise XOR and AND were the two first tests implemented (Tables 6 and 7). With
a rather small database for each set (less than 30 Mb), we detect 99% of malware correctly. The
following tables show the results using a part of the database only [8]. The aim is to determine
whether a reduced database would provide significantly similar results thus enabling to spare
memory.
To create the partial database, we keep only the most significant vectors in terms of informa-
tion contained. This is directly connected to the sparsity of vectors. Another way to select the
vectors to keep consists in computing their respective Information Gain [17]. Let us consider a
vector v. Its information gain is given by the formula:
IGðvÞ ¼
X
υj ∈ {0;1}
X
C∈ {Ci}
Pðυj, CÞlogð
Pðυj;CÞ
PðυjÞ:PðCÞÞ, ð3Þ
where C is the class (malware or benign file), υj is the value of the j-th attribute, P(υj, C) is the
probability that it has value υj in class C, P(υj), is the probability that it takes value vj in the
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whole training set (database) and P(C) is the probability for the class C. With only 75% of the
whole database, we detect 80% of the malware, while the rate of false positive is close to 0.
3.4. Binomial and trinomial set vectors tests
With the binomial and trinomial set vectors we have built in the previous part, we detect 99% of
malware containing an Import Address Table. Whenever an executable file has no IAT, it is
strongly suspected to be a malware. Consequently it is labeled as such. However the size of
database is relatively big: 121 Mb for the binomial set vectors and 34 Gb for the trinomial set
vectors. To reduce the database sizes, once again we keep only the most significant vectors in
each set. In this way, we reduce the time to analyze a file and the size of database. Tables 8 and 9
give the best ratio to keep.
3.4.1. General results
The efficient approach consists in combining and chaining all the tests using different possible
decision rules (one of the most efficient is the maximum-likelihood rule). The detection rate is
then more than 99% while the false-positive rate is very close to 0 (without additional white
listing techniques). Tables 10 and 11 show the detection rate depending on the size of the
% of original base Size on disk Detection rate Time
100 39 Mb 99 2 s
90 35 Mb 93 2 s
80 31 Mb 86 2 s
75 29 Mb 81 2 s
Table 6. Results for the AND test.
% of original base Size on disk Detection rate Time
100 39 Mb 98 2 s
90 35 Mb 97 2 s
80 31 Mb 87 2 s
75 29 Mb 80 2 s
Table 7. Results for the XOR test.
% of original base Size on disk Detection rate Time
100 121 Mb 98 67 s
90 109 Mb 97 53 s
80 96 Mb 90 47 s
50 60 Mb 80 30 s
Table 8. Results for binomial set vectors.
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initial database. The following table indicates us the rate of false positives on all our tests
depending of the database size. As we can see, the rate of false positive is very good. False
positive can be explained as follows:
• Software installers generally embed compressors and packers. Hence we observe the
presence of a small IATwith many compression imports.
• The DotNet environment is developing more and more. DotNet files have really a small
IAT. An optimization would be to analyze the internal imports.
• Update only programs. These programs are generally really near of webdownloaders (a
functionality shared with malware), because they basically only try to connect on specific
websites in order to check whether any new version is online.
In all three cases, white listing techniques and/or additional analysis routines (such as those
presented in Section ??) will make the false-positive rate tends toward 0.
4. The DAVFI project
4.1. Presentation of the project
The DAVFI project [5] (standing for Démonstrateur d’Antivirus Français et International or French
and International Antiviral Demonstrator) was a 2-year project (from October 2012 to September
2014) partially funded by the French Government (National Fund for the Digital Society). The
objective of this project was to design, to implement and to test a proof-of-concept for a new
generation, sovereign, multi-platform (Android, Linux, and Windows) open antivirus software.
% of original base Size on disk Detection rate Time
100 34 Gb 99 287 s
90 30 Gb 98 240 s
80 27 Gb 93 223 s
50 17 Gb 82 153 s
Table 9. Results for trinomial set vector.
% of original base 100 90 80 70 60 50
% of detection 99 98 94 89 87 84
Table 10. Detection rate.
% of original base 100 90 80 70 60 50
% of false positive 1 3 7 12 17 24
Table 11. False-positive rates.
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The final proof-of-concept has been delivered in September 2014 and is based on a strongly
multithreaded architecture. The latter is made of several modules which are chained and
operate within two main resources: a resident notification pilot and an antiviral analysis
service. The latter embeds two analysis streams, one for binaries and executable files, the other
to process documents (and malware documents) specifically. In 2015, after a technical and
operational validation by the French Directorate General of Armaments has been transferred
to the private sector for the industrialization process. By now this project equips the French
National Gendarmerie’s computers (Linux version).
The DAVFI’s general structure (we will focus on the Windows version) is summarized in
Figure 2. The detailed internal structure of the executable analysis chain is depicted in Figure 3.
DAVFI/OpenDAVFI’s detection architecture is based on several modules. Whenever a relevant
file is accessed, antivirus’ kernel drivers notify the analysis service for the file analysis. Then
many possibilities are considered. First, the file may be already known by the analysis system
to be a nonmalicious file. Such a file can be defined as part of the system or already scanned by
the antivirus and therefore has not to be detected as malicious (Figure 2). For this purpose,
dynamic white-listing and black-listing modules have been designed and implemented (mod-
ules 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3). Second, the file is a document file and must be analyzed by a specific
module (module 4 in Figure 3) [9]. Third, if we deal with a script file, it must be analyzed by
another specific module. In the last case of a binary executable file, the analysis involves the
module 5. This module is in fact a chained sequence of sub-modules designed to filter the
detection of a binary file (note that other modules are composed in the same way) as depicted
in Figure 3.
Figure 2. Overall structure of the windows DAVFI/OpenDAVFI application.
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Figure 3. Overall structure of the windows DAVFI/OpenDAVFI executable file analysis module.
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Whenever the module 5 starts, it checks with SEClamAV antivirus engine whether the file is
a well-known malware or not. SEClamAv is used in our case for performance purposes to
notify the heuristic detection module (module 5.2 which implements the detection algorithm
presented in Section 2) with unknown files only. The heuristic module, which has been devel-
oped, is designed to detect both unknown malware and known malware. It is made of three
parts: a header structural analysis [7] and two heuristic submodules which process the infor-
mation contained in the Import Address Table (IAT) and in the Export Address Table (EAT) [6, 8]. It
is also worth mentioning that the first filter in the DAVFI’s analysis system is able to discard
from detection all legitimate Windows kernel files (white-listing approach) or well-known
benign files. This greatly reduces the false-positive detection rate.
Since heuristic detection is generally time-consuming, module 5.2 embeds a structural analysis
chain which operates first [7]. Most AV software still uses detection techniques (either static or
dynamic), which are however mostly based on the general concept of (static or heuristic)
signature. However, we have observed that many malware do not comply to the Microsoft
specifications with respect to the MZ-PE format [21]. Indeed, implementing malware tech-
niques and tricks to fool a number of protection, detection or analysis techniques requires for
the malware writer to take liberties with the file format specification. Consequently, a simple
structural analysis with respect to this file format allows to identify executable that are indeed
surely malware. As a consequence we avoid useless, time-consuming processing with the
subsequent heuristic module.
4.2. Testing and technical evaluation
This project has been tested many times intensively during the two years of the project and
then by the Directorate General of Armaments. A users committee (French Banks, French DoD,
Prime Minister Office, and so on) has also been built for the DAVFI project. The aim was to
involve end users, to have their operational feedback regarding antivirus software and to
make them test a few modules in real-life conditions. Moreover, they feed us with unknown
malware (usually manually detected in their respective CERTduring the very first hours of the
attack), most of them being not detected by commercial AV software (we use the VirusTotal
[27] website for checking this point). Most of the samples provided related to targeted attacks.
Final testing were organized as blind testing (we did not know which files were malware or
benign files).
The performance results are very good and can be summarized as follows:
• The overall detection rate (true positive) is more than 97% while false-positive rate equal
to 0.
• These overall results include unknown malware at the time of testing (the malware nature
has been confirmed by manual malware forensics analysis). It is worth mentioning that
the initial databases (presented in Sections 2 and 3 were not updated during the different
testing phases).
• New tests in mid-2016 confirmed the previous results without database updating.
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5. Conclusion and future work
In this chapter we have presented a different supervised detection algorithms working on data
extracted from the IAT and EAT of binary executable files (Windows and Unices) and more
broadly from their header. These particular pieces of information do not only describe the
executable in a static way more precisely (use of far more complex and rich signatures) but also
they capture the information related to program behaviors.
The overall performances which we have achieved show that is possible to detect unknown
malware proactively and accurately. This yields enhanced detection capabilities while requir-
ing far less database update. Beyond the experimental analysis, operational testing of those
techniques has been performed on malware coming from the real world in real conditions. The
results which have been observed fully satisfy the operational constraints and specifications
with respect to unknown malware detection.
Future work will address the combinatorial modeling and processing of information
contained in IAT/EAT. While we have considered mostly statistical aspects and initiated
their combinatorial analysis in Section 3, it is possible to have a far more precise processing
of this information when using combinatorial structures to synthetize the concept of behav-
iors and hence base a more accurate detection on the dynamical information contained in
the code.
We also intend to extend the information used for detection. The study of data section or
opcodes sections is a possible option in order to increase the number of detection criteria.
These sections can provide correlations with the features we already consider.
As far as combinatorial techniques are concerned (Section 3), they can still somehow be time-
consuming depending on the malware code to classify. The need for an important storage
space when working with binomial and trinomial set vectors may also have an impact of the
detection engine performances (mainly the computing time required for analysis). In case of a
desktop computer, the user may not accept to wait more than a few seconds before he can
access his data or resources. It is then better to use it upstream on a gateway, which would be
dedicated to malware analysis and would check all the flow of incoming data.
As far as the size of the database is concerned, we can mitigate this point by considering that
computer hard drives can store nowadays huge amounts of bytes. They also are large live
memory (RAM) size. But it is still always unpleasant for the final user to let his antivirus
software to be too much resource-consuming. Future work will consequently aim at reduc-
ing the database size by using suitable combinatorial designs [4]. The key approach lies in
the ability to concentrate the information inside combinatorial design blocks while
exhibiting correlation between IAT functions at a far higher order. We estimate that it is thus
possible to reduce the database size at least by 75% without lessening the final detection
performances.
Another future work deals with optimizing the detection with respect to binomial and trino-
mial vector-based detection. By adding or removing a few well-known combinations, it is
possible to reduce the size of the database and the computing time.
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The last work is to consider a limit for the Import Address Table size. In a few cases, malware
writers are trying to fool the work performed by antivirus engines. As an example, they try to
increase the malware size by loading and using too much external functions. It should then be
rather easy to classify malware that are using more than a limited number of external functions
but which actually only need and use less.
In the other hand, they may use a few stealth techniques to load and to use external functions
without linking them in the Import Address Table. The improvement would then be to
consider a file with a too small or too big Import Address Table as a malware.
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Abstract
Achieving cloud security is not a trivial problem to address. Developing and enforcing 
good cloud security controls are fundamental requirements if this is to succeed. The 
very nature of cloud computing can add additional problem layers for cloud security to 
an already complex problem area. We discuss why this is such an issue, consider what 
desirable characteristics should be aimed for and propose a novel means of effectively 
and efficiently achieving these goals through the use of well-designed unikernel-based 
systems. We have identified a range of issues, which need to be dealt with properly to 
ensure a robust level of security and privacy can be achieved. We have addressed these 
issues in both the context of conventional cloud-based systems, as well as in regard to 
addressing some of the many weaknesses inherent in the Internet of things. We discuss 
how our proposed approach may help better address these key security issues which we 
have identified.
Keywords: cloud security and privacy, unikernels, Internet of things
1. Introduction
There are a great many routes into an information system for the attacker, and while many 
of these routes are well recognized by users, many others do not see the problem, mean-
ing limited work is being carried out on defense, resulting in a far weaker system. This 
becomes much more difficult to solve in the cloud, due to the multi-tenancy nature of cloud 
 computing, where users are less aware of the multiplicity of companies and people who can 
access their systems and data. Cloud brings a far higher level of complexity than is the case 
with  traditional distributed systems, in terms of both the additional complexity of  managing 
© 2017 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
new relationships in cloud, and in the additional technical complexities involved in run-
ning systems within the cloud. It runs on other people’s systems, and instances can be freely 
spooled up and down, as needed.
Add to this the conception, or rather the misconception, that users can take the software, 
which runs on their conventional distributed systems network and run it successfully on the 
cloud without modification, thus missing the point that their solid company firewall does not 
extend to the cloud, and that they thus lose control over who can access their systems and 
data. Often, users also miss the point that their system is running on someone’s hardware, 
over which they have limited or no control. While cloud service providers may promise high 
levels of security, privacy and vetting of staff, the same rigorous standards often do not apply 
to their subcontractors.
There are many barriers that must be overcome before cloud security can be achieved [1]. 
A great deal of research has been conducted toward resolving this problem, mostly through 
technical means alone, but this presents a fundamental flaw. The business architecture of 
an enterprise comprises people, process and technology [2], and any solution, which will 
focus on a technological solution alone, will be doomed to failure. People present a serious 
weakness to enterprise security [3], and while process may be very well documented within 
an organization, often it is out of date due to the rapid pace of evolution of technology [4]. 
Technology can benefit enterprises due to the ever improving nature and sophistication of 
software, which is a good thing, but at the same time can present a greater level of complexity, 
making proper and secure implementation within enterprise systems much more difficult. 
Another major concern is that the threat environment is also developing at a considerable 
pace [5].
Cloud computing has been around for the best part of a decade, yet we still have to see 
an effective, comprehensive security standard in existence. Those that do exist tend to be 
focussed on a particular area, rather than the problem as a whole, and as stated above, they 
are often out of date [4]. Legislators and regulators are not much further advanced. The 
usual practice is to state what they are seeking to achieve with the legislation or  regulatory 
rules. Usually, they are very light on the detail of how to achieve these goals. To some extent, 
this is  deliberate—if they specify the principles to apply to achieve their desired objective 
rather than the exact details, they do not have to keep updating the legislation/regulations 
as  circumstances change. Often, they have no clue as to how to achieve these goals anyway, 
leaving it up to the users to work it out. This is the approach favored by the UK authori-
ties, and it can be argued that it generally works well. In the US, they favor the rules-based 
approach, which, of necessity, requires far more work on the part of the government and 
regulators to keep the rules up to date. It also spawns an active industry of specialists who 
constantly probe the boundaries to see how far they can be pushed. Global enterprises often 
have to deal with both types of approach. In addition, the methodology deployed to achieve 
compliance is often flawed [6]. To this complex environment, we must now, of necessity, 
add the impact of both Industry 4.0, which encompasses mostly  high-value targets, e.g. 
factories, and the Internet of things (IoT), which is likely to see a massive global explosion, 
to the mix.
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The IoT has been around now for a considerable time, but it did not get much traction until 
the arrival of cloud computing and big data. In 2007, Gantz et al. [7] suggested that global data 
collection would double every 18 months, a prediction that looks like being very light when 
compared to the reality of data creation coming from the expansion of the IoT. Cisco noted 
that the IoT had really come of age in 2008, when there were now more things connected 
to the Internet than people [8]. The massive impact arising from this enabling of the IoT by 
cloud computing brings some exciting new applications and future possibilities in the areas of 
defense, domestic and home automation, eHealth, industrial control, logistics, retail, security 
and emergencies, smart airports, smart agriculture, smart animal farming, smart cars, smart 
cities, smart environment, smart metering, smart parking, smart roads, smart trains, smart 
transport and smart water, but also brings some serious challenges surrounding issues of 
security and privacy. Due to the proliferation of emerging and cheaply made technology for 
use in the IoT, it is well known that the technology is particularly vulnerable to attack. When 
we combine the IoT and big data, we compound this problem further. This area is poorly 
regulated, with few proper standards yet in place, which would suggest it might be more 
vulnerable than existing cloud systems, which have been around for some time now.
We are concerned with achieving both good security and good privacy, and while it is 
 possible to have security without privacy, it is not possible to have privacy without secu-
rity. Thus, our approach is to first ensure a good level of security can be achieved, and in 
Section 2, we discuss from our perspective how we have set about developing and extend-
ing this idea. In Section 3, we identify the issues that need to be addressed. In Section 4, we 
discuss why these issues are important, and what the potential implications for security and 
privacy are likely to be. In Section 5, we consider some current solutions proposed to address 
some of these issues and consider why they do not really address all the issues. In Section 6, 
we outline our proposed approach to resolve these issues, and in Section 7, we discuss our 
conclusions.
2. Development of the idea
The authors have developed a novel approach to addressing these problems through the 
use of unikernel-based systems, which can offer a lightweight, green and secure approach to 
 solving these challenging issues. Duncan et al. [9] started by outlining a number of issues faced 
and explained how a unikernel-based approach might be used to provide a better  solution. 
Bratterud et al. [10] provide a foundation for the development of formal methods, and to pro-
vide some clarity on the identification and use of good clear definitions in this space.
A unikernel is by default a single threaded, single address space mechanism taking up 
 minimal resources, and [11] look at how the concept of single responsibility might be 
deployed through the use of unikernels in order to reduce complexity, thus reducing the 
attack surface and allowing for a better level of security to be achieved. Given the worrying 
expansion of security exploits in IoT, as exemplified by recent DDoS attacks facilitated by the 
inherent security weaknesses present in IoT architecture, Duncan et al. [12] looked at how the 
Cloud Cyber Security: Finding an Effective Approach with Unikernels
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/67801
33
unikernel approach might be useful when used for IoT and big data applications. Duncan 
and Whittington [13] consider how to develop an immutable database system using existing 
database software, thus providing the basis for a possible solution for one of the major needs 
of the framework.
Unikernels use the concepts of both single address space and single execution flow. A 
 monolithic application could be converted into a single large unikernel, but this would forfeit 
any real benefits to be gained from this architecture. To prevent this, we propose a  framework 
that aids the deconstruction of business processes into multiple connected unikernels. This 
would allow us to develop complex systems, albeit in a much more simple, efficient, secure 
and private way. We must also develop a framework to handle the automated creation 
and shutting down of multiple unikernels, possibly carrying out a multiplicity of different 
functions at the same time. This concept is likely to be far more secure than conventional 
approaches. During runtime, the framework will be responsible for creation, monitoring 
and stopping of different unikernel services. While unikernels themselves do provide good 
 functional service isolation, external monitoring is essential to prevent starvation attacks, 
such as where one unikernel effectively performs a denial-of-service attack by consuming all 
available host resources.
We have identified a number of other areas, which will need further work. We are currently 
working on developing a means to achieve a secure audit trail, a fundamental requirement 
to ensure we can retain as complete a forensic trail as possible, for which we require to 
 understand how to properly configure an immutable database system, capable of  withstanding 
 penetration by an attacker. This work follows on from Ref. [13]. However, in order to run such 
a system, we will need to develop a control system to co-ordinate multiple unikernel instances 
operating in concert. We will also have to develop a proper access control system to ensure 
we can achieve confidentiality of the system and to maintain proper privacy. To help with the 
privacy aspects, we will also require to develop a strong, yet efficient approach to encryption.
In addition, the framework must provide means of input/output for managed unikernels, 
including facilities for communication and data storage.
Communication is both concerned with inter-unikernel communication as well as with  providing 
interfaces for managed unikernels to the outside world. As we foresee a  message-passing infra-
structure, this should provide means for validating passed messages including deep packet 
inspection. This allows for per-unikernel network security policies and further compartmental-
ization, which should minimize the impact of potential security breaches.
In real-world use cases, we require the framework to be capable of handling mutable data, 
such as the ability to record temporary states, logging information or ensuring that  persistent 
application and or user data can be maintained. Unikernels themselves by definition are 
immutable. In order to resolve this conflict, the framework must provide a means to  persist 
and QUERY data in a race-free manner. It may be necessary to provide specialized data 
 storage, depending on the use case. For example, system log and audit trail data require 
 special  treatment to prevent loss of a complete forensic record, thus requiring an append-only 
approach. Since persistent data storage is inherently contrary to our immutable unikernel 
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approach, we do not enforce data storage to be implemented within unikernels. Being prag-
matic, we defer this functionality to the framework, i.e. a means of storage is provided by the 
framework, rather than by the unikernels themselves.
We also believe it may be possible to develop a unikernel-based system to work with the 
serverless paradigm. With those frameworks, source code is directly uploaded to the cloud 
service. Execution is triggered in response to events; resources are automatically scaled. 
Developers do not have any system access except through the programming language and 
provided libraries. We see unikernel and serverless frameworks as two solutions to a very 
similar problem, reducing the administrative overhead and allowing developers to focus their 
energy on application development. Serverless stacks signify the “corporate-cloud” aspect: 
developers upload their code to external services and thus invoke vendor lock-in in the long 
run. Unikernels also allow users to minimize the non-application code, but in contrast to 
serverless architectures, this approach maintains flexibility with regard to hosting. Users can 
provide on-site hosting or move toward third-party cloud offerings. We expect serverless 
architecture providers to utilize unikernels within their own offerings. They are well suited 
to encapsulate the user provided applications and further increase the security of the host’s 
infrastructure.
We are also developing penetration testing approaches, using fuzzing techniques, adapting tools 
and sanitizers, hardening tools and whatever else we can do to strengthen the user environment 
to achieve our aims. The ultimate goal is to make life so difficult for the attacker that they will be 
forced to give up and move on to easier pickings elsewhere. We have also been applying all the 
usual attack methods to our test systems to assess whether our approach will work. This should 
allow us to be sure that each component will be fit for purpose before we move on to the next 
component. In this way, by developing each component of the system to automatically integrate 
with the rest, the system should ultimately become far more robust as a result.
We now have a good idea of how the concept needs to be developed, and what future plans 
are needed to progress the development toward a highly secure and efficient system for cloud 
users. In the next section, we consider what exactly the issues are that we need to address in 
more detail.
3. What are the issues?
The fundamental concepts of information security are confidentiality, integrity, and  availability 
(CIA), which is also true for cloud security. The business environment is constantly chang-
ing [14], as are corporate governance rules and this would clearly imply  changing security 
 measures would be required to keep up to date. More emphasis is now being placed on 
responsibility and accountability [15], social conscience [16], sustainability [17, 18], resilience 
[19] and ethics [20]. Responsibility and accountability are, in effect, mechanisms we can use 
to help achieve all the other security goals. Since social conscience and ethics are very closely
related, we can expand the traditional CIA triad to include sustainability, resilience and  ethics. 
These, then, must be the main goals for information security.
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We now consider a list of ten key management security issues identified in Ref. [1], which 
provide detailed explanations for each of these items on the list. These items represent 
management-related issues, which are often not properly thought through by enterprise 
management.
The 10 key management security issues identified are:
• the definition of security goals,
• compliance with standards
• audit issues,
• management approach,
• technical complexity of cloud,
• lack of responsibility and accountability,
• measurement and monitoring,
• management attitude to security,
• security culture in the company,
• the threat environment.
These are not the only issues to contend with. There are a host of technical issues to address, as 
well as other, less obvious issues, such as social engineering attacks, insider threats ( especially 
dangerous when perpetrated in collaboration with outside parties), state-sponsored attacks, 
advanced persistent threats, hacktivists, professional criminals, and amateurs, some of 
whom can be very talented. There are many known technical weaknesses, particularly in 
web-based systems, but the use of other technology such as mobile access, “bring your own 
device” (BYOD) access, and IoT can all have an adverse impact on the security and privacy 
of  enterprise data.
In spite of what is known about these issues, enterprises often fail to take the appropriate 
action to defend against them, or do not understand how to implement or configure this 
protection properly, leading to further weakness. Staff laziness can be an issue. Failure to 
adhere to company security and privacy policies can also be an issue. Use of passwords, 
which are too simple, is an issue. Simple things, such as the use of yellow stickies can be a 
dangerous weakness when stuck on computer screens, with the user password in full view 
for the world to see.
Lack of training for staff on how to properly follow security procedures can lead to weakness. 
Failure to patch systems can be a serious issue. Poor configuration of complex systems is often 
a major area of weakness. Poor staff understanding of the dangers in email systems presents 
a major weakness for enterprises. Failure to implement simple steps to protect against many 
known security issues presents another problem. Lack of proper monitoring of systems pres-
ents a serious weakness, with many security breaches being notified by third-party outsiders, 
usually long after the breach has occurred.
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We will take a look at some of these technical vulnerabilities next, starting with one of the 
most obvious. Since cloud is enabled through the Internet, and web-based systems play a 
huge role in providing the fundamental building blocks for enterprise systems architecture, it 
makes sense to look at the vulnerabilities inherent in web-based systems.
3.1. Web vulnerabilities
Security breaches have a negative monetary and publicity impact on enterprises, thus are 
seldom publicly reported. This limits the availability of empirical study data on actively 
exploited vulnerabilities. However, web vulnerabilities are well understood, and we can 
source useful information on the risks faced through this medium by using data from the 
work of the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [21], who publish a top 10 list 
of web security vulnerabilities every 3 years.
The OWASP Top 10 report [21] provides a periodic list of exploited web application 
 vulnerabilities, ordered by their prevalence. OWASP focuses on deliberate attacks, each of 
which might be based upon an underlying programming error—for example, an injection 
vulnerability might be the symptom of an underlying buffer overflow programming error. 
OWASP also provides the most comprehensive list of the most dangerous vulnerabilities and 
a number of very good mitigation suggestions. The last three OWASP lists for 2007, 2010 and 
2013 are provided in Table 1.
This list, based on the result of analysis of successful security breaches across the globe, 
seeks to highlight the worst areas of weakness in web-based systems. It is not meant to be 
2013 2010 2007 Threat
A1 A1 A2 Injection attacks
A2 A3 A7 Broken authentication and 
session management
A3 A2 A1 Cross site scripting (XSS)
A4 A4 A4 Insecure direct object 
references
A5 A6 - Security misconfiguration
A6 - - Sensitive data exposure
A7 - - Missing function level 
access control
A8 A5 A5 Cross site request forgery 
(CSRF)
A9 - - Using components with 
known vulnerabilities
A10 - - Unvalidated redirects and 
forwards
Table 1. OWASP top ten web vulnerabilities—2013 to 2007 [21].
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 exhaustive, but instead merely illustrates the worst 10 vulnerabilities in computing systems 
globally. It is clearly concerning that the same vulnerabilities continue to recur year after year, 
which clearly demonstrates the failure of enterprises to adequately protect their resources 
properly.
Thus in any cloud-based system, these vulnerabilities are likely to be present. However, there 
are likely to be additional potential vulnerabilities, which will also need to be considered. 
We group the different vulnerabilities into three classes based on their impact on software 
 development. Low-level vulnerabilities can be solved by applying local defensive measures, 
such as using a library at a vulnerable spot. High-level vulnerabilities cannot be solved by local 
changes, but instead need systematic architectural treatment. The last class of  vulnerability 
is application workflow-specific and cannot be solved automatically but instead depends on 
thoughtful developer intervention.
Two of the top three vulnerabilities, A1 and A3, are directly related to either missing input 
validation or output sanitation. Those issues can be mitigated by consistently utilizing 
 defensive security libraries. Another class of attack that can similarly be solved through a 
“low-level” library approach is A8. By contrast, “high-level” vulnerabilities should be solved 
at an architectural level. Examples of these are A2, A5 and A7. The software architecture 
should provide generic means for user authentication and authorization, and should enforce 
these validations for all operations. Some vulnerability classes, i.e. A4, A6 and A10, directly 
depend on the implemented application logic and are hard to protect against in a generic 
manner. Some other vulnerabilities can be prevented by consistently using security  libraries, 
while other vulnerabilities can be reduced by enforcing architectural decisions during 
 software development.
New software projects are often based upon existing frameworks. Those frameworks  bundle 
both default configuration settings as well as a preselection of libraries providing either 
 features or defensive mechanisms. Software security is mostly regarded as a non-functional 
requirement and thus can be hard to get funding for. Those opinionated frameworks allowed 
software developers to focus on functional requirements while the frameworks took care of 
some security vulnerabilities.
Over the years, those very security frameworks have grown in size and functionality, and 
as they themselves are software products, they can introduce additional security problems 
into otherwise secure application code. For example, while the Ruby on Rails framework, 
properly used, prevents many occurrences of XSS-, SQLi- and CSRF-attacks, recent problems 
with network object serialization introduced remotely exploitable injection attacks [22]. The 
affected serialization capability was not commonly used but was included in every affected 
Ruby on Rails installation. Similar problems have plagued Python and its Django framework 
[23]. All of these are further aggravated as, by design, software frameworks are generic—
they introduce additional software dependencies, which might not be used by the application 
code at all. Their configuration often focuses on developer usability, including an easy debug 
 infrastructure. Unfortunately, from a security perspective, everything that aids debugging 
also aids penetration.
Advances in Security in Computing and Communications38
OWASP acknowledged this problem in its 2013 report by introducing A9. The reason for  adding
a new attack vector class was given as: “the growth and depth of component based  development 
has significantly increased the risk of using known vulnerable components” [21].
Of course, when it comes to the use of IoT with cloud, we need to look beyond basic web vul-
nerabilities. The IoT can also use mobile technology to facilitate data communication, as well 
as a host of inherently insecure hardware, and we look at this in more detail in the next section.
3.2. Some additional IoT vulnerabilities
OWASP now produces a list of the worst 10 vulnerabilities in the use of mobile technology, 
which we show in the list of Table 2.
Of course, it is not quite as simple as that the IoT mechanics extend beyond traditional web 
technology and mobile technology. In 2014, OWASP also developed a provisional top 10 list 
of IoT vulnerabilities, which we outline in Table 3.
An important point to bear in mind is that the above list represents just the OWASP top 10 
vulnerability list. OWASP is currently working on a full list of 130 possible IoT vulnerabilities, 
which should be taken into account. OWASP also provides some very good suggestions on 
how to mitigate these issues.
While the above just covers security issues, we also have to consider the challenges presented 
by privacy issues. With the increase in punitive legislation and regulation surrounding issues 
of privacy, we must necessarily concern ourselves with providing the means to ensure the 
goal of privacy can be achieved. The good news is that if we can achieve a high level of secu-
rity, then it will be much easier to achieve a good level of privacy [9]. Good privacy is heavily 
dependent on having a high level of security. We can have security without privacy, but we 
cannot have privacy without security.
2013 code Threat
M1 Insecure data storage
M2 Weak server side controls
M3 Insufficient transport layer protection
M4 Client side injection
M5 Poor authorization and authentication
M6 Improper session handling
M7 Security decisions via untrusted inputs
M8 Side channel data leakage
M9 Broken cryptography
M10 Sensitive information disclosure
Table 2. OWASP top ten mobile vulnerabilities—2013 [21].
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While the IoT has progressed significantly in recent years, both in terms of market uptake 
and in increased technical capability, it has very much done so at the expense of security and 
privacy. For example, accessing utility companies, including nuclear in the US [25], damage 
caused to German steel mill by hackers [26], drug dispensing machines hacked in US [27], 
plane taken over by security expert mid-air [28], and a hack that switched off smart fridges 
if it detected ice cream [29]. While enterprises often might not care too much about these 
issues, they should. If nothing else, legislators and regulators are unlikely to forget, and will 
be keen to pursue enterprises for security and privacy breaches. In previous years, it was often 
the case that legislators and regulators had little teeth, but consider how punitive fines have 
become in recent years following the banking crisis in 2008. In the UK in 2014, the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) fined a total of £1, 427, 943, 800 [30], during the year, a more than 
40 fold increase on 5 years previously.
As we already stated in Section 1, there are no standards when it comes to components for 
the IoT. This means there is a huge range of different architectures vying for a place in this 
potentially massive market space. Obviously, from a technical standpoint, greater flexibility 
and power can be obtained through good use of virtualization. Virtualization is not new and 
has been around since 1973 [31]. Bearing in mind that dumb sensors do not have enough 
resources or lack hardware support for virtualization (or at least Linux-based virtualization), 
we will have a quick look at some of the most popular hardware in use in this space.
ARM [32] presented the ARM capabilities in 2009. ARM is one of the most used platforms in 
the IoT and has virtualization extensions. Columbia University has developed KVM/ARM, an 
open-source ARM virtualization system [33]. Dall and Nieh [34] have written an article on this 
work for LWN.net and for a conference [35]. Paravirtualization support in ARM Coretex A8 has 
been around since 2006, and ARM Coretex A9 since 2008, with full virtualization since approxi-
mately 2009. Virtualization is also in Linux Kernel 3.8. There are also MMU-less ARMs, although 
it is unlikely that these could be used, unless we were to forfeit the unikernel’s protection.
2014 Code Threat
I1 Insecure web interface
I2 Insufficient authentication/authorization
I3 Insecure network services
I4 Lack of transport encryption
I5 Privacy concerns
I6 Insecure cloud interface
I7 Insecure mobile interface
I8 Insufficient security configure-ability
I9 Insecure software/firmware
I10 Poor physical security
Table 3. OWASP top ten IoT vulnerabilities—2014 [24].
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Many modern smart devices can handle virtualization—devices such as play stations, smart 
automotive systems, smart phones, smart TVs and video boxes. This may not necessarily be 
the case for small embedded components, such as wear-ables, sensors and other IoT compo-
nents. MIPS also supports virtualization [36, 37]. Some Intel Atom processors support vir-
tualization (the atom range is huge). However, the low-power Intel Quark has absolutely 
no support for virtualization. The new open-source RISC-V architecture [38] does support 
virtualization.
Many current IoT systems in use do have the capability to handle virtualization. For exam-
ple, most high-powered NAS systems now have virtualization and application support. 
Thus, we could potentially utilize NAS or other low-powered devices, many of which are 
ARM, MIPS or x86, to aggregate data on-site and then transport the reduced volume of data 
to the cloud.
Right now, we must carefully consider the current state of security and privacy in a massively 
connected world. It is clear that “big brother” is very capable of watching. Not just through 
the use of massive CCTV networks, but also through IoT-enabled devices, which will become 
embedded in every smart city. It is estimated that in smart cities of the future, there will be 
at least 5000 sensors watching as you move through the city at all times. How much personal 
information could leak as you walk? How much of your money could NFC technology in the 
wrong hands steal from you, without you being aware of it happening? Do you trust the cur-
rent technology? We can read about more of these issues in Ref. [39].
3.3. Some basic enterprise vulnerabilities
Of course, there are some additional enterprise vulnerabilities that we also need to take 
into account. These are frequently exploited by the threat environment, and thankfully, 
we have access to some statistics collected by various security breach reports issued by 
many security companies [40–42], which will clearly demonstrate the security and privacy 
problems still faced today, including the fact that the same attacks continue to be  successful 
year on year, as demonstrated by the six-year summary of the Verizon reports shown in 
Table 4. There is no figure provided by Verizon for 2015, as they changed the layout for 
that year.
We have been looking at an extensive range of management and technical issues above. Yet, 
there are some fundamental issues which impact directly on the people in the enterprise, as 
exemplified by the image below in Figure 1.
These attacks have been successfully used for decades, in particular the first three, which also 
happen to be the most devastating. It is no joke to state that in any organization “People are 
the weakest link”, because the first three rely entirely on the inattentiveness and stupidity of 
users to succeed.
Thus, we can see that there are a considerable number of issues, which all enterprises will 
face when considering how to run a system, which can offer both a good level of security 
and privacy. It is necessary to raise awareness of these issues and reasons as to why they are 
important, and so, we take a look at this in the next section.
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4. Why this is important
This question is fairly obvious and easy to answer. Security breaches have a negative mon-
etary and publicity impact on enterprises. In light of the increasing fine levels being applied 
by regulators, particularly in the light of the forthcoming EU General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), which introduces the potential for a massive increase in fine levels, 
enterprises are starting to understand just how much of an impact this will have for them. 
The impact on an enterprise of a breach can be considerable, particularly, as often happens, 
where the breach is identified by third parties. This generally ensures that the impact on 
reputation will be much higher.
Staff often cannot believe that a breach has taken place, and by the time they realize what has 
happened, the smart attackers have eradicated all traces of their incursion into the  system. 
Threat 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016
Hacking 2 1 1 1 1 1
Malware 3 2 2 2 2 2
Misuse by company 
employees
1 4 5 5 5 4
Physical theft or 
unauthorized access
5 3 4 3 4 6
Social engineering 4 5 3 4 3 3
Table 4. Verizon top 5 security breaches—2010 to 2014, 2016 (1 = highest) [40, 43–47].
Figure 1. The most successful people attacks ©2015 Verizon.
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There will be virtually zero forensic evidence, so even bringing in expensive security con-
sultants with highly competent forensic teams will be of little value. Quite apart from the 
possible financial loss to the company from any theft of money or other liquid assets, there 
will be the possibility of huge reputational damage, which can have a serious negative impact 
on their share price. Such enterprises are unlikely to have a decent business continuity plan 
either, which makes recovery even more difficult.
If an enterprise cannot tell how the attackers got in, what data they stole, or compromised, or 
how they got their hands on whatever was removed, it will be very difficult, time  consuming 
and expensive to recover from such an event. Where an enterprise has a robust defen-
sive  strategy implemented, at least in the event of a breach, they will have a better chance 
of  containing the impact of the breach, and a better chance of being able to learn from the 
 evidence left behind.
Another good reason for considering this as an important issue is that it may well be a 
 mandatory legislative or regulatory requirement for the enterprise to maintain such a 
 defensive system. It is clear that legislators and regulators have started to take cyber  security 
far more seriously, and therefore, it is likely that the level of fines levied for breaches will 
continue to rise.
We provide here a few examples to demonstrate how the authorities are starting to get 
tougher:
• In 2016, ASUS was sued by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) [48], because they were 
not providing updates for their insecure routers.
• In January, the FTC started investigations into D-Link [49, 50], “Defendants have failed 
to take reasonable steps to protect their routers and IP cameras from widely known and 
reasonably foreseeable risks of unauthorized access, including by failing to protect against 
flaws which the Open Web Application Security Project has ranked among the most critical 
and widespread web application vulnerabilities since at least 2007”.
• Schneier [51] recently spoke in front of the US House in favor of legal frameworks for IoT 
Security.
• In the EU, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) will come into force in May 2018. 
It will also increase this (monetary) problem for companies with a maximum monetary 
penalty for a single breach of the higher of €10m or 2% of global turnover, and for a more 
serious breach involving multiple failings, the higher of €20m or 4% of global turnover.
Despite the fact that cyber security is often seen as falling into the “Cinderella” category of 
IT expenditure, there is abundant evidence that there are clear benefits to be derived from 
taking this matter seriously. For those who are not entirely convinced by these  arguments, 
there are many security breach companies who compile annual reports showing the 
most successful breaches, providing some insight into the weaknesses that expose these 
 vulnerabilities, and discussing the potential mitigation strategies that might be deployed 
in defense of these attacks. In the next section, we take a look at how current solutions 
approach these issues.
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5. Current solutions
Over recent years, a great many solutions to these problems have been proposed, developed and 
implemented. The early works were generally directed toward conventional corporate distributed 
IT systems. By comparison to the cloud, these are generally well understood and relatively easy 
to resolve, and many companies have enjoyed good levels of protection as a result of these efforts. 
However, cloud changes the rules of the game considerably; because there is often a poor under-
standing of the technical complexities of cloud, and often a  complete lack of understanding that 
the cloud runs on someone else’s hardware and often software too,  resulting in a huge issue from 
lack of proper control. With cloud, the lack of proper and complete security standards [6] also 
presents a major issue, as does the method of implementing compliance with these standards [52].
The other major issue, particularly when cloud is involved, is that implementing partial solu-
tions, while very effective for the specific task in hand, will not offer a complete solution to 
the security problem. There are a great many potential weaknesses involved in cloud systems, 
and without taking a much more comprehensive defensive approach, it will likely prove 
impossible to effectively secure systems against all the threats faced by enterprises.
Any solution, which only addresses partially the overall security of the enterprise, will be 
doomed to failure. The only way to be sure a solution will work, will be to properly  identify 
the risks faced by the organization and provide a complete solution to attempt to mitigate 
those risks, or to accept the particular risks with which the enterprise is comfortable. A 
 fundamental part of this process, which is all too frequently forgotten, is the need to monitor 
what is happening in the enterprise systems after the software solution is installed, not when-
ever compliance time comes around, but day to day on an ongoing basis.
There are two major trends developing in the quest to tackle these issues:
1. preventing security breaches,
2. accepting that security breaches will happen and trying to contain breaches.
Traditionally, perimeter security such as firewalls is utilized to prevent attackers from entering 
the corporate network. The problem with this approach is that this model was well suited to net-
work architectures comprising a few main servers with limited connections between clients and 
servers. However, as soon as the number of connections explodes, this approach can no longer 
cope with the demand. This first occurred with the influx of mobile devices and will again become 
problematic as new Industry 4.0 and IoT devices continue to be implemented and expanded.
We take a look at some of the current solutions available today and will discuss potential 
weaknesses which pertain to them. The following list shows the most common approaches to 
tackle cloud cyber security issues:
• Perimeter security (e.g. firewalls) problems with IoT, etc.
Perimeter Security prevents malicious actors from entering the internal—private—network. 
Traditionally based on network packet inspection at important network connection points, 
e.g., routers, by now it includes endpoints such as client computers or mobile devices;
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• Sandboxes, e.g. for analysis
Sandboxes: traditionally anti-virus software utilized signature-based blacklists. Due to 
newer evasion techniques, e.g., polymorphic payloads, those engines provide insuf-
ficient detection rates. Newer approaches utilize sandboxes, e.g., emulate a real system 
within which the potentially malicious payload is executed and traced. If the payload’s 
behavior seems suspicious, it is quarantined;
• Virtualization
Virtualization solutions allow program execution within virtual machines. As multiple vir-
tual machines can execute on the same physical host, this allows separation of applications 
into separate virtual machines. As those cannot interact, this creates resilience in the face 
of attacks—a successful attack only compromises a single application instead of the whole 
host. Virtualization is also used to implement sandboxes, easy software deployment, etc.;
• Containers
Containers: originally used to simplify software deployments. Newer releases of con-
tainer technologies allow for better isolation between containers. This solves similar 
problems as virtual machines while improving memory efficiency;
• Software development: secure lifecycles (testing, etc.)
Software Development: recently security engineering has become a standard part of soft-
ware development approaches, e.g., Microsoft Secure Development Life-cycle. Mostly, 
this focuses on early security analysis of potential flaws and attacks and subsequent 
verification of implemented mitigations;
• Software development: new “safe” languages
New Programming Languages: as programs are implemented within a given program-
ming language, their security features are very important for the security of the final 
software product. A good example are common memory errors in programs written 
in C-based programming languages. Recently, a new generation of programming lan-
guages aim to provide both performance and safety—examples of those are Rust, Go or 
Swift. Rust has seen uptake by the Mozilla community and is being used as part of the 
next-generation JavaScript engine. Go is used for systems programming and has been 
adopted by many virtualization management and container management solutions;
• Software development: hardening (i.e., fuzzing)
Fuzzing: new tooling allows for easy fuzzing of application or operation system code. 
Automated appliance of this attack technique has yielded multiple high-level memory 
corruption errors recently;
• Software development: hardening (i.e., libraries)
Hardened Libraries and Compilers: recent processors provide hardware support for 
memory protection techniques. Newer compilers allow for automatic and transparent 
usage of those hardware features—on older architectures, similar features can be imple-
mented in software yielding slightly lower security and performance;
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• Architecture: (micro)services
Microservice Architectures encapsulate a single functionality within a microservice that 
can be accessed through standardized network protocols. If implemented correctly, 
each service contains minimal state and little deep interaction with external services. 
This implicitly implements the Separation of Concern principle and thus helps security 
by containing potential malicious actors.
The serverless paradigm is also gaining some traction and examples for this software stack 
can be seen in Table 5.
Another recent security battleground is the IoT. Recent examples are the 1Tbps attack against 
“Krebs on Security” or the 1.2Tbps DDoS attack taking out Dyn in October 2016 [53]. While 
the generic security landscape is already complex, IoT adds additional problems such as 
hard device capability restrictions, manifold communication paths and very limited means of 
updating already deployed systems. In addition, software is often an after-thought; for exam-
ple, for usage within power-grids, all hardware must be certified with regard to their primary 
focus (i.e. power distribution). All later alterations, such as security-critical software updates, 
would void the certification and thus produce substantial costs for the device manufacturer. 
This leads to a situation where security updates are scarce in the best scenario. Unikernels 
can improve upon the current situation [12] on both the device as well as at the cloud-level. 
It should be understood that device level means on the local sensors/actors (problems with 
security and updates) and cloud level is for scale-out of backend processing of data generated 
by IoT devices.
6. Proposed solutions
The most interesting aspect of unikernels from a security point of view is their inherent 
 minimalism. For the purpose of this chapter, we define unikernels as:
• a minimal execution environment for a service,
• providing resource isolation between those services,
• offering no data manipulation on persistent state within the unikernel, i.e. the unikernel 
image is immutable,
Product Supported languages
Amazon Lambda Java, Node.js, Python
Google Cloud Functions Node.js
IBM BlueMix Languages supported by CloudFountry, e.g. Java, Node.
js, Go, C#, PHP, Python, Ruby
Microsoft Azure Functions C#, F#, Node.js, Python, PHP
Table 5. Example of serverless offerings ©2016 Happe, Duncan and Bratterud.
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• being the synthesis of an operating system and the user application,
• only offering a single execution flow within the unikernels, i.e. no multitasking is performed.
The unikernel approach yields an architecture that implicitly follows best software  architecture 
practices, e.g. through the combination of minimalism and single execution flow, the  separation 
of concern principle is automatically applied. This allows for better isolation between concur-
rent unikernels.
It is absolutely necessary to recognize the magnitude of the dangers posed by the threat 
 environment. Enterprises are bound by legislation, sometimes regulation, the need to  comply 
with standards, industry best practice, and are accountable for their actions. Criminals have 
no such constraints. They are completely free to bend every rule in the book, do whatever they 
want, manipulate, cajole, hack or whatever it takes to get to the money. They are  constantly 
probing for the slightest weakness, which they are more than happy to exploit without 
mercy. It is clear that the threat environment is developing just as quickly as the technological 
changes faced by the industry [6, 54, 55]. We need to be aware of this threat and minimize the 
possible impact on our framework. While we have absolutely no control over attackers, we 
can help reduce the impact by removing as many of the “classic attack vectors” as possible, 
thus making their life far more difficult. The more difficult it becomes for them to get into the 
system, the more likely they will be to go and attack someone else’s system.
In the interests of usability, many more ports are open by default than are needed to run a 
system. An open port, especially one which is not needed (and therefore not monitored) is 
another route in for the attacker. We also take the view that the probability of  vulnerabilities 
being present in a system increases proportionally to the amount of executable code it  contains. 
Having less executable code inside a given system will reduce the chances of a breach and 
also reduce the number of tools available for an attacker once inside. As Meireles [56] said 
in 2007 “… while you can sometimes attack what you can’t see, you can’t attack what is not 
there!”. We address these issues by making the insides of the virtual machine simpler. We 
also propose to tackle the audit issue by making configuration happen at build time [57, 58], 
and then making services be “immutable” after deployment, making “configuration lapses” 
(i.e. through conflicts caused by unnecessary updates to background services etc.) unlikely.
Bearing in mind the success with which the threat environment continually attacks business 
globally, it is clear that many enterprises are falling down on many of the key issues we have 
highlighted in Section 3. It is also clear that a sophisticated and complex solution is unlikely 
to work. Thus, we must approach the problem from a more simple perspective.
6.1. Unikernel impact on efficiency
Cloud achieves maximum utilization and high energy efficiency through consolidating 
 processing power within data centers. Multiple applications run on the same computing 
node, but often control on node placement or on concurrently running applications are not 
possible. This means for security, isolation between different applications, users, or services, 
is critical. A popular but inefficient solution is to place each application or service within a 
 virtual machine [59]. This is very similar to the initial usage of virtualization within  host-based 
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 systems; Madnick gives a good overview of the impact of virtualization in Ref. [60]. Containers 
could present a more efficient approach [61], but as they were originally developed to improve 
deployment, their security benefits are still open to debate [62].
A useful benefit of the applied minimalism is a reduced memory footprint [63, 64] plus a quick 
start-up time for unikernel-based systems. Madhavapeddy et al. utilize this for  on-demand 
spin-up of new virtual images [65], allowing for higher resource utilization, leading to 
improved energy efficiency.
6.2. Unikernel impact on security
The most intriguing aspect of unikernels from a security perspective is their capability as a 
minimal execution environment. We can now define the attack surface of a system as:
Definition 6.1 attack surface. The amount of bytes within a virtual machine [10].
When it comes to microcode, firmware and otherwise mutable hardware such as field- 
programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), physical protection can be seen as a gray area. This 
definition is intentionally kept general in order to allow further specifications to refine the 
meaning of “physically available” for a given context. The following example can serve to 
illustrate how the definition can be used for one of many purposes.
Building a classic VM using Linux implies simply installing Linux and then installing the 
 software on top. Any reduction in attack surface must be done by removing unneeded 
 software and kernel modules (e.g. drivers). Take TinyCore Linux as an example of a minimal 
Linux distribution and assume that it can produce a machine image of 24MB in size.
During the build of a unikernel, minimization is performed, meaning the resulting system 
image only includes the minimum required software dependencies. This implies that no 
 binaries, shell or unused libraries are included within the unikernel image. Even unused 
parts of libraries should never be included within the image. This radically reduces included 
 functionality and thus the attack surface. In addition, this can loosen the need for updates after 
vulnerabilities have been discovered in included third-party components—if the  vulnerable 
function was not included within the set of used functions, an update can be moot.
The situation after a security breach with unikernels is vastly different to traditional  systems. 
Assuming that the attacker is able to exploit a vulnerability, e.g. buffer overflow, he gains 
access to the unikernel system’s memory. Due to having no binaries and only reduced 
 libraries, writing shell code [66], a machine code that is used as a payload during  vulnerability 
 execution will not work. Common payloads spawn command shells or abuse existing  libraries 
to give attackers access through unintended possibilities, which is complicated. Pivot attacks 
depending on shell-access are thwarted. But, all direct attacks against the application, e.g. 
data extraction due to insecure application logic, are still possible. A good example of this is 
the recent OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability [67]. A unikernel utilizing OpenSSL would also 
be vulnerable to this, thus allowing an attacker to access its system memory, including the 
private SSL key. We argue that functionality should be split between multiple unikernels to 
further compartmentalize breaches.
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Next-generation hardware-supported memory protection techniques can benefit from mini-
malism. For example, the Intel Secure Guard Extensions [68, 69] allow for protected mem-
ory enclaves. Accessing these directly is prohibited and protected through specialized CPU 
instructions. The protection is enforced by hardware, so even the hypervisor can be prevented 
from accessing protected memory. Rutkowska has shown [70] that deploying this protection 
scheme for applications has severe implications. Just protecting the application executable 
is insufficient, as attacks can inject or extract code within linked libraries. This leads us to 
conclude that the whole application including its dependencies must be part of the secure-
memory enclave. Simplicity leads to a “one virtual machine per application” model, which 
unikernels inherently support. We propose that unikernels are a perfect fit for usage with 
those advanced memory protection techniques.
Returning to the theme of “software development frameworks providing sensible defaults but 
­getting­bloated,­ and­ thus­vulnerable­ over­ time”, unikernels provide an elegant solution; while 
the  framework should include generic defensive measures, the resulting unikernel will, by 
 definition, only include utilized parts, thus reducing the attack surface.
6.3. Service isolation
A fundamental premise for cloud computing is the ability to share hardware. In private cloud 
systems, hardware resources are shared across a potentially large organization, while on 
 public clouds, hardware is shared globally across multiple tenants. In both cases, isolating 
one service from the other is an absolute requirement.
The simplest mechanism to provide service isolation is process isolation in classic kernels,  relying 
on hardware supported virtual memory, e.g. provided by the now pervasive x86  protected 
mode. This has been used successfully in mainframe setups for decades, but access to termi-
nals with limited user privileges has also been the context for classic attack vectors such as 
stack smashing, root-kits, etc., the main problem being that a single kernel is being shared 
between several processes and that gaining root access from one terminal would give access 
to everything inside the system. Consequently, much work was done in the 1960s and 1970s to 
find ways to completely isolate a service without sharing a kernel. This work culminated in the 
seminal 1974 paper by Popek and Goldberg [71], where they present a formal model describ-
ing the requirements for complete instruction level virtualization, i.e. hardware­virtualization.
Hardware virtualization was in wide use on e.g. IBM mainframes since that time, but it was 
not until 2005 that the leading commodity CPU manufacturers, Intel and AMD introduced 
these facilities into their chips. Meantime, paravirtualization had been reintroduced as a 
workaround to get virtual machines to run on these architectures, notably in Ref. [72]. While 
widely deployed and depended upon, the Xen project has recently evolved its paravirtualiza-
tion interface toward using hardware virtualization in, e.g., PVH [73], stating that “PVH means 
less­code­and­fewer­Interfaces­in­Linux/FreeBSD:­consequently­it­has­a­smaller­Trusted­Computing­
Base­(TCB)­and­attack­surface,­and­thus­fewer­possible­exploits” [74].
Yet another mechanism used for isolation is operating system-level virtualization with 
 containers, e.g. Linux Containers (LXC) popularized in recent years by Docker, where each 
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 container represents a userspace operating environment for services that all share a kernel.
The isolation mechanism for this is classic process isolation, augmented with software controls 
such as cgroups and Linux namespaces. Containers do offer less overhead than classic vir-
tual machines. An example where containers makes a lot of sense would be trusted in-house 
clouds, e.g. Google is using containers internally for most purposes [75]. We take the position 
that hardware virtualization is the simplest and most complete mechanism for service isola-
tion with the best understood foundations, as formally described by Popek and Goldberg, 
and that this should be the preferred isolation mechanism for secure cloud computing.
6.4. Microservices architecture and immutable infrastructure.
Microservices is a relatively new term founded on the idea of separating a system into several 
individual and fully disjoint services, rather than continuously adding features and capabili-
ties to an ever growing monolithic program. Being single threaded by default, unikernels natu-
rally imply this kind of architecture; any need for scaling up beyond the capabilities of a single 
CPU should be done by spawning new instances. While classic VMs require a lot of resources 
and impose a lot of overhead, minimal virtual machines are very lightweight. As demonstrated 
in Ref. [76], more than 100,000 instances could be booted on a single physical server and Ref. 
[58] showed that each virtual machine including the surrounding process requires much less 
memory than a single “Hello World” Java program running directly on the host.
An important feature of unikernels in the context of microservices is that each unikernel VM 
is fully self contained. This also makes them immune to breaches in other parts of the service 
composition, increasing the resilience of the system as a whole. Adding to this, the idea of 
optimal mutability (defined below) and each unikernel-based can in turn be as immutable as is 
physically possible on a given platform. In the next paper in this series, we will expand upon 
these ideas and take the position that composing a service out of several microservices, each 
as immutable as possible, enables overall system architects and decision makers to focus on 
a high-level view of service composition, not having to worry too much about the security of 
their constituent parts. We take the view that this kind of separation of concerns is necessary 
in order to achieve scalable yet secure cloud services.
6.5. No shell by default and the impact on debugging and forensics
One feature of unikernels that immediately makes it seem very different from classic operat-
ing systems is the lack of a command line interface. This is, however, a direct consequence of 
the fact that classic POSIX-like CLIs are run as a separate process (e.g. bash) with the main 
purpose of starting other processes. Critics might argue that this makes unikernels harder to 
manage and “debug”, as one cannot “log in and see what’s happened” after an incident, as is 
the norm for system administrators. We take the position that this line of argument is vacu-
ous; running a unikernel rather corresponds to running a single process with better isolation, 
and in principle, there is no more need to log in to a unikernel than there is to log in to, e.g., a 
web server process running in a classic operating system.
It is worth noting that while unikernels by definition are a single-address-space virtual 
machine, with no concept of classic processes, a read-eval-print loop (REPL) interface can 
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 easily be provided (e.g. IncludeOS does provide an example)—the commands just would not 
start processes, but rather call functions inside the program. From a security perspective, we 
take the view that this kind of ad-hoc access to program objects should be avoided. While sym-
bols are very useful for providing a stack trace after a crash or for performance profiling, strip-
ping out symbols pointing to program objects inside a unikernel would make it much harder 
for an attacker to find and execute functions for malicious and unintended purposes. Our 
recommendation is that this should be the default mode for unikernels in production mode.
We take the view that logging is of critical importance for all systems, in order to provide 
a proper audit trail. Unikernels, however, simply need to provide the logs through other 
means, such as over a virtual serial port or ideally over a secure networking connection to a 
trusted audit trail store.
Many UNIX period system administrators will require some mental readjustment due to the 
lack of shell access. On the other hand, the growing DevOps movement [77] abolishes the 
traditional separation into software development and system administration but places high 
importance on the communication between and integration of those two areas. Unikernels 
offer an elegant deployment alternative. The minimized operating system implicitly moves 
system debugging to application developers. Instead of analyzing errors through shell 
 commands, developers can utilize debuggers to analyze the whole system, which might be 
beneficial for full-stack engineering.
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that unikernels in principle have full control over a  contiguous 
range of memory. Combined with the fact that a crashed VM by default will “stay alive” as 
a process from the VMM perspective and not be terminated, this means that in principle the 
memory contents of a unikernel could be accessed and inspected from the VMM after the fact, 
if desired. Placing the audit trail logs in a contiguous range of memory could then make it 
possible to extract those logs also after a failure in the network connection or other I/O device 
normally used for transmitting the data. Note that this kind of inspection requires complete 
trust between the owner of the VM and the VMM (e.g. the cloud tenant and cloud provider). 
Our recommendation would be not to rely on this kind of functionality in public clouds, 
unless all sensitive data inside the VM is encrypted and can be extracted and sent to the tenant 
without decrypting it.
6.6. Why use unikernels for the IoT?
Why use unikernels for the IoT [78]? Unikernels are uniquely suited to benefit all areas 
( sensor, middleman and servers) within the IoT chain. They allow for unified development 
utilizing the same software infrastructure for all layers. This may sound petty, but who would 
have thought JavaScript could be used on servers (think node.js) a couple of years ago?
Using hardware virtualization as the preferred isolation mechanism, we take the view that 
there are three basic approaches we can use to deliver our requirements, namely the  monolithic 
system/kernel approach, the microkernel approach and the unikernel approach. IaaS cloud 
providers will typically offer virtual machine images running Microsoft Windows or one or 
more flavors of Linux, possibly optimized for cloud by, e.g., removing device  drivers that are 
not needed. While specialized Linux distributions can greatly reduce the memory footprint 
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and attack surface of a virtual machine, these are general purpose multi-process operating 
systems and will by design contain a large amount of functionality that is simply not needed 
by one single service. We take the position that virtual machines should be specialized to a 
high degree, each forming a single purpose microservice, to facilitate a resilient and fault 
 tolerant system architecture which is also highly scalable.
In Ref. [11], we discuss six security observations about various unikernel operating systems: 
choice of service isolation mechanism; use of a single address space, shared between  service and 
kernel; no shell by default and the impact on debugging and forensics; the concept of reduced 
attack surface; and microservices architecture and immutable infrastructure. We argue that the 
unikernel approach offers the potential to meet all our needs, while delivering a much reduced 
attack surface, yet providing exactly the performance we require. An added bonus will be the 
reduced operating footprint, meaning a more green approach is delivered at the same time.
6.7. For IoT on the client
Unikernels are a kind of virtualization and offer all of its benefits. They provide application 
developers with a unified interface to diverse hardware platforms, allowing them to focus 
on application development. They provide the ability to mask changes of the underlying 
 hardware platform behind the hypervisor, allowing for application code to be reused between 
different hardware revisions. Also, disparate groups within an enterprise often perform 
 system and application development. Use of a unikernel decouples both groups, allowing 
development in parallel. Application developers can use a virtualized testing environment on 
their workstations during development, which will mirror the same environment within the 
production environment.
Unikernels can certainly produce leaner virtual machines compared to traditional  virtualization 
solutions. This results in a much reduced attack surface, which creates  applications that 
are more secure. Use of a resource efficient unikernel, such as IncludeOS, minimizes the 
 computational and memory overhead that otherwise would prevent  virtualization from 
being used. The small memory and processing overhead enables the use of virtualization on 
low-powered IoT devices and also aids higher capacity devices. Lower resource utilization 
allows for either better utilization (i.e. running more services on the same hardware) or higher 
usage of low power modes, reducing energy consumption, both of which increase the sustain-
ability of IoT deployments.
A feature in high demand by embedded systems is atomic updates. A system supporting 
atomic updates either installs a system update or reverts back to a known working system 
state. For example, Google’s Chrome OS [79] achieves this by using two system partitions. A 
new system upgrade is installed on the currently unused partition. On next boot, the newly 
installed system is now used, but the old system is preselected as a backup boot option if this 
boot does not work. If the new system boots, the new system becomes the new default operat-
ing system and the (now) old partition will be used for the next system upgrade.
This delivers high resilience in the face of potentially disrupting Chrome OS updates. A simi-
lar scheme is set to be introduced for the forthcoming Android Version 7. This scheme would 
be greatly aided by unikernels, as they already provide a clear separation of data and control 
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logic. A system upgrade would therefore start a new unikernel and forward new requests to 
it. If the underlying hypervisor has to be upgraded, likely a very rare event, the whole system 
might incorporate the dual boot-partition approach.
6.8. For IoT on the server
Taking account of the large estimated number of IoT devices to be deployed in the near future, 
computational demand on the cloud can be immense. While IoT amplifies the amount of 
incoming traffic, it has some characteristics that should favor unikernel-like architectures.
Our envisioned unikernels utilize a non-mutable state and are event-based. This allows sim-
plified scale-out, i.e. it allows for dynamically starting more unikernels if incoming requests 
demand it. We believe that many processing steps during an IoT dataflow’s lifetime will be 
parallelizable, e.g. data collected from one household will not interact with data gathered by 
a different household from another continent during the initial processing steps, or possibly 
never at all. Since they do not interact, there is no chance of side effects, thus the incoming 
data can instantly be processed by a newly spawned unikernel.
Two recent trends in cloud computing are cloudlets and fog computing. The first describes 
a small-scale data center located near the Internet’s edge, i.e. co-located near many sensors 
and acting as the upstream collection point for the incoming IoT sensors, while the second 
describes the overall technique of placing storage or computational capabilities near the net-
work edges. A unified execution environment is needed to allow easy use of this paradigm. 
When the same environment is employed, application code can easily be moved from the 
cloud toward the networks’ edge, i.e. into the cloudlets. Unikernels offer closure over the 
application’s code, so the same unikernel can be re-deployed at a cloudlet or within a central 
data center.
The unikernel itself might place requirements on external facilities such as storage, which 
would need to be provided by the current execution environment. A consumer-grade version 
of this trend can already be seen in many high-powered NAS devices, which allow for local 
deployment of virtual machines or containers. This moves functionality from the cloud to a 
smallest-scale local processing environment. A good use case for this would be Smart Homes; 
here, a local NAS can perform most of the computations and then forward the compressed 
data toward a central data center. Also, this local preprocessing can apply various crypto-
graphic processes to improve the uploaded data’s integrity or confidentiality.
7. Conclusions
We have taken a good hard look at cyber security in the cloud, and in particular, we have 
considered the security implications of the exciting new paradigm of the IoT. While the 
 possibilities are indeed exciting, the consequences of getting it wrong are likely to be cata-
strophic. We cannot afford to carry blindly on. Instead, we must recognize that if the issues we 
have outlined on security and privacy are not tackled properly, and soon, we will all be sleep-
walking into a disaster. However, if we realize that we need to take some appropriate actions 
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now, then we will be much better placed to feel comfortable in living in an IoT world. There 
are considerable potential benefits for everyone to be offered from using our unikernel-based 
approach. While we see security and confidentiality of data as paramount—and given the 
forthcoming EU’s GDPA, we believe the EU agrees. Security and privacy do not directly trans-
late into a direct monetary benefit for companies and thus are seldom given enough incentive 
for change to allow serious improvement to gain traction. To better convince enterprises, we 
offer the added benefit of increased developer efficiency. Experienced and talented developer 
resources are scarce at hand, so making the most of them is in an enterprise’s best interest. The 
broad application of a virtualization solution allows them to better reuse existing knowledge 
and tools, as developers gain a virtual long-term environment that they can work in.
Virtualization in combination with the special state-less nature of many unikernels provides 
a solution for short-term processing spikes. Processing can be scaled-out to in-company or 
public clouds by deploying unikernels as they do not require external dependencies and as 
they do not contain state, deployments are simplified. After their usage, they can be discarded 
(no state also means that no compromising information is stored at the cloud provider). In 
the case of sensitive information, special means, e.g. homomorphic encryption or verifiable 
computing technologies need to be employed to protect data integrity or confidentiality.
Unikernels offer a high energy efficiency. This allows companies to claim higher sustainability 
for their solutions while reducing their energy costs. We view our proposed solution as tak-
ing a smart approach to solving smart technology issues. It does not have to be exorbitantly 
expensive to do what we need, but by taking a simple approach, sensibly applied, we can all 
have much better faith in the consequences of using this technology (as well as having the 
comfort of being able to walk through a smart city without having our bank account emptied).
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Abstract
Security threat landscape has transformed drastically over a period of time. Right from 
viruses, trojans and Denial of Service (DoS) to the newborn malicious family of ran‐
somware, phishing, distributed DoS, and so on, there is no stoppage. The phenomenal 
transformation has led the attackers to have a new strategy born in their attack vector 
methodology making it more targeted—a direct aim towards the weakest link in the 
security chain aka humans. When we talk about humans, the first thing that comes to an 
attacker's mind is applications. Traditional signature‐based techniques are inadequate 
for rising attacks and threats that are evolving in the application layer. They serve as 
good defences for protecting the organisations from perimeter and endpoint‐driven 
attacks, but what needs to be focused and analysed is right at the application layer where 
such defences fail. Protecting web applications has its unique challenges in identifying 
malicious user behavioural patterns being converted into a compromise. Thus, there is 
a need to look at a dynamic and signature‐independent model of identifying such mali‐
cious usage patterns within applications. In this chapter, the authors have explained on 
the technical aspects of integrating machine learning within applications in detecting 
malicious user behavioural pattern.
Keywords: machine learning, cybersecurity, signature‐driven solutions, application 
security, pattern‐driven analytical solutions
1. Introduction
Cybersecurity, a niche domain is likely to be compared in parallel to a cat and mouse game 
where sometime the offensive team (attacker/hacker) has an advantage and sometime the 
defensive team (cyber sec personnel). This never settling game has changed drastically over 
a period of time having born to various attack vectors targeting humans or what is largely 
known as the weakest link in the security chain.
© 2017 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Over the years, Information Technology (IT) has witnessed a massive paradigm shift. Initially, 
it was about mainframes, client‐server model, closed group of systems, and the attacks were 
very limited and focused towards these only. Down the line of time, the former has been 
transformed completely into the web‐based layer, clouds, virtualisation, and so on, thus add‐
ing greater complexity in the whole development‐deployment architecture—of applications 
and infrastructure—thus making the attack surface further difficult for the hackers. What has 
remained constant is the human factor and the same is being exploited in large to circumvent 
the protection mechanisms which are in place.
Traditional signature‐based solutions are functioning great in preventing against known 
attacks, but the paradigm shift of the technologies is making the signature‐based systems 
inadequate against the newborn attacks and malicious exploits. Thus, the need of the hour is 
to implement which is a dynamic and signature—less thus evolved machine learning (ML).
Machine learning is not a new domain or technology. It has been in use in other areas since 
the 1950s. The missing link is the intersection of cybersecurity and machine learning. One of 
the best examples of early use of machine learning in security is the case of spam detection.
In this chapter, we cover how cybersecurity has evolved over a period of time and how attacks 
have become more tactical and sophisticated. We also talk about what is machine learning 
and its associated components. In this part, we cover how combination of machine learning 
and security adds value to an organisation. Later on, we focus on the application layer and 
web applications in specifics. And, finally, we talk about focusing on merging machine learning 
and applications to provide a pattern‐based analytics of security within applications.
The second section covers in detail how cybersecurity has evolved over a period of time and 
how attacks have become more tactical and sophisticated. Section 3 focuses on the application 
layer and web applications in specifics. It will also cover how web applications have grown 
over time and the threats associated with them. Section 4 talks about what is machine learning 
and its associated components. This section, in addition, will also cover how combination of 
machine learning and security adds value to an organisation.
Section 5 targets on the merger of machine learning and application to provide a pattern‐
based analytics layer of security within applications.
2. Evolution of cybersecurity
By definition, Cybersecurity can be defined as ‘the body of technologies, processes and prac‐
tices designed to protect networks, computers, programs and data from attack, damage or 
unauthorised access’. One of the most challenging elements of cybersecurity is the quickly 
and constantly evolving nature of security risks. Adam Vincent pronounces the problem [1]:
‘The threat is advancing quicker than we can keep up with it. The threat changes faster than our idea 
of the risk. It’s no longer possible to write a large white paper about the risk to a particular system. You 
would be rewriting the white paper constantly.’
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Initially cybersecurity used to be relatively simple. The enterprise network comprised of 
mainframes, client‐server model, closed group of systems and the attacks were very limited 
with viruses, worms and Trojan horses being the major cyber threats. The focus was more 
towards malwares such as virus, worms and trojans with purpose of causing damage to the 
systems. It started with virus which needed to be executed in order to cause a malfunction or 
damage to the system. As this was something where manual intervention was required for 
propagation, a new type of malware came into existence, that is, ‘Worm’ similar to virus but 
with self‐replicating feature, that is, they do not require a human intervention or a program to 
execute. These cyber threats randomly targeted computers directly connected to the Internet 
but posed little threat. Within the enterprise networks with firewalls on the perimeter and 
antivirus protection on the inside, the enterprise appeared to be protected and relatively safe. 
Occasionally an incident would occur and security teams would fight it.
The initial attacking methodology was attacking the infrastructure. This involved the traditional 
approach of compromising the systems by getting inside the network though loopholes such as 
open ports, unknown services, and exploiting system‐related vulnerabilities in the infrastruc‐
ture. At this time, the offensive teams started to recognise and closed these gaps as much as 
possible, reducing the attack surface. Over a period of time, as the infrastructure changed, the 
former has been transformed completely into the web applications, web‐based layer, clouds, 
virtualisation, mobility, and so on, thus adding greater complexity in the whole development, 
deployment architecture of applications and infrastructure and changing the attack surface 
further as shown in Figure 1. Attackers started getting inside the enterprise networks, and 
once they were inside they operated in stealthy mode. By attaining access, they controlled the 
Figure 1. Cybersecurity attacks evolution over time.
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infected machines and managed them through command and control systems (C&C servers).
Vulnerable systems were exploited within the enterprise for lateral movement among comput‐
ers on the network, capturing user credentials and other critical information of more and more 
users within the organisation. The final nail in the coffin was privilege escalation, art to gaining 
elevated access to the machine, get control of the systems administrator accounts in charge of 
everything. Once these attackers got administrative control of the enterprise, they were able to 
do anything they wanted. It was like ‘Keys to the Kingdom’.
Similarly, to the cat and mouse game or as we have seen in Tom and Jerry, to overcome each 
other as they used to change the tactics, the very same applies when we talk about attackers 
versus defenders in cyber space. Attackers take the advantage of zero‐day exploits, vulner‐
abilities, and so on to compromise the systems, whereas defenders use secure mechanism 
such as hardening, patching, segmentation and other security controls to reduce the surface 
attack. This way the enterprise is locked down up to a certain extent, thus reducing the attack 
surface. For the attackers with less threat surface to attack due to the lock down, the only pos‐
sibility seen by them towards a breach lies in web application.
2.1. Why web applications are vulnerable?
Before we begin, let us have a basic understanding of web applications. A web application 
or web app is a software application in which the client (or user interface) runs in a browser. 
Common web applications include webmail, online retail sales, online auctions, wikis, instant 
messaging services and many other functions [2]. For organisations, whether they are a pri‐
vate entity or government, to conduct business online, it has to provide services to the outside 
world. Over a period or so, the web has been embraced by millions of businesses as an inex‐
pensive medium to communicate and exchange information with customers [3]. Therefore, 
they are vital to businesses for expanding their online presence, thus fashioning long‐term 
and beneficial relationships with customers. There is no doubt in saying that web applica‐
tions have become such a universal phenomenon over a period of time. Web applications are 
convoluted and multifarious in nature, and due to this behavior, they are widely mysterious 
and completely misinterpreted [3].
Regardless of the advantages, web applications do raise a number of security concerns. Severe 
weaknesses or vulnerabilities allow hackers to gain direct and public access to databases in 
order to extract sensitive data. Many of these databases contain critical information (personal, 
official, financial details, etc.) making them a frequent target of hackers. Although defacing 
corporate websites are still commonplace, nowadays, hackers prefer gaining access to the sen‐
sitive data residing on the database server because of the immense pay‐offs in selling the data.
The greater complexity, including the web application code and underlying business logic, 
and their potential as a vector to sensitive data in storage, or in process, makes web applica‐
tion servers an obvious target for attackers [12].
In Figure 2, it is easy to see how a hacker can quickly access the data on the database through 
creativity and negligence or human error, leading to vulnerabilities in the web applications.
As mentioned, websites use databases to store and fetch the required information to the users. 
If a web application is vulnerable, that is, it can be exploited by the attackers, then the database 
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associated with the web application is at serious risk, as it contains all the critical information 
that the attackers are looking for. Recent research shows that 75% of cyberattacks are done at 
web application level [3].
Web application vulnerabilities have drastically increased over the past few years, as 
companies demand faster web application releases to fulfil the end‐user requirements. 
Vulnerabilities associated with web applications are risky for organisations as they endan‐
ger not only brand and reputational damage but also loss of data, legal action and financial 
penalties associated with these incidents. The outcomes continue to confirm the majority 
understanding that the web application vector is a foremost and less protected path for 
attackers [11].
Web application scene is altering continuously over time. Evolution of web layer has enhanced 
rich experiences and functionalities directly within/from the browser. As a result of this flex‐
ibility and scalability that web applications provide, web applications and web services are rap‐
idly replacing the legacy applications, and, as a result, broadening the surface attack which 
increases attacker's chances of exploitation, primarily since traditional network layer security 
controls such as firewalls and signature‐based intrusion prevention and detection systems (IPS/
IDS) have little or no role to play in detecting and preventing an attack occurring via the web 
application.
2.2. Cybersecurity attacks
In the past few years, the trend has played out in more and more breaches hitting the head‐
lines. Some of the cyberattacks that shock the IT world include the following:
• RSA SecurID breach: Year 2011 [4]
In 2011, RSA's enterprise was breached and the security keys for many of its customers 
were believed to have been stolen. This breach prompted RSA to replace millions of its 
SecurID tokens to restore security for its customers.
Figure 2. How an attacker exploits a web application.
Machine Learning in Application Security
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.68796
65
• Columbian Independence Day Attack: Year 2013
In 2013, a large‐scale cyberattack held on 20 July—Columbian Independence Day—
against 30 Colombian government websites. As the most successful single‐day cyberat‐
tack against a government, most websites were either defaced or shut down completely 
for the entire day of the attack. Attacks included both web and network vectors includ‐
ing web application and network Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. [5]
• eBay Data Breach: Year 2014 [6]
eBay went down in a blaze of embarrassment as it suffered this year's biggest hack so far. 
In May 2014, eBay revealed that hackers had managed to steal personal records of 233 
million users.
• Sony Picture Entertainment: Year 2014 [7]
On 25 November 2014, something new happened in the history of data theft activity. A 
group calling itself GOP or The Guardians of Peace hacked into Sony Pictures, causing 
severe damage to the network for days and leaked confidential data. The data included 
personal information about employees and their families, e‐mails and copies of then‐
unreleased Sony films and other information.
• Dyn Cyber Attack: Year 2016 [9]
The largest cyberattack in recorded history happened on 21 October 2016, causing tem‐
porary shutdown of websites such as Twitter, Netflix, Airbnb, Reddit and SoundCloud. 
The threefold hack caused mass Internet outage for large parts of the USA and Europe.
These incidents are a few of the numerous cybersecurity breaches and attacks that have occurred 
over the past few years [8]. The trend indicates that the attacks are more towards personal iden‐
tities, financial accounts and healthcare information and getting such information on millions 
or tens of millions of people. Looking at the trend here, these types of cyberattacks are moving 
down market over time. In simple terms, the techniques that nation states were using few years 
back are being used by cyber criminals currently [10]. In the real‐world scenario, we have to 
expect that these types of less known attacks will become more public in the near future as 
exploits and techniques will surge and become available to larger communities. These types of 
threats may be affecting a small group of organisations at a given time, but progressively they 
will become more common. Organisations have to be regularly evolving their defences [10].
2.3. Web application threat trend
As per Verizon's [12] recently released Data Breach Investigation Report (DBIR) for 2016 
which is constructed on real‐world investigations and security incidents:
1. When we compared this year's data to last year's data, the total number of attacks this year 
was significantly higher than last year (see below).
2. Conventional web attacks rose by 200 and 150%, respectively, continuing the trend from last
year, with larger numbers and larger volumes of scanning campaigns across the Internet.
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3. The volume and persistency of attacks indicate industrialisation of and automation behind 
organised efforts.
4. Ninety‐five per cent of confirmed web app breaches were financially motivated [12].
5. Web application attacks are the #1 source of data breaches [12].
6. Data breaches caused by web application attacks are rapidly rising. The percentage of data 
breaches that leveraged web application attacks has increased rapidly in the last. This in‐
dicates that the web applications in many organisations are not just exposed but are also 
extremely susceptible compared to other points of attack [12].
Figure 3 illustrates the occurrence rates of different attack methods that resulted in data loss. 
The grey bars indicate the corresponding figure for the past year, that is, 2015. It clearly shows 
that web application attacks accounted for the highest proportion of attacks that resulted in 
breaches.
3. Web application threats
3.1. Web application security: a new boundary break
In the recent era, each and every business has web applications to showcase its online pres‐
ence, conduct business online, and so on. These applications are hosted on multiple online 
servers, databases, infrastructures, and so on. And, thus, inherits security risks from the 
underlying technologies and its associated components. An interesting fact, in 2012 alone, 
there has been reported around more than 800 hacking events and around 70% of them where 
Figure 3. DBIR statistics report.
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via issues in web applications, thus, making the web the new boundary for security, which is 
not as easy to pull a kill switch like the network [28].
These days we see application development is more focused towards the web, creating appli‐
cations for every business and personal needs. Looking at an increase in web applications, 
hackers are more focused to alter their threat attack model targeting these applications instead 
of a complete protected infrastructure, networks, and so on [29]. Web applications are suscep‐
tible to attack from the time they go online. As more inventive attack strategies and structures 
seem on the Internet, end users and the organisations that provide web services need to shield 
their systems from being compromised. According to Gartner, around 75% of all external 
attacks occur at the application level [18]. Web 2.0 helps enterprises in conducting their busi‐
ness; however, an understanding needs to be adhered to that it also introduces a surfeit of 
damaging risks [18]. The beauty about web application is that in the past the applications 
were created with scripts as there were no frameworks to support a web developer. But these 
days, rise in various web development languages, such as Java, NET, WordPress, PHP, Ajax 
and JQuery, allows a developer to create web application with delivering wide range of func‐
tionality in less than no time. Thus come the security issues with the underlying frameworks.
3.2. Security risks in a web application
Application security risks are universal and can pose an unswerving threat to business avail‐
ability. Business world works using web‐based applications and web‐based software. Because 
of the propagation of web‐based apps, vulnerabilities within the web applications are the new 
attack path for malicious actors/hackers. An attack of a web‐based application possibly will 
produce information that should not be available, browser spying, identify theft, theft of ser‐
vice or content, damage to corporate image or the application itself and the feared Denial of 
Service (DoS). The nature of http, hackers find it very easy and lucrative to modify the param‐
eters and execute functionality that was not envisioned to be performed as a function of the 
application [30, 32, 33].
Businesses and organisations are anticipating large amount of capital in expenditure to safe‐
guard and secure their complete networks (internal/online) and servers. And yet, when it 
comes to web application security, there is a huge ignorance towards its protection, or, at the 
very least, considered as an undervalued aspect within the threat model architecture. This 
notion of thought is considered to be ill‐fated, as it has been seen that most security attacks 
occur online via applications. As per Gartner Group, ‘75% of cyber‐attacks and internet secu‐
rity violations are generated through internet applications’. It is just that organisations are 
unable to comprehend the security loopholes which exists in web applications [31].
Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Top 10 increases cognizance of the challenges 
organisations face safeguarding web application security in a swiftly fluctuating application 
security environment. Let us focus on the OWASP Top 10 from 2013 as described below [34].
Injection: Injecting aka inserting code to trick an application in triggering unplanned activities 
which serve as a deviation from the business functional logic. One of the most preferred injec‐
tion hacks, which is being actioned by the hackers, is a SQL Injection (SQLi) attack. In SQLi type 
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of attack, malicious actor (hacker) injects a SQL declaration within the application to perform 
malicious actions like deleting the database, retrieving sensitive database records, and so on.
Broken Authentication and Session Management: Hackers can take over user identities, unau‐
thenticated pages and hide behind a genuine user ID to gain easy admittance to your data and 
programs.
Cross‐Site Scripting (XSS): XSS inserts malicious scripts within the web applications. This 
malicious script lies within the client side code (browser) and targeted for a different user of 
the application.
Insecure Direct Object References: Most websites store user records based on a key value that 
the user controls. When a user inputs their key, the system regains the equivalent information 
and presents it to the user. An Insecure Direct Object Reference occurs when an authorisation 
system fails to avert one user from gaining access to another user's information.
Security Misconfiguration: Security misconfiguration is a reference to application security sys‐
tems that are half‐finished or ailing managed. Security misconfiguration can occur at any level 
and in any part of an application and, thus, is both highly common and effortlessly noticeable.
Sensitive Data Exposure: Inadvertent data leak is a grave problem to everyone using a web 
application that contains user data.
Missing Functional Level Access: Wrongly configured user access control system can allow 
users the capacity to achieve functions above their level.
Cross‐Site Request Forgery (CSRF): The attack functions on a web application in which the 
end users’ client (browser) has performed an undesired action (user has no knowledge until 
the task has been performed) in which the very same user is authenticated.
Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities: Open source development practices drive 
innovation and reduce development costs. However, the 2016 Future of Open Source Survey 
found that momentous encounters remain in security and management practices. It is critical 
that organisations gain perceptibility into and control of open source software in their web 
applications.
Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards: When a web application accepts unverified input that 
affects URL redirects, malicious actors/hackers can redirect users to malicious websites. In 
addition, hackers can alter automatic forwarding routines to advance access to sensitive 
information.
3.3. Associated motive in a web application hack
Users’ accessing web application(s) are indirectly accessing the critical resources such as the 
web server and database server (if applicable). Software developers intend to spend vast 
amount of their project allocated time in developing the functionality and ensuring a timely 
release thus binding less or no time to security requirements. The reason for this can be due to 
lack of understanding/implementing security measures/controls in a web application [19]. For 
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whatever reason, applications are often peppered with vulnerabilities that are used by attack‐
ers to advance access to either the web server or the database server. Some of the aspects what 
an attacker seeks for [19]—defacement, redirect the user to a malicious website, inject malicious 
code, steal user's information, steal bank account details, access unauthorised and restricted 
content, and so on.
4. Machine learning (ML)
4.1. What is ML?
An ardent subset of artificial intelligence dedicated to the formal study of learning systems. 
Machine learning is a methodology of performing data analysis which automates an analyti‐
cal model [13]. In other words, machine learning is all about learning to do a task better in 
the future based upon its previous learned patterns in the past [14]. ML being a subsection 
of artificial intelligence provides systems/computers with the power to learn without being 
explicitly programmed [14]. One of the reasons why ML is picking up traction in the IT world 
is because as and when patterns are developed with new data, ML algorithms has the ability 
to independently adapt and learn from the data and information. With ML, computers are not 
being programmed but are altering and refining algorithms by themselves [13, 14].
Looking at other definitions, ML discovers the study and construction of algorithms that can 
learn and make predictions of data. In other words, it focuses on prediction‐making through 
the use of computers [13–15].
With the rise in new‐generation‐technologies being witnessed in the twenty‐first century, ML 
today is something that cannot be compared to what it used to be in the historical past. The 
past has been witnessed in the rise of various ML algorithms and the complexity of the calcu‐
lations being carried out; however, it is just during the recent times, the recent ML algorithms 
have been tuned in such fashion that the whole complex mathematical calculations, analysing 
big data at a much greater and faster—a very recent development [16, 17]. Some of the under‐
neath examples (but not limited to) have adapted ML within their service space:
• Google's Self‐Driving Cars: ML algorithms are used to create models in classifying various 
types of objects in different situations [18].
• Netflix: ML is used in improving the member experience [19].
• Twitter: ML is being applied to enhance its video strength [20].
4.2. Rise in ML
An immense amount of popularity is being gained over Data Mining and Bayesian analysis 
due to a fast‐pace adaptation of ML in solving business problems. Computational power, 
availability and various type of data, cheap and powerful data storage is ever growing which 
is some of the few attractive factors towards adapting ML. What this mean is that it is quickly 
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possible to fire up an automated predictive model which can analyse larger and complex 
datasets and deliver accurate final outcomes [25]. This results in an additional value towards 
predictions which leads in creating smarter real‐time decisions without human intervention 
[25]. Within the software vertical, artificial intelligence is being a popular technology to inte‐
grate within a service as the mandate for analytics is motivated more by growth in type of 
both structured and unstructured data [21].
In the 1930s and 1940s, the pioneers of computing, such as Alan Turing, began framing and 
playing with the most basic aspects of ML such as a neural network which has made today's 
ML probable [27].
As per [25], humans create couple of models every week; with ML, thousands of models are 
created within a week. Upsurge in computing power is one of the prime reason from a trans‐
formational shift from theoretical to practical implementation. High number of researchers 
and industry expertise are contributing towards the advancements in this space as it is con‐
stantly being used in solving some real issues across industries including (but not limited to) 
healthcare, automotive, financial service, cloud, oil and gas, governments, and so on. Data (be 
it small or large) residing within these types of industries contain a large number of patterns 
and insights. ML creates the ability to discover various patterns and trends within these giv‐
ing rises to substantial results.
The rise of cloud computing, massive data storage, devices connecting with each other 
(Internet of Things [IoT]), and mobile devices play a huge role in the adaption of ML.
4.3. ML methodologies
Supervised Learning: Algorithms are trained on labelled data, essentially leading to its mean‐
ings where an input having a looked‐for output. In other words, a supervised learning algo‐
rithm with an input variable denoted as P and an output variable denoted as Q and algorithms 
are used to create and learn a mapping function (f) via the input to the output.
  Q = f ( P ) 
The goal of a supervised learning algorithm is to achieve an estimate mapping function so 
that for every new input (P), a new predicted output (Q) is created. In other words, the learning 
algorithm receives a set of inputs with their corresponding outputs, and the algorithm learns 
by equating its concrete output with correct outputs in order to find errors and have the 
learning model modified accordingly. Supervised learning algorithms make use of patterns 
to predict the values of the label on unlabelled data. This is achieved by classification, regres‐
sion, prediction, and so on [25, 22].
Supervised learning is used to predict probable future events within applications having vast 
amount of historical data [25]. An example is detecting likely fraud patterns in credit card 
transactions.
Unsupervised Learning: Unsupervised learning is where only an input data (P) is avail‐
able with no equivalent output variables. The aim of unsupervised learning is to model the 
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 construction of the data in order to learn more about the data. Algorithms are required to
discover a structure, an inference and meaning within the data in order to arrive to a conclu‐
sion. These algorithms do not have any type of historical data in order to predict the output 
unlike supervised algorithms [25]. Unsupervised learning does not have any explicit outputs 
and nor exists a dependency environment factor within the input variables; it brings to accept 
preceding predispositions as to what aspects of the structure of the input should be seized in 
the output [23]. In an aspect, unsupervised learning locates patterns in the data which succours 
in arriving to a constructive meaningful decision.
4.4. Adaption of ML in industry
ML has been widely adopted across various sectors within the industry to solve real‐life busi‐
ness statements. Data is available within the whole global space and to derive a deep under‐
standing from it, ML is the methodology to be consumed for such derivations. We live in the 
golden era of innovative technologies and ML is one of them [24]. ML has created an ability 
to solve problem declarations horizontally and vertically across aviation, oil and gas, finance, 
sales, legal, customer service, contracts, security, and so on, due to its greatest capability of 
learning and improving. ML algorithms has been a great stimulus in creating applications 
and frameworks to analyse data which brings in a great predictive accuracy and value to 
enterprise's data, leading to a sundry company‐wide strategy ensuing faster and stimulating 
more profit [25].
One such example is of the revenue teams across the industry, they are converting the practical 
aspect of ML in augmenting promotions, compensations and rebates driving the looked‐for 
behaviour across various selling streams. Figure 4 draws a mind of ML applications within 
some of the industries [25].
ML has been a chosen integration within the industries for its skill to constantly learn and 
improve. As we have seen, ML algorithms are very iterative in nature, having the flex‐
ibility to make it learn towards a vision of achieving an optimised and a useful outcome 
[25]. ML's data‐driven acumen is infusing every corner of every industry and it's starting 
Figure 4. ML applications in industries.
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to disrupt the way business is done worldwide. Leveraging ML has enabled processes to
be re‐calibrated inevitably and improved for reduced cycle times, created a higher quality 
of delivered goods and allowed for new products to be established and tested. The abil‐
ity to influence data for more accurate decision‐making in place of instinctive feel [26]. 
According to a representative from Gartner, as quoted, ‘Ten years ago, we struggled to 
find 10 machine learning – based business applications. Now we struggle to find 10 that 
don't use it’ [26].
ML's rise in the industry makes data a growing vital part of how a business makes deci‐
sions. Because of this, data scientists will take up a complete central focused role in organ‐
isational strategies as data is becoming a core agent of change within a business. It is 
forecasted that with a wealth of data in business given the occurrence of sensors and IoT 
implementation, the wide ability to influence data will be critical to building competitive 
advantage [26].
ML should not be understood as a technology component, and, by the rise within the cur‐
rent era, it confidently is not a short‐term trend. With its impact within the industries and 
various business sectors by bringing out toppling business models and with its rising matu‐
rity in terms of sophisticated algorithms being advanced, it will continue to be the solitary 
driver in shifting the complete viewpoint in decision making and having a truly workable 
conclusion [26].
4.5. Machine learning usage in cybersecurity
Machine learning (ML) is not something new that security domain has to adapt or utilise. 
It has been used and is being used in various areas of cybersecurity. Different machine 
learning methods have been successfully deployed to address wide‐ranging problems in 
computer security. Following sections highlight some applications of machine learning in 
cybersecurity such as spam detection, network intrusion detection systems and malware 
detection [39].
4.5.1. Spam detection
Traditional approach of detecting spam is usage of rules also known as knowledge engineer‐
ing [39]. In this method, mails are categorised as spam‐ or genuine‐based set of rules that are 
created manually either by the user. For example, a set of rules can be:
• If the subject line of an email contains words ‘lottery’, its spam.
• Any email from a certain address or from a pattern of addresses is spam.
However, this approach is not completely effective, as a manual rule doesn’t scale because of 
active spammers evading any manual rules.
Using machine learning approach, there is no need specifying rules explicitly; instead, a decent 
amount of data pre‐classified as spam and not spam is being used. Once a machine learning 
model with good generalisation capabilities is learned, it can handle previously unseen spam 
emails and take decisions accordingly [40].
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4.5.2. Network intrusion detection
Network intrusion detection (NID) systems are used to identify malicious network activity 
leading to confidentiality, integrity or availability violation of the systems in a network. Many 
intrusion detection systems are specifically based on machine learning techniques due to their 
adaptability to new and unknown attacks [39].
4.5.3. Malware detection
Over the last few years, traditional anti‐malware companies have stiff competition from new 
generation of endpoint security vendors that major on machine learning as a method of threat 
detection [41]. Using machine learning, machines are taught how to detect threats, and, with 
this knowledge, the machine can detect new threats that have never been seen before. This is 
a huge advantage over signature‐based detection which relies on recognising malware that it 
has already seen.
4.5.4. Machine learning and security information and event management (SIEM) solution
Security information and event management (SIEM) solutions have started leveraging machine 
learning into its latest versions, to make it quicker and easier to maximise the value machine 
data can deliver to organisations [42]. Certain vendors are enabling companies to use predic‐
tive analytics to help improve IT, security and business operations.
5. Uniting machine learning and application security
In the last few sections, we have seen that the web application attacks are constantly evolving, 
and building protection mechanism on the fly has been a complex task. So, with all of the recent 
threats and attack trends on web application, one may ask what exactly is machine learning 
and how is it applied in these situations.
Inferring from a much wider scope and having it elucidated, machine learning imparts the 
understanding as a line of drills where the algorithm would ‘train’ a machine in cracking a 
problem. In order to understand the above statement, we need to comprehend it via an exam‐
ple, let us imagine a task to determine if the animal in the photo is a lion or an elephant. Prior to 
coming out with this conclusion, it is imperative to train the machine by providing ‘n’ photos 
of elephants and ‘m’ photos of lion. As the machine trains, a picture can be supplied and the 
output will be predicted if the supplied picture is a lion or an elephant.
The effectiveness of a machine learning model is determined in the accuracy of its predictions; 
in other words, a predictive analytical model needs to be derived. In order to explain this, let 
us now provide the model with around 10 pictures of elephants and the output imparts eight 
being elephants and two depicted as lions. In this case, we derive the model to be 80% precise. 
Looking at this being on the brink of accuracy, there is a way to improve the model. And the 
improvement will be by providing more data; in other words, deliver knowledges to improve 
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its proficiencies meaning to provide a large number of photos to train the machine as increase
in data volume rises large developments aiming at an acceptable accuracy of the model. An 
implausible frequency of growth of web applications over the years produces large sum of logs 
which leads to a methodology in improving the precision over a period of time.
Let's explain the above perspective in web application scenario. Any three‐tier web appli‐
cation consists of web traffic logs, application logs (normally terms as business layer) and 
the database logs (normally termed as data access layer). When we look at the logs, let's 
say we look at one category, that is, login attempts on the application. The output of the 
login can be either a successful attempt or a failure attempt. Compared to our example 
of elephants and lions, to train the failure or successful attempts we provided it with 
100 logs of successful attempts and 100 logs of failed attempts. Once the model or the 
machine is trained, we can provide a log and it can tell me if it is a failed attempt or a 
successful attempt.
Now for predictive analysis, if we provide the model with 10 web logs of successful login 
attempts, out of that it says that seven are successful attempt and three are failed attempts, 
we can say that the model is 70% accurate. One way to improve a machine learning system is 
to provide more data, essentially provide broader experiences to improve its capabilities and 
with the application logs this is not a challenge. Any application which is accessed my thou‐
sands of users can generate huge number of logs on daily basis, thus increasing the accuracy 
of the machine learning model or algorithm.
5.1. ML detecting application security breaches
Researchers are constantly working on implementing ML techniques in detecting various 
application security level hacks. But the authors have proposed an extraction algorithm, 
which is based upon various ML algorithms. The authors [36] adapted various ML algo‐
rithms, such as SVM, NB and J48, to develop the vulnerability prediction model. They have 
emphasised on vulnerability prediction prior releasing an application. In an environment 
where time and resource are very minimal, web application security personnel require an 
upper‐level support in identifying vulnerable code. A complete practical methodology in 
bringing out predicted vulnerable code will surely assist them in prioritising the secure 
code vulnerabilities.
Inferring from this thought process, authors [37] have worked towards bringing out a 
substantial pattern that illustrates both input validation and sanitisation code which are 
expected to be the predicted vectors of web application vulnerabilities. They have applied 
both supervised and semi‐supervised learning when building vulnerability predictors 
based on hybrid code attributes. Security researchers are utilizing ML towards web appli‐
cation vulnerability detection. SQL Injection being one of the most preferred attack vector 
of hackers, authors [38] have displayed their work by coming with a classifier for detection 
of SQL Injection attacks. The classifier implements Naïve Bayes ML algorithm in conjunc‐
tion with application security principle of Role‐Based Access Control implementation for 
detection of such attacks.
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5.2. Anomaly detection and predictive analysis
Anomaly detection is the documentation of items, events or observations which do not con‐
form to an expected pattern or other items within a dataset. Anomalies are also termed as out‐
liers. These outliers will detect an issue which is not normal compared to its learned model. 
Industries are adapting anomaly detection techniques in identifying medical problems, finan‐
cial frauds, and so on.
Anomaly detection is not limited just to security but it is being utilised in various other domains 
such as financial fraud uncovering, fault detection systems for structural defects, event detec‐
tion in sensor networks used in petroleum industries and many other. It is used in preprocess‐
ing the data, to eliminate any abnormal data from the dataset. By eliminating the abnormal 
data in supervised learning results in a statistically significant increase in accurateness.
Looking at the vast amount of cyberattacks increasing on web applications, the authors of 
Azane were inspired by the complete study of anomalies and patterns which led them to 
present a research towards the implementation of an ML engine comprising of an anomaly 
detection and predictive analysis framework at an application level to detect certain user 
behaviour in order to predict if it is a normal usage or an attack. The authors have explained a 
prototype model that will describe the Azane which is a machine learning framework [35] for 
web applications. Azane as a proof‐of‐concept algorithm designed by the authors has played 
a major role at the applications log level to detect anomalies at the application workflow level 
and also serve as a prediction base for any future events. The workflow in Figure 5 comprises 
multiple stages: Application Logs → Pre‐processing → Training Data → ML Algorithm → Test 
Phase → Predictive Model Output.
Let us understand each phase in general:
1. Logs
This is the first and the foremost phase upon which the whole model depends. We need to 
understand that in order for the model to work, logs are necessary. The authors have taken 
the dual aspects of logging into consideration and have applied their algorithms in order 
to derive a meaningful context. This phase is more about collection of logs and verifying 
whether the log contains the parameters that are required for analytical purpose.
Figure 5. Anomaly detection workflow.
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2. Pre‐processing
This phase is more of transforming a given dataset into a format in which the ML algorithm 
can deduce and learn from it. This phase emphasises on making your data compatible with 
the machine learning algorithms. A challenge which can occur is that various algorithms 
make different assumptions about the data which may require to conduct individual analysis 
to see which algorithm is more suitable to the business needs. Further, when you follow all 
of the rules and prepare your data, sometimes algorithms can deliver better results without 
the pre‐processing.
Pre‐processing in general includes the following steps:
a. Load the data
b. Split the dataset into the input and output variables for machine learning.
c. Apply a pre‐processing transform to the input variables.
d. Summarise the data to show the change.
3. Training data
Training data phase is more of a data that is an outcome of pre‐processing and will be used to 
train the algorithm. This data plays a vital role to feed in the ML algorithm as it has the right 
amount of input and output data. Training data is more about making the machine learning 
algorithms aware about the data attributes and their values.
4. Machine learning algorithm
This phase is used to identify the algorithm which suits your dataset and final outcome.
5. Test phase (Learning: Predictive Model)
In simpler terms, training data is bought in to create a learning set which will service as a 
predictive model against the selected algorithm to validate the prediction or the accuracy 
of the model. A training set is learnt and this particular set of learnt data is used to discover 
potentially predictive relationships. This whole analysis is based on the training data which 
forms the baseline of the predictive analysis model.
6. Predictive model output
Now the final step is to test the predictive model with the accuracy with the new data known 
as the test data. A test set is a set of data used to assess the strength and utility of a predictive 
relationship.
Azane was developed to unite machine learning and application security in order to protect 
web applications from sophisticated type of attacks by predicting the application's user pattern.
ML algorithms yield a near‐to‐accurate result when huge amount of data is fed and trained 
in order to aid in spotting malicious patterns. Data should be consistent for the ML algorithm 
to work to its fullest. Combining ML output with other infrastructure devices, such as IPS 
Machine Learning in Application Security
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.68796
77
and firewall, will strengthen the correlation and assist in drilling down to its correctness and 
validation of a web application attack. Finally, once the patterns are identified and analysed 
and blocked, this can be integrated to a SIEM solution for a complete centralised management 
metrics reporting.
In this chapter, we have seen how machine learning can be integrated within application 
security in order to prevent attacks on web‐driven applications.
6. Conclusion
Our daily life, economic growth and a country's security is highly dependable on a safe and 
secure cyber universe. Hackers are always on a lookout in breaching the cyber universe in 
identifying vulnerable loopholes to steal information, data, money, having services disrupted, 
and so on. The inventiveness of hackers has led to the advance of new attack vectors and new 
ways of exploiting bugs in a web application. Web application breaches have evolved the 
cyber war between application owners and hackers. As companies cope with a more urbane 
threat landscape, they will have no choice but to innovate, automate and predict hacking 
identifications, attempts and breaches in their web applications.
Talking about prediction, machine learning as a technology has erupted vastly in the 
whole cyber implementation space. These decision‐making algorithms are known to 
solve several problems as seen in the above illustrations. Following a simple principle of 
prediction, machine learning has shown itself as the problem solver for any given type 
of problem occurring within the complete technology space. Looking at the in‐depth 
capability of machine learning, the cybersecurity industry started its adaptation. The 
collection and storage of large amount of data points is rapidly rising in cybersecu‐
rity where machine learning plays a huge role in analyzing different use case patterns. 
Another facet where machine learning is being utilized is in identifying and defending 
against vulnerabilities in the complete cyber eco‐system and web application being a 
part of it.
Integrating machine learning in web applications are proving to serve as an identification 
and prevention against web hacking breaches by analysing the usage patterns of the web 
application. As seen within the above sections, machine learning has been a success in iden‐
tifying various attacks, and research works have been carried out. Future of web applica‐
tion security lies in the hands of machine learning as we are stepping in the space of large 
data residing in web applications, logs being written every millisecond and attacks being 
witnessed at large.
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Abstract
The swift cadence of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) is at the ori-
gin of a new generation of open, ubiquitous, large-scale, complex, and heterogeneous 
information systems (IS). Inextricably linked with this evolution, a number of technical, 
administrative, and social challenges should be urgently addressed. Security and pri-
vacy in critical IS are recognized as crucial issues. The access control is well adopted as 
a typical solution for securing sensitive resources and ensuring authorized interactions 
within IS. The chapter deals mainly with the thematic of advanced access control to IS 
and particularly to relational databases. We present a synthesis of the state of the art of 
access control that encloses a study of research advancements and challenges. We intro-
duce and discuss requirements and main characteristics for deploying advanced access 
control infrastructures. Then, we discuss the problem of the conformity of concrete access 
control infrastructures, and we propose a conformity management scheme for monitor-
ing the compliance between low-level and high-level policies. Finally, we provide and 
discuss proposals and directives to enhance provably secure and compliant access con-
trol schemes as a main characteristic of future IS.
Keywords: information systems security, access control, database security, conformity, 
security policy
1. Introduction
Nowadays, Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) developments bring out sig-
nificant security concerns related to the deployment and operation of IS. In fact, in today’s IS 
infrastructures characterized by their criticality, openness, complexity and heterogeneity (such 
as e-commerce, e-government, and e-health care), security and privacy are recognized as crucial 
issues. Ensuring a high level of security with a minimal overhead is the main goal of research 
© 2017 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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activities. Among several security mechanisms, it is commonly agreed that the access control is a
strong driving force and is well adopted as a typical solution for ensuring a high level of protec-
tion of critical infrastructures. This mechanism is fundamental to ensure higher confidentiality 
and integrity of sensitive data and services within IS. It helps in a structured manner—generally 
enforced according to an access control policy with reference to a security policy—to define and organize 
accesses and interactions within a specific system. The standing of the access control in the protec-
tion of critical resources has been well studied in literature. Several mechanisms, approaches, and 
models have been proposed to structure, specify, and enforce access rights. As a part of this chap-
ter, we review in an exhaustive manner and discuss access control advancements. We highlight 
the evolution of access control infrastructures from traditional solutions to fine-grained solutions.
Despite the great advancements, several requirements and concerns need to be addressed 
for defining and setting up efficient and reliable access control infrastructures. Indeed, speci-
fying and enforcing a trustworthiness access control infrastructure, ensuring its coherence, 
and monitoring its conformity have now become complicated and even puzzling activities. 
Moreover, it is commonly agreed that effective and proficient administration and manage-
ment of access control infrastructures are recognized as main issues, while mastering these 
tasks is crucial as it would help to guarantee a higher security of IS. We study and discuss 
basic requirements for deploying advanced access control infrastructures. We discuss the 
problem of the conformity of concrete access control infrastructures, and we propose future 
directives to enhance provably secure and compliant access control schemes as a main char-
acteristic of future IS.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce and review 
access control advancements. In Section 3, we study and discuss main access control chal-
lenges for IS. In Section 4, we focus on advanced access control to IS. We study the main 
requirements for deploying advanced solutions, and we propose a compliance management 
solution. We present future directives to enhance provably secure and compliant access con-
trol schemes. Finally, Section 5 concludes the chapter.
2. Access control advancements: from traditional approaches to fine-
grained access control
2.1. Introduction to access control
The access control is defined as any physical/logical mechanism by which a system controls 
and manages the access and the use of its resources. This mechanism allows the system to 
grant or revoke privileges for active entities (subjects) to access to or to perform some actions 
on passive entities (objects). The mechanism is also identified as authorization service or ref-
erence monitor that generally enforces access control policies.
An access control policy—in general defined in the context of a security policy—corresponds to the 
sets of rules and practices that regulate within a specific system how different resources (data 
and services) are operated, managed, and distributed. A security policy has to identify for a 
specific system the security objectives and the associated threats [1]. The policy acts mainly 
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on three levels or aspects: administrative, physical, and logical. In the administrative level, we 
focus on the organizational security and the corresponding administrative procedures within 
the organization. In the physical level, we need to define the necessary procedures and means 
to protect the set of resources from physical risks and accesses. Finally, in the logical level, 
we define legitimate and authorized actions a user can perform. This level contains a set of 
security mechanisms such as the identification, authentication, and access control.
2.2. The generic model of access control
The generic model to control access to resources in the context of databases (as an example) 
is defined according to Figure 1. (1) A subject (an active entity) requests access to a database 
object (a passive entity) to perform some actions. (2) The authorization service checks the set 
of rights granted to the subject by the defined access control policy. (3) Then, an access deci-
sion (grant or revoke) is accorded to the subject.
2.3. Access control models
The emphasis on access control for ensuring high protection of critical infrastructures has 
been extensively justified in literature. The three main reference models have been defined: 
discretionary, mandatory, and role-based access control (RBAC) models. The wide deploy-
ment and great success of the standard role-based access control model have initiated several 
research works leading to the definition of advanced models for a fine-grained access control.
2.3.1. The discretionary access control (DAC) model
The discretionary access control (DAC) model has appeared mainly with Lampson [2] in the 
1970s who defined the structure of the access control matrix based on the subject, object, and 
action notions. The model allows to restrict the access to objects on the basis of the identity of 
the subjects and/or the groups of subjects. In the DAC model, the owner of a specific resource 
fixes itself the access rights to the resource for all users of the system. Moreover, a subject 
who has an access authorization is able to pass this permission (perhaps indirectly) to other 
Figure 1. The generic model of access control.
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subjects. The controls are discretionary in the sense that the management of access rights is 
left to the discretion of the users.
2.3.2. The mandatory access control (MAC) model
The mandatory access control (MAC) [3, 4] model controls access to resources on the basis of 
the notion of security level. It associates a confidentiality level to each subject and object. The 
set of subjects and objects is classified according to corresponding confidentiality levels, and 
authorized actions are derived based on associated levels. In this model, the system manages 
directly user rights based on the corresponding security information (confidentiality levels) 
assigned to users and objects. This model was motivated by the need of providing higher 
security by preventing unauthorized accesses and protecting resources from Trojan horses.
2.3.3. The role-based access control (RBAC) model
The role-based access control (RBAC) model [5, 6] controls access to resources on the basis 
of the concept of roles assigned to users. A role represents a function within an organization. 
The model defines access rights to resources based on the roles assigned to users. A variety of 
RBAC conceptual models had been defined. The core model (noted RBAC0) defines, for any 
system, the minimum requirements to support the access control based on roles. The hierarchi-
cal RBAC (noted RBAC1) extends RBAC0 with the concept of role hierarchy. The constrained 
RBAC (noted RBAC2) extends RBAC0 with the notion of constraints. Constraints are a set of 
restrictions defined on RBAC components, such as static separation of duty, dynamic separa-
tion of duty, prerequisite, and cardinality constraints. The global model called consolidated 
model (noted RBAC3) contains both of the hierarchy and the constraint concepts. It includes 
RBAC1 and RBAC2 models and consequently the RBAC0model.
2.3.4. Fine-grained access control (X-BAC) models
To structure access rights and to meet specific application needs, numerous extensions have 
been proposed for the RBAC family, called X-based access control models. The ORBAC [7] 
model represents a main extension defined as a conceptual and industrial framework to 
meet security needs for sensitive healthcare communications. RBAC+ is a dynamic model 
to enforce fine-grained access control to web databases. The model extends the standard 
model with the notions of application, application profile, and sub-application session. The 
GEO-RBAC [8] model has been proposed to take into account spatial contextual informa-
tion. It is motivated by security requirements of location-based services and mobile appli-
cations as well as the increased concern for the management and sharing of geographical 
information in strategic applications like environmental protection and homeland security 
[8]. The temporal RBAC and the generalized temporal-RBAC extensions [9] are defined 
to take into account temporal contextual information and to constrain the use of permis-
sions to specific temporal periods. Several other extensions that define the concepts of 
teams (Team-BAC), tasks (task-LAC), lattice (Lattice-LAC), organizations (Organization-
BAC), or contexts (Context-LAC) have been also defined to structure rights. The concept 
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of  attribute-based access control (ABAC)  organizes access based on the evaluation of attri-
butes. RBAC extensions are defined for a fine-grained access control policy specification to 
meet new security challenges.
Content-based access control is a particular case of fine-grained access control specific to data-
base systems. In this type of access control, access decisions (to authorize or to deny an access 
request) are based mainly on the content of the data to be accessed.
2.4. Synthesis
The main discretionary access control model expressed through access matrices has been widely 
used and implemented in several applications in the commercial and academic fields, such as in 
Unix/Linux operating systems. Nonetheless, the management of permissions list is tedious and 
prone to errors in the case of a large number of users and permissions. Moreover, this model is 
difficult to administer in the case of large infrastructures and is vulnerable to Trojans.
In order to improve and strengthen access control to critical resources, several research works 
gave rise to other models, mainly the MAC model based on the definition and exploitation of 
security levels. In this context, the early defined approaches have proposed to organize the set 
of security levels in a strict order. Then, the obligation to refine and relax this constraint made 
it possible to organize the security levels according to lattices. The notion of lattice allows 
structuring the security levels according to a hierarchy that gives more freedom to adminis-
trators in the modeling of access control policies. This makes the MAC models well adapted 
to highly structured IS that require a high confidentiality, namely, military systems or sensi-
tive enterprise systems. However, in the case of large-scale organizations, it is too rigid to 
apply the MAC model since it is difficult to classify a huge number of objects and subjects in a 
predefined number of security levels. Moreover, database management systems (DBMS) that 
adopt only the MAC model as a unique access control solution had a little commercial success 
due to their rigidity and the strict hierarchy they impose on users and objects.
Even though historical access control models have introduced the concepts and generic prin-
ciples of access control, the concern to impose strict access control rules has led to the defini-
tion of the notion of structured intermediate levels between subjects and permissions. The 
general principle of the new models is to introduce a new level of indirection (defined by 
roles) between users and permissions. The main purpose of this new concept is to facilitate the 
administration of access control policies. Indeed, in role-based access control models, it is not 
necessary to update the whole access control policy when adding a new subject (user), and 
it is sufficient to assign it rights through one or more roles. Thus, the use of this intermediate 
entity (role) reduces considerably administrative errors and contributes to master difficulties 
and complexities in the management of access rights through the mechanism of inheritance 
between roles. This model of access control has received a particular attention by the research 
community and has become in its simplest or most complex form the most used model [10]. 
This huge success has made from this model a standard for access control [11]. This led to the 
elaboration of multiple models and derivations for this family of access control named X-BAC 
for the definition of a fine-grained access control.
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In order to highlight the main advancements of access control, we present in Table 1 a com-
parative study and analysis of the discussed access control models and mechanisms with 
reference to their approaches, applications, and capabilities.
From a security perspective, we present in Table 2, a summary of security analysis of the 
discussed access control models and mechanisms that identifies the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of existing approaches and their security vulnerabilities.
Features DAC MAC RBAC Fine-grained models 
(exp. ABAC)
Context of 
application
Commercial and 
academic fields: 
Unix/Linux operating 
systems
Suitable to highly 
structured IS: 
military systems 
and intelligent 
environments
Various IS Specific to particular 
applications
Implementation Access control 
matrix\access control 
and capability lists
Security levels for 
subjects and objects
Roles and 
authorization 
constraints
Specific mechanisms 
(exp. ABAC: 
attributes)
Sensitivity No fine-grained 
access control
No fine-grained 
access control
No fine-grained 
access control
Fine-grained access 
control specific 
to particular 
applications
Policy updates The policy update is 
costly
The policy update is 
costly
The policy update is 
simple
The policy update is 
simple
Policy management 
and administration
Tedious 
management, prone 
to errors, and difficult 
to administer
Requires a higher 
management to 
account and update 
security levels
Easier than previous 
models
Easier than previous 
models
Advantages Flexibility of usage
Enforces the sharing 
of information
Multilevel security
Ensures higher 
integrity
Well-adapted to 
highly structured IS
Includes the 
advantages of 
historical models
Intermediate levels 
between subjects and 
permissions
Hierarchy of roles 
and constraints
Adapted to complex 
and distributed areas
Fine-grained controls
Respond to specific 
access control needs
Solve RBAC limits
Focus on other 
concepts than roles 
(exp. attributes in 
ABAC)
Higher flexibility
Adapted to complex, 
distributed, open, 
and dynamic areas
Disadvantages Problem of scalability
No distinction 
between users and 
subjects
Security problems
Too rigid to apply
Problem of scalability
Not suitable 
to dynamic 
environments
Static access control
Requires roles 
engineering
Does not support 
contextual rules
Difficulty in 
compliance 
management
More complex to 
implement than 
RBAC
Table 1. Comparative study of access control models.
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3. Access control to databases
3.1. Mechanisms
In a database context, a number of mechanisms can be enforced in a cooperative manner for 
ensuring the control of legitimate accesses and preventing unauthorized accesses. The diver-
sity of access control mechanisms for database systems illustrates on the one hand the impor-
tance of the access control for protecting sensitive data and services and on the other hand the 
difficulty and the complexity of defining a reliable access control solution. We present in the 
following a list of the principal access control mechanisms for database systems.
• Passwords: a database management system allows to associate passwords for the identifica-
tion of users and to enforce passwords for the activation of roles.
• Privileges: a database management system allows defining a set of privileges for managing 
the empowerment of users. It provides system privileges and object privileges that allow 
users performing specific actions across the system and accessing database objects.
• Views: a view represents an important and very useful mechanism for restricting access to 
data. It is a most common mechanism adopted by database management systems to sup-
port content-based access control.
Features DAC MAC RBAC Fine-grained models 
(exp. ABAC)
Performance and 
integrity
Low: possibility to 
settle insecure rights
High: based on 
security level
High Very high
Access decision Ownership Centralized Centralized Centralized
Vulnerability Vulnerable to 
malicious programs 
such as Trojan horses 
and covert channels
Vulnerable to covert 
channels
Vulnerable to inner 
threats, particularly 
administrative 
threats
Vulnerable to inner 
threats, particularly 
administrative 
threats
Flexibility Flexible Rigid Flexible Higher flexibility
Security separation 
of duties
Does not support Does not support Static and dynamic 
separation of duties
Static and dynamic 
separation of duties
Constraints and 
conditions
Does not support Does not support Constraints 
and condition 
enforcement
Constraints 
and Conditions 
enforcement
Inference (indirect 
access)
Fail to deal with 
inferences
Fail to deal with 
inferences
Fail to deal with 
inferences
Requires specific 
study to each model
Transitivity No control on 
transitive access flow
Transitivity is 
controlled
Transitivity is 
controlled
Transitivity is 
controlled
Least privilege and 
delegation of rights
Supports Does not support Supports Supports
Table 2. Security analysis of access control models.
Advanced Access Control to Information Systems: Requirements, Compliance, and Future...
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.69329
89
• Triggers: triggers allow to automatically enforce access restrictions as well as security rules. 
They especially allow enforcing authorization constraints mainly pre- and post-authoriza-
tion constraints.
• Stored procedures: stored procedures may be used in order to define privileges associated 
with a user’s job functions and to ensure that access to data and services are performed ac-
cording to the defined rules.
• Encryption mechanisms: a number of encryption mechanisms contribute to access control for 
databases. They concern several applications, such as password encryption, data encryption, 
digital signature, authorization tickets, etc.
• Access control policies: it consists on enforcing access control policies based on different 
models such as DAC, MAC, RBAC, etc. Indeed, database management systems provide 
mechanisms based on different access control models allowing the management of access 
rights.
• Specific mechanisms: this type of mechanisms is context dependent and specific to every 
DBMS. As an example, we cite the component Oracle Database Vault that allows restricting 
access to sensitive data even for database administrators.
3.2. Policy enforcement
In a database context, enforcing an access control policy consists in deploying within a data-
base system, generally in a distributed manner, the schema of the access control policy. This 
distribution of the policy between different active components of the system ensures a better 
management of access requests and operations of the database resources. In fact, an access 
control policy is often spread over several levels. (i) The first level is defined by the data-
base management system itself. Indeed, a DBMS makes it possible to define and store in 
its depository (data dictionary) a set of information and access rules allowing it to control 
and manage access to data. (ii) The second level is defined by application servers that allow 
restricting access to applications and data. (iii) The third level is relative to the application 
part. Indeed, the software application can manage itself the level of accreditation of users, 
and it connects to the database under its own logical identity and decides which information 
the users can consult, modify, etc. (iv) The fourth level belongs to the set of privileges associ-
ated to different actors of the system and defined in the directories of users and operating 
systems of the IS.
3.3. Challenges
Even though, the access control is becoming increasingly important for protecting sensitive 
data in critical systems; several issues are recognized as crucial challenges in today’s access 
control infrastructures. In fact, the efficient and secure administration and management of 
access control infrastructures, the safety analysis of access control models, and the risk assess-
ment in access control systems are recognized as fundamental issues. Moreover, setting up a 
trustworthiness environment of access control and monitoring its compliance and coherence 
have emerged as complicated and confusing tasks. Indeed, in unreliable and untrustworthy 
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environment, the administration of access control policies considered as a fundamental 
 security aspect generally raises a critical analysis problem when the process of administration 
is distributed and/or potentially untrusted users contribute to this process. As a consequence, 
collusion attempts and inner threats may take place to generate crucial and invisible breaches 
to circumvent the access control policy. Moreover, an administrator via its administrative 
privileges has power increasingly disputed when the safety of data is threatened [12]. Given 
that administrative roles are naturally powerful, if they are not used in cautious manner, a 
malicious administrator or a powerful user can corrupt the policy and create other breaches 
difficult to identify.
In database context, most of existing DBMS use the closed-world policy as a main authoriza-
tion model. Under this circumstance, whenever a user tries to access a database object and 
no authorization rule is found, the access is denied. Hence, the lack of authorizations is inter-
preted as no authorization. Nonetheless, this policy has a major drawback since it does not 
prevent the user from receiving the required authorization some times in the future [13]. 
Moreover, most of existing DBMS act as a black box, and it is difficult for administrators and 
security architects to identify the actual state and the compliance level of the concrete policy 
enforced by the DBMS. Recently, researchers are convinced of the urgency of this topic given 
the challenges of securing data. A few attempts addressed the topic of reverse engineering of 
access control policies to externalize the low-level schema of an access control policy enforced 
by a relational DBMS [14, 15].
4. Advanced access control
Advanced access control solutions should provide an efficient and flexible access control with 
a reasonable (minimal) overhead for ensuring a higher protection of private data and sensitive 
resources. From a security perspective, we consider that a reliable and trusted access control 
infrastructure for future information systems should take into account several requirements 
and should provide a minimum of security features.
4.1. Requirements
4.1.1. Confidentiality and integrity
In critical systems, it is compulsory to consider and treat sensitive data and services as confi-
dential resources which integrity should be preserved. In this context, the confidentiality and 
the integrity of the IS resources must be preserved, and a main requirement for the access 
control system is that it should not allow in any way illegal accesses and unauthorized exploi-
tation of the system resources.
4.1.2. Privacy
In open and untrustworthy environments, preserving the privacy of different users and actors 
in a critical system is highly required. The access control solution should consider the protec-
tion of private data as well as the preservation of a high level of secrecy as main objectives.
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4.1.3. Authenticity
The authenticity of the actors of the system is an important aspect that needs to be taken into 
account by the access control solution. Ensuring the authenticity in the system relies princi-
pally on the validation of the origins and the identities of the different actors of the system. In 
order to ensure a high level of authenticity, the access control system should dispose of reliable 
identification and authentication mechanisms such as cryptographic and digital signature.
4.1.4. Robustness
The access control system must ensure a high level of robustness in the sense that inappropri-
ate and unauthorized accesses should not be expected. The access control rules have to be 
rigorous enough to authorize desired accesses and prevent illegal accesses. The robustness 
of the access control as a crucial question is described with the levels of confidentiality and 
privacy provided by the system.
4.1.5. Flexibility
In critical infrastructures, such as healthcare and commercial systems, emergency accesses 
should be preserved by the access control system. In this case, the access control system must 
integrate flexible controls as regards to emergency cases. The flexibility needs to be integrated 
in a smooth and transparent manner to permit emergency accesses based on a delegation of 
rights or an overriding of access privileges.
Moreover, revoking access privileges is an important aspect that should be considered by 
access control solutions. Indeed, the access control system should be flexible in the sense that 
it should allow revoking access rights in an easy manner especially in critical situations when 
users abuse the trust and threaten the IS.
4.1.6. Non-repudiation
In order to pass up incidents linked to user’s irresponsibility and negligence, it is recom-
mended that the access control system has to integrate non-repudiation mechanisms such as 
auditability. This helps mainly in auditing illegal access and collusion attempts that allows 
strengthening the system with the corresponding prevention rules and controls.
4.1.7. Administration, management, and compliance
An access control system has to remain compliant and coherent with regard to the validated 
requirements without alterations. The necessity of integrating flexible controls in the system 
should not be at the origin of the non-compliance situations. In this context, we verify that a 
secure and efficient management of the access control infrastructure is a main requirement that 
has a wide impact on the quality of the system. Indeed, a faulty access control policy, a miss-
configuration of the policy, or flaws in the policy and system deployment can result in serious 
vulnerabilities. A reliable management helps to precisely capture the security properties and 
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needs that access control should adhere to bridge the gap of abstraction between the access 
control policy and the corresponding mechanisms.
4.2. Compliance management
The traditional life cycle of an access control policy defines three main phases: the specifica-
tion, the verification, and the implementation of the policy. Then, the policy evolves with 
reference to maintenance and administrative tasks, following the evolution of security needs. 
Throughout its life cycle, the policy can undergo confused alterations: (i) It may record illegal 
updates and non-compliant changes with regard to its original specification. This generally 
occurs following an intrusion attempt or an illegal delegation of rights. (ii) It may contain 
incoherent and conflicting access control rules. This generally occurs following inner threats 
and collusion attempts and particularly in case the policy is defined by using more than a 
unique model of access control that leads to redundancy, inconsistency, and contradiction in 
the expression of the policy. We consider that the identification of the discrepancies between 
the abstract level of the access control policy (the specification) and its concrete level is crucial 
since correct operation and enforcement of access control policies by corresponding applica-
tions rely on the hypothesis that the specifications are correct and valid.
In large-scale, open and untrustworthy environments, the administration and management of 
an access control policy (considered as main security aspects) generally raise a critical analy-
sis problem in case of a distributed administration of the policy, and/or potentially untrusted 
users (in most cases represent malicious administrators) contribute to the administration 
process. As a consequence, collusion attempts and inner threats may take place to generate 
crucial and invisible breaches to circumvent the policy. In fact, a faulty access control policy, 
a miss-configuration of the policy, or flaws in the policy and system deployment can result 
in serious vulnerabilities. In a database management system (DBMS) context, we easily check 
that as business and private data is exposed to several security threats and attacks, an access 
control policy is also subject to the same dangers [16]. According to Imperva Application Defense 
Center reports in 2013 and 2015, Excessive and Unused Privileges and Privilege Abuse are identi-
fied as most critical threats in top 10 database security threats.
Moreover, in the context of healthcare and e-healthcare systems (as a typical critical infra-
structures), access control solutions should be rigorous to ensure a higher protection and flex-
ible to treat emergency cases. We check that the simultaneous coupling of two necessary but 
contradictory objectives (robustness and flexibility) has a direct influence and a wide impact 
on the compliance of the deployed access control policy [17].
Our proposal to address issues related to the deployment and management of access control 
policies extends the traditional life cycle of access control policies with pertinent phases that 
we consider as necessary activities for ensuring the trustworthiness and the compliance of 
security policies. We consider three main levels of compliance management of access control 
infrastructures like illustrated in Figure 2. The first level concerns the management of the 
conformity between security and functional needs and the specification and design of the 
access control system. Indeed, a main requirement in the deployment of the access control 
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infrastructure is specifying security and business needs, mastering, and validating its basics 
and expressiveness. Then, evolving the policy according to new security and business needs 
is highly required to maintain coherence between security needs and the high-level policy.
The second level concerns the management of the compliance between the specification of the 
policy and its concrete implementation. This level ensures the identification of faulty access 
control policy, miss-configurations or flaws in the policy and the system that can result in 
serious vulnerabilities. To ensure a high level of trustworthiness, it is highly recommended 
to proceed with verifying the conformity between the specification and the first implemented 
instance of the policy and particularly before the concrete exploitation of the system. The 
third level concerns the management of the compliance between the high-level policy as a 
reference model and any concrete instance of the policy. This helps detecting illegal updates 
and non-compliant changes in the concrete instance with regard to its original specification. 
It allows also identifying incoherent and conflicting access control rules occurred following 
inner threats and collusion attempts.
To ensure an efficient and secure deployment and management of reliable access control 
policies, we cover three key security aspects like illustrated in Figure 3. (i) The specifica-
tion, verification, and implementation of the policy invariants, (ii) the validation of a con-
crete (implemented) instance of the policy regarding its original specification, and (iii) the 
adjustment and optimization of the access control policy schema. In fact, the goal during 
Figure 2. Compliance management levels.
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the specification phase is to capture the maximum of security needs and to distinguish the 
invariants that must meet any concrete instance of the access control policy. Security architects 
dispose, during this phase, of security modeling languages that extend classical application 
modeling languages. Verifying the exactitude of the specification and adopting a model-driven 
architecture (MDA) approach are highly interesting in system development and allow espe-
cially reaching the implementation via successive refinements of the verified specification. 
During the validation phase, the reference stage (the specification) and the concrete instance 
are facing in a logical framework allowing formal reasoning and compliance demonstration. 
To do so, two preliminary phases are necessary: a reverse engineering phase that allows gen-
erating the schema of the implemented policy and a formalization phase for representing the 
extracted policy in our formal framework. The optimization phase corrects the redundancy 
anomalies and helps check the properties of the graph of roles, calculate the power of a role, 
etc. Obtained results allow the adjustment and the up to date of the corresponding policy.
4.3. Future directives
4.3.1. Compliance management of distributed policies
Today’s IS generally comprises several heterogynous components. Securing the IS requires 
mainly defining and enforcing a global security policy to be distributed on several active 
components that participate—in a collective manner—to the system security. The security 
architect is responsible for defining a global access control policy (GACP) and for defining the 
sub-policies (ACP1, ACPn) relative to each active component in the system such as firewalls 
(FW), database management systems (DBMS), application servers (AS), operating systems 
(OS), enterprise directory services (LDAP), etc.
Figure 3. Formal approach of compliance management.
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A global management of the compliance of the global access control policy enforced by the IS 
consists in monitoring the conformity of all sub-access control policies enforced by active com-
ponents separately and in verifying the conformity of the global policy taking into account 
the interactions between those components, like illustrated by Figure 4. As a future research 
direction, a global compliance management process—which integrates compliance manage-
ment of sub-policies—should be defined and investigated for a global check of the conformity 
of the global policy taking into account interactions between active components of the system.
4.3.2. Reverse engineering access control policies
The management of the compliance of access control policies within databases relies on a 
reverse engineering step for externalizing the concrete implementation of a policy from the 
DBMS. In literature, numerous research works addressed the thematic of retro-conception 
or reverse engineering in the context of relational databases. This was at the origin of the 
development of professional tools for databases reverse engineering. Existing tools allow to 
generate the functional model of a concrete database, while they do not allow to generate the 
complete security model. In other words, they do not offer the opportunity to extract all the 
components of persistent access control policies. The reverse engineering procedure is based 
on the exploitation of the DBMS data dictionary.
Actually, a few research works addressed this important topic and defined reverse engineer-
ing techniques for extracting concrete policies from the Oracle DBMS [14, 15]. Even though, 
Figure 4. Distributed compliance management.
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defined reverse engineering approaches can be generalized, we need specific reverse engi-
neering procedures relative to each DBMS. A main contribution in this thematic is to define 
specific reverse engineering techniques relative to other familiar database management sys-
tems such as Informix, MySQL, etc.
4.3.3. Compliance management of access control policies in the context of object and NoSQL 
databases
The fact that the concepts and principles of object-oriented and NoSQL databases are com-
pletely different from traditional databases (mainly relational databases), the application of 
traditional security controls is not adequate for providing effective security measures for 
object-oriented and NoSQL databases. Due to the specificity of object databases, we need—in 
a future research directive—to define the necessary techniques for monitoring the compliance 
of implemented access control policies in object-oriented DBMS.
5. Conclusion
Addressing security issues in today’s information system requires mainly defining a trust-
worthy environment of access control. In this chapter, we review the actual state of research 
in access control to highlight the main advancements and challenges. We introduce and dis-
cuss requirements and the main characteristics for deploying advanced access control infra-
structures. We illustrate that the management of the compliance of today’s access control 
infrastructures represents a main issue for the deployment of secure systems. To address this 
thematic, we discuss the problem of the conformity of concrete access control infrastructures, 
and we propose a conformity management scheme for monitoring the compliance between 
low-level and high-level policies. Moreover, we highlight some future research directives that 
comply with the discussed thematic.
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Abstract
Databases represent today great economical and strategic concerns for both enterprises 
and public institutions. In that context, where data leaks, robbery as well as innocent or 
even hostile data degradation represent a real danger, and watermarking appears as an 
interesting tool. Watermarking is based on the imperceptible embedding of a message or 
watermark into a database in order, for instance, to determine its origin as well as to detect 
if it has been modified. A major advantage of watermarking in relation to other digital 
content protection mechanisms is that it leaves access to the data while keeping them pro‐
tected by means of a watermark, independent of the data format storage. Nevertheless, it 
is necessary to ensure that the introduced distortion does not perturb the exploitation of 
the database. In this chapter, we give a general overview of the latest database watermark‐
ing methods, focusing on those dealing with distortion control. In particular, we present 
a recent technique based on an ontological modeling of the database semantics that rep‐
resent the relationships in between attributes—relationships that should be preserved in 
order to avoid the appearance of incoherent and unlikely records.
Keywords: watermarking, relational database, information security
1. Introduction
The evolution of multimedia technologies and communications has resulted in a remark‐
able increase in the construction, transfer and sharing of databases. As a consequence, data 
gathering and management into databases or data warehouses or the scaling up to big data 
become important economical and strategic concerns for enterprises and public administra‐
tions in decision making. The expansion of data‐mining and assisted analysis tools are just 
© 2017 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
two examples that highlight the growing value of these databases. In that context, informa‐
tion leaks, thefts (confidentiality, traceability) or even degradations (integrity/authenticity), 
intentional or not, represent a real menace. This has recently been proved by the Wikileaks [1] 
or the Falciani cases [2], where large amounts of sensitive data have been exposed publicly on 
the Internet due to internal leaks.
Several protection mechanisms have been proposed so as to protect digital contents. A nonex‐
haustive list encompasses user authentication, access control and encryption which are help‐
ful for confidentiality, digital signatures that can support data integrity and non repudiation 
and logs that can help to trace data. However, these security solutions offer an a priori protec‐
tion in the sense that once they are bypassed, or more simply when the data access is granted, 
data are no longer protected.
On the contrary, watermarking can complementarily provide an a posteriori data protection. 
By definition, watermarking lies on the insertion of a message (some security attributes) 
into a host document (e.g., an image, an audio signal or, in our case, a database) by slightly 
modifying it based on the principle of controlled distortion. Watermarking leaves thus access 
to the data, which can be manipulated or consulted, while staying protected by means of a 
watermark. This watermark or the message it corresponds to (or equivalently the embedded 
security attributes) may serve as the protection of the owner rights, data integrity, data trace‐
ability, etc. Its versatility makes watermarking a really attractive solution for sensitive data 
protection.
While there is vast knowledge in the field of multimedia watermarking [3, 4], the interest 
in database watermarking has been limited, to date, with about 100 publications since the 
seminal method of Agrawal and Kiernan, which dates to 2002 [5]. In particular, and as we 
will see in the sequel, relational database watermarking differs from multimedia contents 
watermarking in several points. Among them, two are worth highlighting—i) records in a 
database can be reorganized without changing the meaning of the database, in opposition 
to highly correlated neighbor samples in a signal or pixels in images and ii) the existence of 
specific manipulations a database may undergo like tuple suppression and insertion which 
will modify the database structure. At the same time, depending on the nature and on the 
sensitivity of the data, more or less strict distortion constraints have to be considered and 
managed or at least modeled.
This chapter addresses the latest advances on the protection of relational databases by means 
of watermarking. We focus, in particular, on methods that aim at preserving the informative 
content of database. If in the past distortion control techniques preserved database statistics, a 
recent one suggests taking into account the semantic meaning of database records.
This chapter is divided into five main sections. First, in Section 2, we present the main applica‐
tions of database watermarking. In Section 3, we come back and sum up the basic principles 
of database watermarking, highlighting the main differences with watermarking of multimedia 
contents (i.e., images, video). Section 4 gives an overview of the existing database watermarking 
techniques, putting in evidence “how” distortion control in database watermarking is most 
of the time achieved. In this section, we describe, in more detail, a semantic distortion control 
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by means of ontologies—a modeling that is much more general. This solution is illustrated 
considering a practical case with a medical database containing inpatient stay records.
2. Applications of database watermarking
As depicted above, watermarking stands for the insertion or dissimulation of a message 
(a watermark) into the records or the attributes’ values of a database. Depending on the rela‐
tionship between the host database and the embedded message, different applications have 
been proposed.
2.1. Copyright and ownership assertion
As in the case of multimedia content watermarking, the first developed and most‐studied 
watermarking application corresponds to database copyright protection. It relies on the inser‐
tion of an identifier associating the host document to its owner (creator or buyer) [6]. This 
identifier or watermark should be imperceptible and resistant to any operations, especially 
those aiming at removing the watermark. The first database watermarking technique, intro‐
duced by Agrawal and Kiernan [5], focused on copyright protection.
2.2. Traitor tracing and database traceability
In some cases, the identification of the recipient of one database can be a priority so as to trace a 
possible illegal redistribution. Watermarking is referred in that context as “fingerprinting” [7]. 
Herein, each distributed copy of the content is marked with an identifier or fingerprint which 
uniquely identifies an individual. If one of the receivers decides to illegally reroute or redis‐
tribute the database, it becomes possible to identify him or her [8]. The way these fingerprints 
are built has received a lot of research effort in order to make them resistant to collusion 
attacks in which several users owning copies of the same content cooperate in order to obtain 
an unwatermarked version. Such fingerprints or user identifiers are anticollusion codes [9, 10] 
and have, as an objective, the identification of at least one or several colluders in a coalition 
of users.
In the same vein, such traitor tracing solutions can serve as the identification of a dishonest 
user at the origin of a data leak. As previously exposed, a message identifying the user is 
embedded when he/she accesses the content. If the information is retrieved online, it will be 
possible to identify the responsible person by extracting the message. Contrary to the previ‐
ous problem, the collusion attack is of less concern as such data leaks are usually the result 
of one user.
2.3. Integrity control (tamper detection)
Integrity or authenticity control represents the third main application of database watermark‐
ing. Indeed, it is essential to ensure data integrity, especially when they acquire a legal value 
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or if they contribute to sensitive decision making. That is especially the case of the medical 
domain in case of litigations.
Fragile or semifragile watermarking constitutes attractive alternatives. In opposition to robust‐
ness, the fragility of the mark to databases’ manipulations can herein be useful. The absence 
or the incorrect detection of a mark will indicate a loss of data integrity. Depending on the 
applicative context, the mark can be designed to resist some specific manipulations but not to 
all. If all manipulations have to be detected, we will talk about fragile watermarking [11, 12]. 
Such techniques are usually very sensitive, like a digital signature or message authentication 
code, and can indicate which parts of the database have been altered [13]. On the contrary, a 
semi‐fragile watermark will be designed to be robust to some innocent manipulations, that is 
allowed in the applicative framework, and fragile to hostile attacks [14, 15].
3. Database watermarking: Specificities and a general chain of
watermarking
A database DB is composed of a finite set of relations {Ri}i=1,…,NR. Hereon, for sake of simplic‐
ity and without loss of generality, we will consider one database based on one single relation 
constituted of N unordered tuples {tu}u=1,…,N, each of M attributes {A1, A2,…, AM}. The attribute 
An takes its values within an attribute domain, and tu.An refers to the value of the nth attribute 
of the uth tuple. Each tuple is uniquely identified by either one attribute or a set of attributes, 
and we call its primary key tu.PK. Tuples or attributes in such a database can be reorganized, 
removed and added by the user. In this section, we expose the fundamentals of how this kind 
of structure can be watermarked and with which purposes.
The application of existing signal or image watermarking techniques to databases is not a 
straightforward process. Relational databases differ from multimedia contents in several 
aspects that must be taken into account when developing a watermarking scheme.
3.1. Database structure and watermark insertion/detection synchronization
One of the main differences is that samples in a multimedia signal are sorted into a specific 
order, in a temporal (e.g., audio signal samples) and/or spatial domain (e.g., pixels of an image 
or video), giving a sense of the content itself to the user. Close samples are strongly correlated 
with usually important information redundancy. This is not the case of relational databases, 
the purpose of which is to provide efficient storage of independent elements within a com‐
mon structure. Thus, tuples in a relation are not stored in any specific order. At the same 
time, because tuples or records can be stored and reorganized in many ways in a relation 
without impacting the database information, questions arise between the synchronization of 
the watermark insertion and the watermark reading/extraction processes. Indeed, with sig‐
nals or images, one can count on their intrinsic structure, working, for instance, on blocks or 
groups of consecutive samples or on transformed coefficients so as to conduct the insertion of 
one symbol of the message. The same strategy is not so easy to apply in the case of relational 
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databases where tuples can be displaced, added and removed. Identification of watermarked 
elements in a database (records or attributes) and consequently the synchronization between 
the watermark insertion and detection stages require specific solutions. In order to make the 
watermark insertion/reading independent of the database structure, or more clearly of the way 
this one is stored, a preprocessing step is usually applied before message insertion/reading 
and (see Figure 1) following different possible strategies.
The first approach [5] consists of secretly constituting two groups of tuples based on a secret key. 
One group contains the tuples to be watermarked while the tuples in the second are not modi‐
fied. In order to obtain the group index of a tuple tu in the relation Ri, it makes use of a HASH 
function (H) modulo a parameter  γ ∈ N which controls the number of tuples to modify. If we 
define tu.PK as the primary key of a tuple, KS as the secret watermarking key, mod as the modulo 
operator and ‖ as the concatenation operation, the condition  H ( K S ‖ H  ( t u  . PK ‖   K S ) ) mod  γ  =  0 indi‐
cates whether a tuple must be watermarked or not. In [16], the HASH operation is replaced 
by a pseudo‐random generator initialized with the tuple primary key concatenated with the 
secret key. Notice that these methods allow for embedding a message of one bit only. This con‐
sequently restricts the range of possible applications. In order to increase the capacity, Li et al. [8] 
proposed an evolution of the previous method in which one bit of the message is embedded per 
selected tuple. To do so, the watermark bit to embed in the tuple tu is also selected taking into 
account the tuple primary key tu.PK and the secret key Ks. This allows the insertion of a multi‐bit 
watermark offering more applicative options.
A more advanced solution consists of a “tuple grouping operation,” which outputs a set of 
Ng that is nonintersecting groups of tuples {Gi}i=1,…,Ng. This allows spreading each symbol of a 
message S (or equivalently of the watermark) over several tuples, increasing, then, the water‐
mark robustness against tuple deletion or insertion (i.e., the capability to detect/extract the 
message even if the database is modified).
The first strategy proposed in [17] is based on the existence of special tuples called “markers” 
which serve as a boundary or frontier between groups of tuples organized in a user‐depen‐
dent order. A group corresponds to the tuples between two group markers. More clearly, 
Figure 1. A common database watermarking chain. The message S is the concatenation of different symbols independently 
inserted into groups of tuples secretly constituted based on a secret watermarking key KS.
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tuples are ordered according to the result of a cryptographic HASH operation applied to the 
most significant bits (MSB) of the tuples attributes concatenated to a secret key KS such as 
HASH ( Ks‖MSB‖Ks ) . Then, tuples for which  H ( K s ‖   t u  . PK ) mod e  =  0 , where e is a parameter that fixes 
the size of groups, are chosen as group markers. The main drawback of this approach stands 
on the deletion of some of the markers which will induce a loss of watermark symbols. The 
extracted message will be shorter than the one originally embedded. To overcome this issue, 
the most common strategy consists of calculating the group index number nu  ∈ [0, Ng − 1] of 
tu as in Eq. (1) [18]. Using a cryptographic hash function, such as the secure hash algorithm 
(SHA), ensures the secure partitioning and the equal distribution of tuples into groups.
 n u  = H ( Ks‖H ( Ks‖ t u  . PK ) ) modNg (1)
Once this preprocessing task is conducted, one bit or symbol of the message is then embedded 
per group of tuples by modulating or modifying the values of one or several attributes according 
to the rules of watermarking modulation (e.g., modifying the attribute’s statistics as in Ref. [17] 
or the tuple order as in Ref. [11]). Thus, with Ng groups, the inserted message corresponds to a 
sequence of Ng symbols—S = {si}i=1,…,Ng.
Some other approaches that do not make use of the primary key for group construction have 
also been proposed. Shehab et al. [18] regroup tuples depending on the MSB of some attributes. 
The main disadvantage of this strategy stands on the fact that groups can have very different 
sizes as MSBs do not usually follow uniform distribution. In a similar way, and with the same 
disadvantage, Chang et al. [19] propose to construct a virtual primary key from a fragment of 
some categorical or textual attributes.
3.2. Database manipulations
Another important difference between multimedia and database watermarking is associated with 
the frequency and the nature of manipulations over the data. In the multimedia case, filtering 
and compression operations are common. They modify the signal samples’ values but do not 
change the signal structure (a filtered image or of a part of it will be close to its original version). 
In databases, insertion and deletion of tuples are frequent. They can be seen as sub‐sampling and 
oversampling operations but with irregular distribution, a quite rare situation in signal pro‐
cessing, especially if the process output should keep an image structure. Moreover, databases 
may be queried so as to extract pieces of information that present an interest to the user.
3.3. Numerical and categorical attributes
Beyond the database structure and manipulation, one must also consider that the information 
contained in a database may come from different sources, for example, different services in a 
hospital. Hence, the attributes of the database can be of very heterogeneous nature while hav‐
ing semantic logic. In particular, one may have to handle numerical and categorical attributes 
or complex data such as images and so on. Categorical attributes differ from numerical attri‐
butes in the absence of order relationships in between the values of their domain. For example, 
considering the attribute “eye colour,” no rule states a priori that “blue” is greater or smaller than 
“green.” It is then difficult to apply mathematical operations in this context. We cannot say what 
will be the result of “blue” plus “brown.” This is not the case in multimedia signals where all the 
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samples are numerical with the same dynamic. Nevertheless, solutions have been proposed to
handle such categorical attributes even though it appears more difficult to control the distortion 
and preserve the meaningful value of the database. In a more general way, if image or video 
watermarking makes use of perceptual models of the human perception defects in order to 
mask the watermark, database watermarking requires other kind of distortion control solutions. 
As we will see, they are based on statistical and semantic aspects, some of which will be exposed 
in Section 4.
4. Overview of database watermarking schemes
This section presents an overview of the state of the art in database watermarking. Marking 
modulations are classified according to four criteria. The first two correspond to the robust‐
ness of the watermark or its fragility against database modifications. As stated earlier, 
robustness is the capability to retrieve the watermark after the protected database has been 
innocently (i.e., modifications that are authorized in the applicative framework) or malevo‐
lently (i.e., modification where the purpose is to remove the watermark) modified. Robustness 
is an important property in traitor tracing and copyright protection (ownership proof) frame‐
works. On the contrary, fragility of the watermark to some or all database modifications is a 
property that is at the basis of integrity control (tamper detection) applications.
The other two criteria are watermark imperceptibility and the database information the 
watermarking modulation uses so as to embed the watermark (e.g., categorical or numerical 
attributes, tuples’ order, etc.). The former is a fundamental issue in database watermarking. 
This is why we propose a second classification level which depends on the way methods deal 
with data distortion. We will thus distinguish methods with or without distortion control, 
“distortion free” methods and lossless or reversible methods.
4.1. Robust methods
In the sequel, these methods are presented depending on the pieces of information they modu‐
late in a database. We propose to distinguish three categories. Distortion‐based methods modify or 
alter the values of some attributes of the database, these attributes being numerical or categorical, 
satisfying or not distortion constraints. The second class we suggest to consider regroups lossless 
or reversible distortion‐based methods. The reversibility property ensures that it is possible to remove 
the watermark and to restore the original attributes’ values of the database. The last class of meth‐
ods modulates the database structure for message embedding. These schemes are referred to as 
distortion‐free methods, due to the fact that they do not modify the record attributes values.
4.1.1. Distortion‐based methods
4.1.1.1. Modification of numerical data
The first database watermarking method proposed by Agrawal and Kiernan [5] inserts a water‐
mark by bit substitution into the least significant bits (LSB) of the database attributes’ values. 
The tuples, attributes and bits to be modified are secretly selected by means of a hash operation 
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(see Section 3). In this scheme, the watermark bit sequence depends on the database content
and is not known by the user, that is, it corresponds to a database “footprint.” At the detec‐
tion, if the database has been watermarked, the expected number of bit correspondences (or 
equivalently the correlation) in between the recomputed database footprint and the extracted 
watermark should be near to 100%, while this number logically falls down to 50% if it has not.
Li et al. [8] extended the previous method so as to allow the insertion of a sequence of bits: 
a multi‐bit message. Considering thus a multi‐bit message m, the jth bit of the tth attribute 
At of the record tu, which we call bj, is set to a value  b j ' = b ⊕ m [ q ] , where b∈{0, 1} is a mask bit 
obtained from a random sequence generator S such as b = S(KS‖tu.PK) mod 2, m[q] is the qth 
bit of m secretly selected based on a function of KS and tu.PK and  ⊕ is the xor operator. The 
message is inserted several times in the database. At the detection, for each secretly selected 
tuple, the operation  b ⊕  b 
j
 ' is computed so as to extract the binary value inserted in tu.At. This 
bit extraction is followed by a majority vote strategy so as to determine the final value of the 
extracted message. Such repetition increases the watermark robustness. Since Li et al., differ‐
ent approaches following the same embedding strategy have been proposed with as objective 
to increase the complexity of message extraction or tampering an attacker [20, 21].
4.1.1.2. Modification of categorical data
Categorical attributes differ from numerical data in the absence of order relationships in 
between the values of their attribute domain. Sion et al. [22] were the first to propose a method 
for this kind of data. Let us consider an attribute At which takes its values in the finite value 
domain {a1, a2, a3,…, aNa}. These different values do not have a predefined order. However, a 
numerical value can be arbitrarily assigned to each categorical value creating thus a virtual 
attribute dynamic as for numerical attributes. By doing so, they can then apply a numerical 
attribute modulation, for instance LSB substitution. The main problem of this method is the 
strong distortion it can introduce when the meaning of the new value is considerably different 
from the original one.
4.1.1.3. Introduction of “fake” tuples and/or attributes
Another type of method is based on the insertion of new pieces of information (e.g., tuples or 
attributes) into the database. In that case, even though the original information has not been 
modified, one can consider that a certain distortion results from the additional data. Indeed, 
they can bias the result of database queries or of some statistical analysis. Pournaghshband [23] 
presents a method that inserts false tuples. In order not to impact the database integrity or 
coherence, it constructs primary key values for each new tuple so as to respect the key integ‐
rity constraint (there should not be duplicated primary key values). The detection seeks for 
fake tuples. The presence of one of them indicates that the database has been watermarked as 
they are only known to the database owner.
In a scenario not too different of this one which focuses on the watermarking of ontologies, 
we find the method of Suchanek and Gross‐Amblard [24] based on the same strategy of false 
information insertion in order to identify the ontology owner.
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4.1.2. Distortion control‐based methods
In order to increase the watermark imperceptibility and to not modify the normal use of 
the data, distortion control techniques have been considered. All of them work on numerical 
attributes. Gross‐Amblard published in 2003 a theoretical work [25] oriented to distortion 
minimization in the case of a priori known aggregation queries. Minimal distortion is consid‐
ered to be obtained if the result of these queries is exactly the same as the one obtained with 
nonwatermarked original data. In this framework, Gross‐Amblard modulates pairs of tuples 
involved in the result of the same query with distortion of identical amplitude but of opposite 
sign for each tuple in the couple so as to compensate introduced perturbation in average. This 
algorithm has been extended and implemented in the Watermill method proposed by Lafaye 
et al. [26]. A limitation of this approach is that queries should be a priori known. Moreover, 
only aggregation queries are considered. Regarding other kind of queries (e.g., selection of a 
set of tuples), Lafaye et al. apply the method of Sion et al. [17] which is based on the modifica‐
tion of attribute’s values statistics under information quality constraints, defined by means of 
the mean squared error (MSE). Once groups of tuples are constructed, Sion et al. compute a 
reference value ref that is calculated in each group according to the mean (avg) and the stan‐
dard deviation (σ) of the attribute to the watermark such as: ref = avg + cσ, where c  ∈ (0, 1) is a 
user‐defined parameter. The embedded bit value depends on the number of attributes’ values 
in a group νc that are over this reference. More clearly, for a group of Nt tuples, insertion relies 
on two parameters, νtrue, νfalse  ∈ (0, 1), in a way that a bit “0” is embedded if νc < Nt  × νfalse and a 
bit “1” is embedded if νc > Nt  × νtrue. At the same time, if the modification exceeds the quality 
constraints, a fixed threshold or a rollback operation is applied, that is, all the operations per‐
formed onto the tuples of a group are undone.
Shehab et al. [18] enhanced the method of Sion et al. with a more efficient management of dis‐
tortion constraints, while solving, at the same time, some issues linked to the group creation 
strategy (see Section 2.2). Watermarking is presented as a constrained optimization problem, 
where a dissimulation function Θ is maximized or minimized depending on the bit value to 
embed. The optimization space is limited by the quality constraints set. In the example given 
by the authors, Θ represents the number of elements which exceed a certain reference value 
(same value as in the method of Sion et al.). At the detection, the value of Θ is calculated and 
the detected bit is a 1 (resp. 0) if its value is greater (resp. smaller) than a threshold T. The 
value of T is calculated from the embedding information so as to minimize the probability of 
a decoding error.
Lately, Kamran et al. [27] have proposed the concept of “once‐for‐all” usability constraints. 
Considering a database that should be transferred to several users, they proved that if the 
detection threshold is fixed in order to ensure a correct detection for the most restrictive set of 
constraints, then detection reliability is independent of the constraints. This most restrictive set 
of constraints can be named “once‐for‐all” usability constraints. One drawback of this method 
is that its robustness and the lowest distortion it induces stand on a very short mark embed‐
ded into a few number of tuples. If the “good” tuples are altered, that is the watermarked 
tuples, the database is unprotected. Notice also that the modulation on which this scheme is 
based has some security issues allowing detecting any chosen watermark even if it has not 
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been embedded into the database. The same authors propose in another work a watermarking 
scheme that preserves classification results of an a priori known data‐mining process [28]. 
To do so, attributes are first grouped according to their importance in the mining process. 
Then, some local (i.e., for a set of attributes) and global constraints are derived from some 
dataset statistical characteristics that are relevant to the mining process. Finally, the allowed 
perturbation for a set of attributes is determined by means of optimization techniques.
As it can be seen, all the above methods aim at preserving statistical properties of the data‐
base. They do not consider the existence of strong semantic links in between attributes values 
in a tuple, links that should be preserved when modifying attributes values. Indeed, tuples 
must remain semantically coherent in order to: (i) assure the correct interpretation of the 
information without introducing incoherent or unlikely records and (ii) keep the introduced 
perturbations invisible to the attacker. In order to solve these issues, Franco‐Contreras and 
Coatrieux propose to consider an ontological modeling of the semantic relations between 
attributes values in the database so as to guide the watermark embedding [29]. Being the most 
recent approach in dealing with attributes distortion control, we will present it in more detail 
in the next section.
4.1.3. Lossless or reversible methods
4.1.3.1. Lossless watermarking of numerical data
In some cases, there is an interest or even a need of being able to recover the original database 
from its watermarked version. For instance, one may want to perform some operations on 
the original data or update the watermark. The reversibility property is herein of great inter‐
est. Robust lossless watermarking has been recently considered in the context of relational 
databases. Most of the existing methods are an adaptation of techniques proposed for image 
watermarking [30] and, as these, they are predominantly fragile with some exceptions.
Let us start by the latter, that is, robust methods. In Ref. [31], Gupta and Pieprzyk pro‐
pose a zero‐bit watermarking method where a binary meaningless pattern is embedded into 
secretly chosen tuples with attributes which are real numbers. To do so, a secretly chosen 
LSB from the integer part of an attribute is replaced by a pseudo‐random‐generated bit. To 
make the scheme reversible, the original LSB value is inserted into the space left by shifting 
the LSB representation of the fractional part of the attribute. The presence of the binary pat‐
tern is checked by the detector, indicating if the database has been watermarked or not. In 
order to reduce data distortion, Farfoura et al. [32] suggest watermarking the fractional part 
of one numerical attribute by means of prediction‐error expansion modulation originally 
proposed by Alattar in [33] for images. Although this method is robust against common 
database manipulations (e.g., tuple addition or removal), the watermark will not survive a 
simple rounding integer operation. Beyond, it is important to notice that difference expan‐
sion modulation has not been designed for being robust to attributes’ values modifications 
(this is the same for images). Indeed, Farfoura et al. [32] achieve watermark robustness 
with the help of a majority vote strategy, repeating thus several times the message into the 
database.
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On its side, the method by Li et al. [34] constructs groups of tuples according to a clustering 
technique. The maximal modification that can be introduced into a tuple ensures that it will 
remain in the same group from the detector point of view. The watermarked value of an attri‐
bute is then calculated from an expansion of the polar angle of the attributes to the watermark. 
However, and as reported by its authors, this method is not fully reversible as some little 
errors can be found in the recovered data.
Recently, Franco‐Contreras et al. [35] adapted the lossless watermarking scheme based on circu‐
lar histogram modulation, originally proposed for images by De Vleeschouwer et al. [36], to the 
watermarking of relational databases. More precisely, this scheme modulates the relative angular 
position of the circular histogram center of mass of one numerical attribute in the relation. This 
scheme allows the embedding of a robust sequence and a fragile sequence at the same time and 
it can be thus considered for ownership control and traceability as well as for integrity control. 
Details on experimental and theoretical performance of this scheme can be found in Ref. [35].
4.1.3.2. Reversible watermarking of categorical data
In the method proposed by Chang et al. [19], one bit of a message is embedded by replacing 
the last letter of the last word of a textual attribute with another one from previously con‐
structed reference sets. More precisely, before message embedding, two reference sets are 
constructed, one for each possible bit value, “0” or “1,” which simply correspond to a secret 
ordering of letters in the alphabet, that is {a, b, …, z}. At the detection, the knowledge of these 
reference sets allows for extracting the embedded bit as well as the restoring of the original let‐
ters’ values. If high robustness against classic attacks is achieved, the use of a spelling checker 
will help erase the embedded message.
4.1.3.3. “Attribute distortion‐free” methods
In the above methods, it is assumed that a slight distortion can be carried out for message 
insertion without perturbing the interpretation or any a posteriori uses of data. However, if one 
may consider that no data perturbation can be introduced, methods that do not modify attri‐
butes values can represent as interesting alternatives. These attribute distortion‐free robust 
embedding strategies play on the way textual or categorical attributes values are encoded.
Al‐Haj and Odeh [37] embed a binary image by modifying the number of spaces between 
words. In the same vein, Hanyurwimfura et al. [38] take advantage of the Levenshtein distance 
between words in order to select the words between which the space can be modified, those at 
the smaller distance. Figure 2 illustrates the application of this modulation on a textual attri‐
bute. It is considered that such kind of modification does not induce any information quality 
loss. Instead of modifying the spaces in between words, Shah et al. suggest to alter the encoding 
of attributes values and work with capital and small letters of secretly selected attributes [39]. 
According to the bit to embed the complete word (or phrase) or only the first letter is capital‐
ized. Notice that even if their authors present these methods as being robust, the watermark 
will be easily identified and erased by means of simple manipulations changing the way the 
attributes are encoded (e.g., fixing the number of spaces or changing words’ capitalization).
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4.2. Fragile methods
In contrast to robust methods, fragile methods are designed so as to make the watermark 
disappear after database manipulations. This makes them of interest for verifying the 
integrity of a database (tamper detection), which is the main objective of the following 
methods.
4.2.1. Distortion‐free methods
As stated in Section 4.1.3.3, by definition, such kind of methods do not modify the values of 
the attributes and basically consist of introducing “virtual attributes” or the modulation of the 
tuples’ (or attributes’) organization in the relation.
Prasannakumari [40] proposed the addition of one or several virtual attributes into the rela‐
tion, which will contain the watermark information. They propose the following steps. In a 
first time, groups of tuples are constructed. One or several attributes of NULL value are 
next inserted in all tuples of the relation. For each group, the value of the virtual attribute 
is replaced by an aggregate of the values of a chosen numerical attribute in the group. The 
aggregate can be the sum, the mean value, the median, etc. Then, for each tuple, the checksum 
of each attribute is calculated and concatenated to the virtual attribute value. At the verifica‐
tion stage, the same steps are followed. Integrity of data is verified if recomputed checksums 
correspond to the extracted ones. Working at the tuple level allows the identification of the 
records of the database that have been modified.
Regarding “attribute distortion‐free” strategies playing with the tuple organization, that is 
to say reorganizing the way tuples are ordered in the database, they have been originally 
introduced by Li et al. [11]. Their scheme works as follows. In order to embed the watermark, 
tuples are grouped and ordered into a group depending on the value of a hash function cal‐
culated on some attributes concatenated with the tuple primary key and the owner secret key. 
Database is then rewritten or reorganized so as to store tuples according to the increasing 
order of their hash. For a group i, the watermark is a sequence Wi of length li = Ni/2 with Ni the 
number of tuples in the group. Insertion consists of reorganizing the order of pairs of tuples in 
the group depending on the bit to embed. One bit of Wi is embedded in a pair by interchang‐
ing the position of the tuples in the database so as to encode “1” or left unchanged in order to 
encode “0”. Thus at the detection, if in a pair the hashes of the tuples do not respect their hash 
ordering, a bit value “1” will be extracted, “0” on the contrary. Other approaches that have 
been proposed later on allow the identification of the manipulations the database underwent 
(e.g., tuple suppression) [12, 41] or the increase of the embedding capacity, that is, the number 
of watermark bits that can be embedded [13].
Figure 2. An example of distortion‐free watermarking of categorical attributes considering the method by Al‐Haj and 
Odeh [37].
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It is important to notice that methods based on tuple reordering are extremely fragile and con‐
strain database handling by the database management system (DBMS). Tuple order should be 
preserved. As a consequence, their application context remains limited.
4.2.2. Lossless or reversible methods
Lossless watermarking is well adapted for verifying the integrity or authenticity of a database. 
For instance, it allows the embedding of a digital signature or a message authentication code 
like SHA [15] computed over the whole database. At the verification stage, one just has to 
extract the watermark, restore the database and compare the extracted signature with the 
recomputed one. If signatures do not match, the database has been modified. Such protec‐
tion is based on fragile lossless watermarking and different strategies have been proposed. 
Again, these methods have been derived from reversible watermarking scheme or modulation 
proposed for images.
4.2.2.1. Methods working on numerical data
The histogram shifting (HS) modulation, a well‐known lossless modulation for images, has 
been applied by Zhang et al. [14] to partial errors in a relation, that is in the differences between 
the values of one attribute of two consecutive tuples. The histogram of one digit of these differ‐
ences is computed. Classes on the right side of the maximum class of the histogram are shifted 
to the right, creating thus an empty class close to the histogram maximum (see Figure 3). The 
attributes, the value of which belong to the maximum class, are then shifted to empty class 
value so as to code a “1” or left unchanged to code “0.” The main drawback of this approach 
stands on the fact that consecutive tuples in the relation are not necessarily correlated values 
(contrary to contiguous pixels in an image). As a consequence, the less significant digits of the 
calculated differences may follow an almost uniform distribution, which seriously reduces 
Figure 3. Histogram shifting modulation. (a) Original histogram and (b) histogram of the watermarked data.
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the embedding capacity. Notice that in an image, the pixel difference distribution is close to a 
Gaussian distribution of small standard deviation.
Another approach proposed by Chang and Wu [42] considers the use of a support vector 
machine (SVM) classifier. One SVM is trained with a set of tuples selected so as to obtain a 
classification function f(V) used by the next to predict the values of one numerical attribute. 
Then, they apply the difference expansion modulation, another well‐known lossless water‐
marking modulation, for message embedding. Basically, this modulation expands the dif‐
ferences between original and predicted values adding one virtual least significant bit that is 
used for message embedding. The distortion magnitude is unpredictable and, as underlined 
by its authors, it can be high in some cases.
4.2.2.2. Methods working on categorical data
Coatrieux et al. [15] adapted the histogram shifting modulation to categorical data, being the first 
lossless watermarking method for this kind of attributes. Following the general watermarking 
chain exposed in Figure 1, one group of tuples is secretly divided in two subgroups, SG1 and SG2. 
The number of occurrences of each value of the attributes considered for embedding in SG1 is 
used to construct a virtual dynamic. More clearly, values are organized depending on their cardi‐
nality, as exposed in Figure 4. Attributes of SG2 are then watermarked accordingly to this virtual 
dynamic based on histogram shifting modulation (see Figure 3). The embedded watermark can 
be a signature of the database used to verify its integrity.
4.3. Comparative view of database watermarking methods
A synthetic classification of the methods described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 is given in Table 1, 
depending on: the type of the watermarking modulation, the applicative context, the type of 
the watermarked data, the type of watermark distortion control and, finally, the robustness or 
fragility of the watermark against common attacks.
Figure 4. Histogram shifting applied to one categorical attribute with values {ci}i=0,…,7. SG1‐ tuple subgroup use to derive the 
histogram x‐axis (i.e. “virtual dynamic”). {ci} are sorted depending of their occurrences in SG1. SG2 – tuple subgroup use 
for embedding applying HS based on SG1 virtual dynamic.
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Authors Method Application Data type Distortion control Robustness
Agrawal and 
Kiernan [5]
LSB substitution Ownership proof Numerical No Robust
Li et al. [8] LSB substitution Traitor tracing Numerical No Robust
Wang et al. [20] Insertion of an 
image into LSB
Ownership proof Numerical No Robust
Wang et al. [21] Insertion of speech 
into LSB
Ownership proof Numerical No Robust
Sion et al. [22] MSB of the 
frequency histogram
Ownership proof Categorical No Robust
Pournaghshband 
[23]
Insertion of fake 
tuples
Ownership proof – No Robust
Lafaye et al. [26] Modification of 
pairs of tuples
Traitor tracing Numerical Yes, respecting 
query constraints
Robust
Sion et al. [17] Modification of 
statistics
Ownership proof Numerical Yes, rollback if 
required
Robust
Shehab et al. [18] Modification of 
statistics
Ownership proof Numerical Yes, controlled 
by optimization 
techniques
Robust
Kamran et al [27] Modification of LSB Ownership proof Numerical Yes, parameters 
respecting 
constraints
Robust
Kamran et al [28] Modification of LSB Ownership proof Numerical Yes, controlled 
by optimization 
techniques
Robust
Gupta and 
Pieprzyk [31]
Difference 
expansion
Ownership proof Numerical Yes, reversible Robust
Farfoura et al. [32] Insertion into the 
fractional part
Ownership proof Numerical Yes, reversible Robust
Li et al. [34] Polar angle 
expansion
Ownership proof Numerical Yes, reversible Robust
Franco Contreras 
et al. [35]
Circular histogram 
shifting
Ownership proof Numerical Yes, reversible Robust
Chang et al. [19] Modification of 
letters
Ownership proof Categorical Yes, reversible Robust
Al‐Haj and Odeh 
[37]
Modification of 
spaces between 
words
Ownership proof Text No but distortion 
has no impact
Robust
Haryunwinfura  
et al. [38]
Modification of 
spaces between 
words
Ownership proof Text No but distortion 
has no impact
Robust
Shah et al. [39] Capital/noncapital 
letters
Ownership proof Text No but distortion 
has no impact
Robust
Prasannakumari 
[40]
Insertion of 
attributes
Tamper detection – Distortion free Fragile
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5. Preserving semantic data quality in database watermarking
As exposed in the previous section, distortion control‐based watermarking methods mainly 
focus on minimizing the distortion of the database statistics. Such consideration does not 
necessarily take into account the semantic relationships that exist in between the attributes’ 
values in a tuple. Database semantics should not be neglected; it will avoid the introduction of 
incoherent or impossible records by the watermarking process, records that give clues about 
the presence of a watermark to an attacker.
In this section, we propose the use of an ontological model of the semantic links in between 
the attributes’ values in a relational database in order to minimize the distortion [29].
5.1. Definition and main components of ontology
By definitions in the literature [43–45], ontologies allow defining shared concepts in some 
specific area of knowledge and how these are related by means of a common vocabulary in 
order to overcome the intrinsic heterogeneity and complexity of the real world. An important 
feature of ontologies is that they are interpretable by both human operators and computer 
programs, representing a gateway between human and artificial knowledge.
Even though authors do not come to an agreement in terms of what components ontology 
should have, most definitions contain the following elements defined by Gruber [45]: classes, 
relations, axioms and instances.
Concepts or classes correspond to abstract groups, sets or collections of objects. Examples 
of concepts could be: Person, Car, Thing, etc. The notion of classes depends on ontology. 
Authors Method Application Data type Distortion control Robustness
Li et al. [11] Reordering of order Tamper detection – Distortion free Fragile
Kamel and Kamel 
[12]
Reordering of tuples Tamper detection – Distortion free Fragile
Bhattacharya and 
Cortesi [41]
Reordering of tuples Tamper detection – Distortion free Fragile
Guo [13] Reordering of tuples Tamper detection – Distortion free Fragile
Zhang et al. [14] Histogram shifting 
of partial errors 
histogram
Tamper detection Numerical Yes, reversible Fragile
Chang and Wu 
[42]
SVM used to predict 
values in detection
Tamper detection Numerical Yes Fragile
Coatrieux et al. 
[15]
Histogram shifting 
of categorical 
attributes
Tamper detection Categorical Yes, reversible Fragile
Table 1. A synthetic overview of database watermarking methods.
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For instance, one can define the class “Thing” that (in the abstract sense of the word) may
contain anything one could imagine (e.g., Person, Car, Book, etc.). As exposed, classes can 
contain other classes and a universal class may contain every other class.
An individual or instance corresponds to the ground level concept of ontology; it is a con‐
crete instantiation of an element or an object (e.g., a person named Peter or a car Renault Clio). 
Notice that the frontier between an individual and a class is quite blurred. It relies on the 
considered ontology. Individuals are described in ontology by a set of attributes. Examples 
of attributes can be has‐name, has‐age and so on. The value of an attribute is defined by a data 
type, for example, integer, string.
Objects in the domain are associated by means of relations specifying interactions between 
them. We can have relations between classes, between an individual and a class, between indi‐
viduals, etc. For example, we know that one person is‐child‐of another person or that Batman 
fights‐against the Joker.
We invite the reader to consult [43–45] for more information about ontological modelling of 
knowledge.
5.2. Relational databases and ontologies
A relational database consists of a finite set of relations {Ri}i=1,…,NR where one relation Ri con‐
tains a set of N unordered tuples {tu}u=1,…,N, each of which having M attributes {A1,A2, …,AM} 
(see Section 3). Defined as such, this data structure lacks semantic information about the attri‐
butes meaning and links between different attributes’ values in a tuple. Considering as an 
example the database of inpatient stay records, with a relation to the records which include 
the attributes Gender and Diagnosis, one should take care that the watermarking process does 
not turn a record such as {Gender =”female”, Diagnosis =”pregnant”} into { Gender =”male”, 
Diagnosis =”pregnant”}.
To overcome this issue, we propose to use the concepts and relations of ontology associated 
with the database in order first to model the knowledge one can have of the semantic relation‐
ships in between attributes of tuples and second to identify the maximum tolerated distortion 
for numerical attributes that will be watermarked. To do so, one question to consider is how 
to make interact these two database and ontology structures.
As stated above, concepts in an ontology are linked by means of relationships that specify 
hierarchical or associative interactions between them. From this standpoint, each domain 
value, subset or a range of values of an attribute At can be associated with one ontology con‐
cept. We depict in Figure 5 an illustrative extract of such mapping considering the example of 
one database containing pieces of information related to in‐patient stay records and its associ‐
ated ontology, ontology one must a priori know or elaborate. Notice that such relations cannot 
be easily identified by means of a simple statistical analysis of the database.
In this example, the value “Alzheimer” in the domain of the attribute “diagnosis” can be associ‐
ated to a concept “Alzheimer” in medical ontology. This concept is related to another concept 
“≥ 60 years old,” which can be mapped into a range of possible values for the attribute “age.” 
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From a watermarking point of view, this semantic relationship informs us that one attribute 
age value should not be turned into a value smaller than 60 in a tuple where the “diagnosis” 
attribute value is “Alzheimer.” If we generalize, assuming the numerical attribute At is consid‐
ered for watermarking, its value in the uth tuple, that is tu.At, semantically depends on the set 
of values Stu.At of the other attributes of tu, that is tu.{A1, …,At−1,At+1, …,AM} or a subset of them.
The distortion limits of tu.At can be defined as Rgtu.At, that is, the allowable range of values tu.
At can take after the watermarking process under the semantic constraint set Stu.At in order not 
to introduce incoherent or unlikely tuples in the watermarked database (see Figure 6). If we 
come back to the previous example, where At = “age” is an integer, the value tu.age belongs to 
an integer range Rgtu.age imposed by the set Stu.age = “Alzheimer.”
Let us now consider that a categorical attribute Ac has been selected for message embedding 
in the relational database DB. We recall that tu.Ac corresponds to the value of the attribute Ac 
in the uth tuple.
As above, the range of values Rgtu.Ac that tu.Ac can take is semantically linked as Stu.Ac. Because 
Ac is a categorical attribute, Rgtu.Ac is a set of categorical values Rgtu.Ac = Val1, …, ValNvals. Again, 
Rgtu.Ac can be identified by querying the ontology. For example, if we consider Ac = “diagnosis” 
in regard to the attribute Ac+1 = “gender,” we know that for a tuple where tu.Ac+1 = “Male,” tu.Ac 
cannot be equal to “Multiple gestation.”
Figure 5. An existing connection between a relational database (database plane) and ontology (ontology plane) in the 
case of a database of in‐patient stay records. Dotted and dashed arrows represent ontological relations between concepts 
in the ontology. Solid arrows represent connections between attributes or attributes values and ontological concepts [29].
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It is important to notice that this semantic distortion control is complementary to any other 
statistical distortion control method. Indeed, additionally to the semantic constraints, one may 
aim at preserving the correlation or the mutual information between attributes. Then, a global 
solution associating semantic distortion control and statistics distortion control, such as the tech‐
nique suggested by Kamran et al. [27] can be constructed. This was done in Ref. [29], where it was 
also shown that the semantic control does not reduce the watermark robustness performance.
6. Conclusion
In this chapter, we gave an overview of most recent database watermarking techniques as well 
as of the latest advances in terms of database distortion control. As for multimedia data, like 
images or video, this aspect is important due to the fact that: (i) watermarking should preserve 
data quality and should not interfere with the a posteriori use and interpretation of data and 
(ii) induced distortion should not betray the presence of a watermark. To do so, semantic and 
statistic distortion controls have both to be considered. As illustrated, ontology appears as a 
good candidate so as to model the semantic relationships and will help to avoid the occurrence 
of incoherent or unlikely tuples.
Several issues are still to be considered in database watermarking and have to be addressed. 
Regarding the control of the database distortion, the joint application of statistical and seman‐
tic constraints should be analyzed. Indeed, in order to minimize the risk of incorrect data 
interpretation and to ensure the correct result of data‐mining operations both criteria must be 
considered. Moreover, the automation of distortion control is still a challenge, especially in 
terms of complexity.
Figure 6. Identification of the allowable range Rgtu.At of values the attribute tu.At of the uth record can take for 
watermarking purpose. Rgtu.At is derived from the relationship in between the values of tu.At with those of other attributes 
of tu: (a) when At is only related to At−1 (in that case, the set of constraints is Stu.At = tu.At−1) and (b) when At is only related 
to At−1 and At+1 (in that case, the set of constraints is Stu.At = {tu.At−1, At+1}). In the first case, Rgtu.At corresponds to the union 
of different intervals while in the second it is at the intersection of allowable ranges imposed by the two values in Stu.At.
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Abstract
There has been a significant increase in the implementation of wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) in different disciplines, including the monitoring of maritime environments,
healthcare systems and industrial sectors. WSNs must regulate different sorts of data
transmission such as routing protocols and secure key management protocols. An effi-
cient WSNs’architecture must address the capability for remote sensor data management,
for example encrypted transmitting data between nodes. This system demonstrates the
capability to adapt its sensor members in the network in response to environmental
changes or the condition of sensor nodes. The key management technique for any secure
application must minimally provide security services such as authenticity, confidentiality,
integrity, scalability (S), and flexibility. This chapter studies and analyzes different key
management schemes that are implemented in WSN applications and evaluates the
performance of secure key coordination algorithm for line topology WSNs. This scheme
provides traveling packet for a source to end user via an individually encrypted link
between authenticated sensor nodes. It will be shown how security algorithms are applied
on a network, such as advanced encryption standard (AES)-basedWSNs in real time, e.g.,
Waspmote sensor platform at the University of Limerick Campus.
Keywords: wireless sensor networks,WSN, security, maritime WSN, dynamic symmetric
key update, Waspmote, algorithm, predistribution
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1. Introduction
Key management schemes should provide a level of security requirements, low-energy con-
sumption, and low-key storage overhead (KSO). However, some requirements are conflicting
and difficult to provide at the same time. For these reasons, an efficient key management
scheme should be applied to meet the requirements of the deployed applications. Moreover,
distribution techniques that are applicable employ assorted key management schemes such as
asymmetrical key cryptography and require numerous communication and computation
capabilities. Thus, it is substantial to examine the different requirements, constraints, and
evaluate various key management schemes that are applied to wireless sensor network
(WSNs). The key management schemes based on WSNs must meet particular criteria for
efficiency in light of vulnerability to attackers, including scalability, authenticity, flexibility,
resistance value against node capture, key connectivity, and key storage overhead. This chap-
ter investigates the core mechanism in the security of WSNs, which is managing the security
keys in the network. Although wireless sensor nodes have limited resources and vulnerable
against malicious attacks, different key management schemes in WSNs have been proposed in
order to secure the communications between network members.
This chapter is organized as following; after briefly introduced, a detailed review about the
existing security key management techniques based on symmetric encryption techniques in
WSNs will be presented in Section 2. This chapter will classify schemes into different classes
relying on key distribution approaches into three categories; probabilistic predistribution
technique, deterministic predistribution technique and combined (probabilistic and deter-
ministic) predistribution technique. The most common security schemes implemented in
each technique will be explained and evaluated in detail in Sections 3–5. In Section 6, the
performance evaluation of predistributed schemes will be presented in terms of distribution
technique (DT), node type (NT), scalability (S), resistance value against node capture (RV),
key connectivity (KC), and key storage overhead (KSO). Section 7 will explain the design,
outdoor implementation, and evaluation of a secure and efficient key coordination algorithm
for line topology-based WSNs. The performance evaluation of the outdoor implementation
measurements will be discussed in terms of the received single strength indicator (RSSI) and
current consumption. Section 8 highlights how to connect Libelium motes to IoT sensors via
Intel Galileo in order to provide a secure solution for an end-to-end IoT system via the cloud.
The chapter is concluded in Section 9.
2. Symmetric cryptography key management schemes in WSNs
Most of the key management schemes work in phases including key generation, key transmis-
sion, generation of transport key, and revocation of compromised keys. In the symmetric cryptog-
raphy predistribution scheme, keys are stored in the sensor nodes that are used in a transport key
(session key) generation phase. The predistribution key management techniques can be classified
based on key distribution mechanism to two types: probabilistic and deterministic scheme.
In this section, key management schemes are classified into classes that are relying on key
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distribution approach as illustrated in Figure 1. For a better understanding, we have classified
these existing key management schemes into three different categories according to their
distribution techniques.
3. Symmetrical probabilistic key management based on predistribution
technique
This technique is based on an offline distribution of a number of keys where the identities to
each sensor node (key ring) are drawn from a large pool of keys. The main idea in this scheme is
that any given pair of nodes in the network will share a common key with a certain probability.
The initial step in the deployment phase is the exchanging of keys identifiers between sensor
nodes in order to discover their common keys. A secure channel will be established between
nodes when two nodes notice that they have the same common key [1].
Figure 1. Classification of key management schemes based on symmetric cryptography for WSNs.
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3.1. The basic probabilistic key predistribution scheme
Figure 2 illustrates the basic probabilistic key predistribution scheme. The overlaps between
key rings present the shared keys between sensor nodes. Thus the configuration of the sensor
network topology is established relying upon the secure channels between sensor nodes. After
the deployment phase, and as a result of the exchange of key identifiers messages between
node A and node B, they will use K4 as their shared common key in order to secure the
communication channel between them as shown in Figure 2. ON the other hand; if one sensor
node is captured, the attacker could reveal the key ring which leads to compromised one or
more secure channels in the network.
3.2. Q-composite random key predistribution scheme
Chan et al. [2] proposed a solution to improve the basic probabilistic key predistribution scheme
against node capture attack called q-composite random key predistribution scheme. This solu-
tion used q number of common keys to establish a secure channel between sensor nodes, which
is boosting the network performance against node capture attack. As the number of keys overlap
between two nodes is increased, the scheme performs more resistance against communication
link break attack. Therefore, the scheme provides security under small-scale attacks.
3.3. The multipath reinforcement scheme
The multipath reinforcement scheme offers good security [2]. This scheme relies on updating
links between nodes after the key setup phase. Since security is more of a concern than band-
width or power drain, the scheme offers good security with additional sensor network commu-
nication overhead. The communication links established between sensor nodes after the key
discovery phase in the basic scheme are based on the random selection of keys from the key pool.
This allowed sensor nodes in the network to share a subset of the same keys and, thereby,
possibly threaten multiple nodes when only one is compromised. Firstly, Anderson and Perrig [3]
Figure 2. Key pool scheme of key pool size 16 with 4 size of key ring.
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applied a multipath to reinforce links in a random key establishment scheme, then Chan et al. [2]
used the multipath key reinforcement scheme in order to establish a communication path
between every two sensor nodes in WSNs. This technique makes the multipath reinforce scheme
stronger with communication links better than that the original basic scheme.
3.4. The basic probabilistic key predistribution scheme using deployment acknowledge
To ensure that the attacker cannot compromise secure channels between noncompromised nodes
in Refs. [3, 4] proposed the basic probabilistic key predistribution scheme using deployment
acknowledge. This scheme uses non-uniform probability density functions (pdfs) in order to
perform deployment acknowledge. In other words, the locations of sensor nodes should be in
certain positions. This scheme allowed sensor node to store only the keys that are shared with the
other nodes in the networks.
4. Deterministic technique based on predistribution scheme
Generally, in deterministic technique, only the individual keys are predistributed offline. These
keys are shared between sensor nodes and the base-station. Thus, after deployment, each node
broadcasts only its node identifier using the shared individual keys in order to establish a
secure channel with other nodes in the network. However, there is no demand to exchange key
identifiers. In predistribution deterministic scheme, the pairwise keys are established after the
deployment phase.
4.1. The polynomial-based pairwise key deterministic predistribution scheme
In Ref. [5], polynomial-based pairwise key deterministic predistribution scheme is generated
dependent on a bivariate t-degree polynomial.
f ðx, yÞ ¼
Xn
i, j¼0
qijx
iyj, where qij ¼ qji ð1Þ
where q is a prime number above a finite area of Fq, where that should be large enough for a
secret cryptographic key, and it has the property of f (x, y) = f (y, x). Initially, every sensor node
in the network loaded with a polynomial share of f (x, y), such as f (i, y) in node i. Thus, nodes i
and j can generate the common key via evaluating the f (i,y) at point j or f (j,y) at point i.
For example, we assume that sensor nodes 4 and 5 are loaded with a bivariate two-degree
polynomial:
f ðx, yÞ ¼ x2 þ 3xyþ y2 ð2Þ
So the bivariate two-degree polynomial in node 4 is as follows:
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f ð4, yÞ ¼ 42 þ 3ð4yÞ þ y2 ð3Þ
Also, the bivariate two-degree polynomial in node 5 is as follows:
f ð5, yÞ ¼ 52 þ 3ð5yÞ þ y2 ð4Þ
After nodes exchanged their identifiers, sensor node 4 calculates the share pairwise key with
node 5:
f ð5, 4Þ ¼ 52 þ 3ð5Þð4Þ þ 42 ¼ 101 ð5Þ
And sensor node 5 calculates the shared pairwise key with node 4:
f ð4, 5Þ ¼ 42 þ 3ð4Þð5Þ þ 52 ¼ 101 ð6Þ
This scheme is secure and does not expose the link information of other nodes, if n nodes are
not compromised. This is making n collusion resistant where the n value relies on the sensor
memory storage availability. Since each sensor node in this technique needs to store an
n-degree polynomial, which occupies (n + 1) log(q) memory space. Therefore, this scheme is
suitable only for nodes with big size of memory storage.
4.2. The polynomial pool-based key predistribution scheme
Modifications based on the basic scheme can address the issues of the scheme. Thus, instead of
using a single t-degree polynomial, the polynomial pool-based key predistribution scheme is
used. This scheme has three phases:
Step 1. Setup phase: the setup server randomly selects a subset of polynomials Fi from a set of
a generated bivariate t-degree polynomials F over finite field Fq which are assigned with a
particular ID for the server, and deployed into each node’s memory, e.g., node i.
Fi⊆F ð7Þ
Step 2. Direct key establishment: each sensor node in this stage finds the same share of the
bivariate polynomial with the other nodes. Next process is that each sensor node establishes
the pairwise key.
Step 3. Path key establishment: This phase is based on the key predistribution scheme afore-
mentioned in the previous section.
Initially, randomly selected polynomials are uploaded into each node. However, this scheme will
functionally resemble the polynomial pool-based key distribution, if only one polynomial
remaining in the pool, or all of the polynomials are 0-degree. While polynomial deployment is
the main issue of the setup phase, the complex issue is in the direct key establishment phase,
where each sensor node needs to find the other sensor nodes that share the same polynomial. In
this stage, sensor nodes use two techniques: deterministic pairwise key based on predistribution
scheme [6] and real-time discovery scheme [7]. In the deterministic pairwise key based on
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predistribution scheme, the knowledge of the nodes with which each node will share a polyno-
mial is preloaded. In this approach, each node carries the node IDs of sensor nodes, which share
the same polynomial. The drawbacks of this approach are that sensor node does not offer the
flexibility of joining new nodes into the network. In fact, this approach is predistributed infor-
mation of sensor nodes, which helps an adversary to gain access to the stored data in the case of
a compromised node.
In the real-time discovery approach, source node aims to find a communication path with
other sensor nodes that did not share polynomial in order to establish a pairwise key. The
source node sends a message with the destination node ID to the intermediate nodes that
already share a common key. Since the communication paths between sensor nodes that
share common keys is secure, we assume that a node that is located between the source and
destination shares the same secret key with the destination node. Thus, a communication
link between the source and destination nodes has been discovered through which they may
discover a common key. However, the issue of real-time discovery approach is the overhead
of communication.
4.3. The polynomial pool-based using a grid-based key scheme
Ref. [8] provides all the properties of the polynomial pool-based key predistribution. In this
scheme, each two sensors can establish a pairwise key in case of uncompromised nodes and
the nodes can communicate with each other. Also if some sensor nodes are compromised,
uncompromised nodes still have a great opportunity for the establishment of a pairwise key.
By using grid-based key predistribution, a sensor node can determine the other sensor nodes,
which can establish a pairwise key with, and it can choose which proper polynomial should be
used for key establishment.
This scheme consists of constructing a m�m grid, where the number of sensor nodes in
network can be at most m2 and a set of 2m polynomials is constructed as follows:
ff ci ðx, yÞ, f ri ðx, yÞg, i ¼ 0,…m� 1 ð8Þ
where c and r represent the column and row. Thus, each row i in the grid is associated with a
polynomial f ri ðx, yÞ where i = 0 to m � 1, and each column j in the grid is associated with
polynomial f cj ðx, yÞ where j = 0 to m � 1. The setup server assigns to each node a unique
intersection point (i, j) in the grid and allocated polynomial shares of f ri ðx, yÞ and f cj ðx, yÞ. Using
this information, each node can perform key discovery and path key establishment. Each sensor
node has two bivariate polynomials, while each polynomial (assigned to either the row or the
column) shared by m different sensor nodes in the network. Therefore, each node can directly
establish two (m � 1) pairwise keys with other sensor nodes.
In this scheme, the attacker can prevent the two nodes from establishing a shared key, or by
attacking the communication link between two nodes by either compromising the pairwise
key. Moreover, the adversary can attack the entire sensor network by attacking a pair of nodes
and finding their common key without actually compromising the nodes. This can be done
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through compromising the sharing polynomial of the two nodes. Thus, the attacker must
compromise at least t+1 nodes in order to discover the polynomial share. In case the attacker
successfully discovers the polynomial that is shared between two nodes, sensor nodes can
avoid such an attack by establishing a common key through path key establishment.
4.4. A low-energy key management protocol for wireless sensor networks scheme
Themain idea in Ref. [9] is that sensor nodes do not generate keys, and there is no sensor-to-sensor
secure communication. Thus, each sensor node needs to store particularly two secret keys to
secure the communication links with the base-station and the cluster gateways. Since the sensor
nodes are not trusted in this scheme, storing a small number of keys is advantages for the
memory constrained. These keys are stored in the flash RAM of sensor nodes before deploy-
ment. The gateways must have big size of memory resources in order to store a huge number of
keys. Each gateway in the cluster stores all of the keys that are shared with the sensor nodes,
keys shared with the command node, and key shared with one other gateway in the network
(Figure 3). In addition, the command node stores all of the secret keys in the network.
The number of keys stored by the command node is equal to the total number of the gateways
and the sensor nodes. Before the deployment phase, each sensor is preloaded with the identi-
fier and the shared key of its cluster gateway. Then after deployment, each sensor node
broadcasts “hello” message included in the identifier of its gateway. Therefore, the gateway
shapes the cluster and sends assigned message to all sensor nodes in its own gateway cluster.
Subsequently, each gateway broadcasts the identifiers of its group to the other gateways in the
network. This broadcast stage helps minimize the volume of inter-gateway traffic.
Figure 3. A low-energy key management protocol for WSNs.
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The scheme provides a cost-effective key management infrastructure for security wireless
sensor networks and the sensor nodes are not required to store large numbers of keys. More-
over, the scheme supports key revocation and renewal mechanisms, an energy conserving
technique to provide key management for sensor networks presented as well.
5. Combined techniques based on predistribution scheme
5.1. Location-dependent key management scheme
Relying on their environment positions of nodes, the location-dependent key management
scheme in Ref. [10] decides which keys to load on each node. All sensor nodes in this approach
are considered to be static and communicate through encrypted links, also new nodes can be
added at any time. Additionally, this scheme is assumed that nodes are transmitting at differ-
ent power levels and different ranges. In this scheme, the nodes that transmit at different
power levels and are tamper proof are called anchors. Each sensor node in the location-
dependent key management scheme is preloaded with a subset of keys along with a single
common key that is shared between all nodes. These keys are computed by a key server and
placed into a key pool. However, the anchor nodes do not get keys from the key pool [11].
5.2. Localization encryption and authentication protocol
Zhu et al. [12] innovated a key management scheme called localization encryption and authen-
tication protocol (LEAP). This scheme offers the main WSNs security requirements such as
confidentiality and authentication. Also, LEAP supports diverse communication patterns,
including unicast which is addressing a single node, a local broadcast which is addressing a
group of nodes in a neighborhood, and global broadcast by addressing all the nodes in the
network. One of the crucial points in LEAP is survivability, where compromising of some
sensor nodes does not affect the entire network. Furthermore, LEAP is based on the theory
that different types of messages exchanged between sensor nodes, where all the packets
transferred in the network always need to be authenticated and encryption of packets carrying
routing information is not always needed. In LEAP, each sensor node stores four types of keys
as illustrated in Figure 4 including individual, pairwise, cluster, and group.
• Individual key: This is a unique key that is shared between each sensor node and the base
station in the network. Sensor nodes use this key to secure the communication link with
the base station. The individual key is generated and preloaded into each sensor node
before the deployment process. The individual key KIN for node N (each node has a
unique id) is generated as follows:
KIN ¼ f KmðNÞ ð9Þ
where f is a pseudo-random function and Km is the master key known only to the controller.
Thus, the controller might only keep its master key in order to generate any individual key
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rather than store all the individual keys. In fact, the computational efficiency of pseudoran-
dom functions is negligible, thus the controller generates individual keys on the fly.
• Pairwise key: This key is shared between each sensor node and its immediate neighbors
(one-hop neighbors) in the network. Pairwise Key is used to secure communication links
between sensor nodes which are used to transfer individual messages like sharing a
cluster key or sending data to an aggregator node. Therefore, this type of pairwise key is
most commonly used in the network. This scheme assumes that neighbors of a node are
relatively static and a sensor node that is being added to the network will discover most of
its neighbors at the time of its initial deployment (Test). Moreover, [12] showed in practice
that Test is smaller than the time interval (Tmin) for an attacker to compromise a sensor
node. There are four stages that describe the demonstration of the pairwise key establish-
ment of new deployed node (e.g., N) in the network. These stages are key predistribution,
neighbor discovery, pairwise key establishment, and key erasure.
• Key predistribution: During the initial stage of key predistribution, the KIN is generated by
the controller and loaded into each node. Then each node (e.g., N) computes a master key.
KN ¼ f KINðNÞ ð10Þ
• Neighbor discovery: The first stage in deployment phase is discovering node’s neighbors. By
broadcasting a “hello”message that contains its ID, NodeN starts to discover its neighbors,
and in the same time starts a timer of Test. ACK response of the “hello” message contains
neighbor ID ( e.g., V). Node N authenticates the ACK using master key KV as follows:
KV ¼ f KINðVÞ ð11Þ
Since node N knows KIN, it can also derive KV and then verify node V’s identity.
Figure 4. Communication links in LEAP.
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• Pairwise key establishment: Both Nodes N and V compute their pairwise key as the
following:
KNV ¼ f KV ð12Þ
• Key erasure: In the case a timer expires, node N erases KIN and all the master keys (e.g., Kv)
of the other neighboring nodes, which it generated in the neighbor discovery stage, and
keeps its own master key KN. Subsequently, the communication links between nodeN and
another node cannot be decrypted without the key KIN.
• Cluster key: This is a shared key (Kc) between multiple neighboring nodes, which is
very important since it is mainly used for securing locally broadcast messages. In
case, two neighboring nodes intend to send the same message to the base station, the
node with a better message signal may be elected to send the message to the base
station. A discovery of this process is only possible to implement if a node shares a
common key with its neighboring nodes. In order to reduce the network communi-
cation overhead, LEAP uses cluster key to select which messages to transfer. The
establishment of the cluster key between neighbors in the network relies on the
shared pairwise key. Where node N generates Kc and before it transmits this key to
its neighbors, it needs to encrypt that key using the pairwise key that is shared with
each neighbor (V1, V2, V3,…, Vn). Next step, node V1 decrypts and stores the Kc, and
then it sends back its cluster key to node N. In node revocation, the new cluster key
will be generated and swapped between all the neighboring nodes in the cluster via
the same aforementioned method.
• A global group key: All nodes in the network shared this key including the base
station. This key is used by the base station to encrypt messages which are broad-
casted to all nodes in the network. A basic approach to establish a global key KG for a
sensor network is to preload each node with the global key in key predistribution
stage. However, this key needs to securely update in case a compromised node is
revoked. Ref. [12] proposed an efficient mechanism that relied on cluster keys (Kc),
where the transmission will only be one key. The mechanism was employed in Ref.
[13] for broadcast authentication. The sensor nodes in Ref. [13] are organized into a
breadth-first spanning tree, where each node remembers all the neighbors including
the parent and children of a spanning tree [14].
6. Evaluation of the performance of key predistribution scheme
This section evaluates the performances of aforementioned predistribution schemes in terms of
distribution technique (DT), node type (NT), scalability (S), resistance value against node
capture (RV), key connectivity (KC) and key storage overhead (KSO). Table 1 illustrates the
comparison between the schemes.
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6.1. Key distribution technique (KDT)
The aims of the key management protocol are to establish secure communication links that are
used to exchange data between sensor nodes and update the encryption keys in case of some
node compromised. KDT refers to the approach of distributing secret keys between authorized
sensor nodes in WSN in order to establish secure communication links.
Scheme KDT NT S RV KC KSO Ref
The basic probabilistic
key predistribution
scheme
Probabilistic All Good 1� kringkp Medium Kring [1]
Q-random key
predistribution Scheme
Probabilistic All Medium 1� kring !ðkring�qÞ!ðkring�qÞ!kp ! Poor Kring [2]
The basic multipath
reinforcement scheme
Probabilistic All Good 1� Pð2P�P2ÞNN
0:5865nd2NN
[2, 3]
The basic probabilistic
key predistribution
scheme using
deployment
acknowledge
Probabilistic All Good 1�
m
jSj
1�mjSj
� �x Good ≤ Kring [3, 4]
The polynomial based
pairwise key
deterministic
predistribution scheme
Deterministic All Excellent
1�
k
jSj
� �
1� kjSj
� �x Good ck where(Kring ≤ s) [5]
The polynomial
pool-based using
a grid-based key
scheme [++]
Deterministic All Good 1� 12m�6N Good 2(t + 1)
log(q) +
2(t + 1)l
[6–8]
A low-energy key
management protocol
for wireless sensor
networks scheme
Deterministic 1. Cluster
gateways
Excellent 1� G�1þCN1þC1
Ciþ1þCNi�1þ
Xt
1
Gi�1
Poor G + Ci + 1 [9]
2. Command
nodes
1� GnþG G
3. Ordinary
nodes
1� 1n�1 2 K
Localization encryption
and authentication
protocol
Combined All Excellent 1� 1þ2Nnþnnðn�1Þ
2 þ2Nn
Excellent 2Nn + 3 [11–13]
kring : Key ring.
kp :Key Pool.
q: composite random key.
p: Basic propabilty of sompromise link.
d: Probability of sharing sufficient communication keys.
n: Number of deplied sensor nodes.
|S|: Size of the global key pool.
m: Number of keys carried by each sensor node.
Nn: Number of node neighbors.
x: Number of compromised nodes.
Gk: Keys generation.
C: Total number of independently generated.
Keys via a unique generation key Gk.
S: Polynomials in the sensor node.
G: Number of gateways
Ci: Number of nodes in the cluster.
CNi: command node.
Table 1. Comparison between predistribution schemes.
Advances in Security in Computing and Communications136
6.2. Node type (NT)
As we defined the KDTabove, sensor nodes are classified into different categories based on their
function. In some cases in WSNs, nodes could work as supervised nodes or supervisor nodes.
Thus, in this section, the NT indicates to node classification in the networks.
6.3. Scalability (S)
The term of scalability in WSNs means each key management scheme must allow for the varia-
tion in the size of the network. In other words, distributed scheme must be able to add more
nodes in case of new nodes request to join the network.
6.4. Resistance value against node capture (RV)
As adversary might attack the network by compromising one or more nodes in the network and
reveal the secure communication links between sensor nodes, the attacker can compromise the
entire network. Therefore, keymanagement schememust resist against such attacks. In this section,
we evaluate the RVas the ratio between number of compromised communication links (NCCL) and
the total communication links (NTCL) in the network when one sensor node is compromised:
RV ¼ 1�NCCL
NTCL
ð13Þ
where RV = 1 implies that capturing one sensor node in a key management scheme will not
affect the other secure communication links in the networks. However, RV = 0 implies that
capturing one sensor node in a key management scheme will lead to compromise the rest of
the security communication links in the network.
6.5. Key connectivity (KC)
KC means the probability of neighboring nodes sharing some common keys or nonneighboring
nodes securely communicating via secure intermediate nodes sharing common keys. Therefore,
the communication between sensor nodes in the network must be high.
6.6. Key storage overhead (KSO)
Due to the limitations on sensor nodes in term of memory space, KSO is considered as the most
important constraint in designing suitable key management scheme in WSNs. In this section,
we evaluate KSO as the total number of keys stored in each sensor node in the network.
7. Secure and Efficient Key Coordination Algorithm for Line Topology
Network maintenance for use in maritime wireless sensor networks
The Secure and Efficient Key Coordination Algorithm for Line Topology Network (SEKCA) is a
symmetric security scheme for a maritime coastal environment monitoring-based WSN [15, 16].
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The scheme provides security for travelling packets via individually encrypted links between
authenticated neighbors, thus addressing the main issues in security mechanisms based on the
symmetric encryption algorithm, including memory, storage space, key generation, and a reiter-
ation of a global rekeying process. Furthermore, SEKCA proposes a dynamic update key based
on a trusted node configuration, called a Leader node (Ln), which works as a trusted third party.
The technique has been implemented in real time on a Waspmote test bed sensor platform [16].
The deployment of a Waspmote sensor node integrated with the XBee 802.15.4 pro module in an
outdoor environment using IEEE 802.15.4 /2.4GHz standard will be used to demonstrate the
implementation of the algorithm. This mechanism relies upon the concepts of location-based
routing [17]. Packets travel between nodes based on the information of the next repeater node.
Subsequently, the static position of the sensor node encourages proposing a strategy for manag-
ing and controlling the transmission of secure packets between wireless nodes. In addition,
maintaining network connectivity when removing or joining nodes makes it necessary to know
the identification of the neighboring node/nodes in order to exchange the cryptographic keys
and create a secure communication link. The main idea behind this work is to allow an ordinary
node to determine its authenticated neighbor without the use of complex computations. Nodes
will make their decision depending on the recommendation message from the Ln [16]. The Ln is
located at a calculated distance from the line topology of ordinary nodes. The packet travels from
the source to the destination based on the location of the nodes in the neighboring node’s list of
members, which is coordinated from/by the Ln. Each ordinary node must forward the packet to
its next authenticated neighbor through link encryption with its adjacent key, ”knj”. The funda-
mental motivation behind this strategy is to configure a network line topology with simple and
scalable security algorithms [16]. Figure 5 illustrates the deployment of the nodes in our scheme
and Table 2 provides details on the notation used [16].
7.1. Implementation outline of SEKCA
The Waspmote sensor node as shown in Figure 6 is provided with different frequency radio
and protocols. In SEKCA, the XBee-Pro protocol is used for communication between nodes.
This provides for a maximum communication distance of 7000 m between nodes which is ideal
for the line topology used in a maritime coastal environment monitoring.
SEKCA is based on Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with a key length of 128 bits, where
AES encrypts a block of elements using the electronic codebook (ECB) encryption mode as
shown in Table 3.
Sensor data “M” is encrypted in the application layer via software with AES 128 using the
source key “ks”, which is shared exclusively between the source and the destination nodes.
Then, the encrypted frame is encrypted again with the shared adjacent key “knji” (AES-128),
which is shared exclusively between every set of two neighbors as in Eq. (14). The repeater
node that forwards the sensor data to the destination in the network will decrypt the informa-
tion once using the shared adjacent key, “kni” [16]. Then, to ensure complete confidentiality and
privacy, before forwarding the data to the next repeater, the node will encrypt it via its adjacent
key, “knj”. Thus, the repeater will not be able to see the original sensor data transmitted due to
the encryption with the source key, “ks” [16]. Equation below shows this process where the red
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text indicates decryption with a shared adjacent key which is shared with the neighbor of the
node performing the encryption [16].
! nj: fMgks
n o
k
then at nj: fMgks
n o
k
n o
k then nj ! nk: fMgks
n o
knj
etc: ð14Þ
All ordinary nodes and the Ln must share a master key called the Leader node key, “kLn”. This
key is used for all the confidential communication between network members in processes such
Symbol Description
ni, nj, nk, nl Ordinary nodes in the line topology.
Ln Leader node.
{ }k Symmetric encryption/decryption with key K.
M Transmitted sensor data.
ks Secret encryption source key.
kni Secret encryption adjacent key of node i.
ki Secret encryption individual key of node i.
kLn Secret encryption leader node key.
{{M}ks}kni Sensor data encrypted with source and adjacent keys.
{M}ki Message encrypted with individual key of node i.
{M}kLn Message encrypted with leader nod key.
Table 2. Explanation of notation used in Figure 1.
Figure 5. Nodes in line topology “originally published in Ref. [16], under a CC BY license”.
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as when a new member joins the network, and for monitoring the behavior of the ordinary
nodes [16]. The individual key “kj” is a unique predistributed key between every ordinary
node and the leader node. This key is used in the re-keying phase during the revocation
process [16].
In the case of a network member being revoked, only the leader node key ‘kln’, and one adjacent
key needs to be renewed [16]. Subsequently, every node in the network has a key re-generation
mechanism to create a new key [16]. This mechanism relies upon theMessage Digest 5 algorithm
(MD5) outlined in Table 4 and a hash of the Real Time Clock (RTC) value as shown below.
k ¼ HðRTCÞ ð15Þ
Due to the straight line network topology, only the node located before the revoked node must
update its own adjacent key ”knj”. This node then needs to share its new key with the new
neighbor that replaces the revoked node in the authenticated neighbors list [16]. This stage is
coordinated by the Ln via a method of unicasting a revoked message that is encrypted with a
predistributed individual key “kj” [16].
Figure 6. Waspmote components top and bottom sides “originally published in Ref. [16], under a CC BY license”.
Algorithm Key size Data block size Mode cipher Padding
AES-128 128 bits 16 bytes ECB ZEROS
Table 3. AES-128 with ECB cipher mode and zeros padding “originally published in Ref. [16], under a CC BY license”.
Algorithm Output size (bits) Internal state size (bits) Block size (bits) Max message size (bits) Word size (bit)
MD5 128 128 512 264-1 32
Table 4. MD5 hash algorithm “originally published in Ref. [16], under a CC BY license”.
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7.2. Practical outdoor implementation of SEKCA
The outdoor implementation involves four Waspmote nodes, a Waspmote Gateway, four XBee
802.15.4 Pro modules with antennae, an MC1322x USB ZigBee dongle, an Agilent 66321D
mobile communication DC Source, a Waspmote Pro IDE version 04 with Waspmote Pro API
version 013 software based on Arduino, X-CTU provided by Digi, and the Wireshark network
analyser [16]. Each Waspmote was placed on a fixed pole at a height of 80 cm from the ground.
The effects of temperature and humidity on RSSI in WSNs as in Ref. [18] were considered. In
this scenario the temperature was between 20 and 21C and the humidity was 70%. SEKCA
was implemented into three scenarios [16]:
• Four nodes and the gateway at a distance of 80, 120, or 160 m between end points in line
topology.
• Three nodes and the gateway at a distance of 80, 120, or 160 m between end points in the
line topology.
• One repeater node between sender and the gateway at a distance of 80, 120, or 160 m
between ends in the line topology [16].
In this experiment, the received single strength indicator (RSSI) was measured at the gateway.
Figure 7 shows the average value of RSSI which was measured after receiving 300 encrypted
packets of 79 bytes in size at a baud rate of 115,200 bps [16]. These values were measured in the
three aforementioned scenarios of distances and repeaters. The signal strength in the 80 m
scenario was the strongest in the all case of one, two, and three repeaters at exactly—48, 41
and 36 dB, respectively. However, in the case of one repeater the 160 m scenario had the
minimum signal strength value at 64 dB. While, in the case of all possible scenarios the
maximum achievable signal strength is36 dB, which is the 80 m distance with three repeaters
Figure 7. Average RSSI in three different scenarios of outdoor implementation “originally published in Ref. [16], under a
CC BY license”.
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scenario. These measurements are then used by the leader node to determine the positions of
future new joining nodes into the line topology [16].
Data processing relies on the size of the data and the approach used in processing this data.
Furthermore, SEKCA has been adapted to use minimum current consumption for data
processing. The current consumption of the transmission data has been improved by using
sleeping schedules for the receiving/transmitting modules (the XBee current consumption is
from 37 to 64 mA with the mode ON fully operational). The measurements were taken using
the 66321D-Agilent with input 3.689 V and 0.19999 Ω resistance. The average current con-
sumption of the XBee module is 64.9123 mA when the leader node is operational. The mea-
sured current consumption has been improved from 64.9123 to 7.4355 mA, when the system
returned to sleeping mode after transmitting/receiving data, which is a reduction of over 88%.
Table 5 provides the current consumption of the scheme modes, this includes when the XBee
module is fully functional and sleeping [16].
SEKCA has improved some common security issues in WSNs [16], including:
• Efficiency: 88.55% of current consumption was reduced using the XBee sleeping mode.
This will improve the lifetime of all network sensor nodes.
• Data confidentiality: By doubling the encryption of the messages, we ensure that only the
gateway in the network can decrypt the original data (using AES 128) and after that, we
establish peer-to-peer encryption between repeaters [16].
• Authentication: Each node has an individual key shared with the leader node, which is
used to “sign” the messages in order to ensure the authenticity of the new neighbor and
the rekeying. This signing is performed when the leader node reconfigures the network
topology in the case of joining or revoking network members [16].
• Memory capacity storage: By using the re-generation function, there is no need for each
node to store as many keys as are required in some key predistribution schemes where a
large pool of keys is located in each node before deployment. In our scheme, each node
has only four keys. Therefore, every node requires only a small amount of memory for key
storage, which is four times 128 bits [16].
• Non-repudiation: by signing the XBee acknowledgment messages, there is now verifiable
proof that the information sent has really been received by a specific sensor node. This
Scheme mode Max measured current
consumption (mA)
Min measured current
consumption (mA)
Average measured current
consumption (mA)
Fully functional system 66.732 63.5297 64.9123
XBee module (sleeping) 9.4567 5.6248 7.4355
XBee module current consumption
(awake)
57.2753 57.9049 57.4768
Table 5. Measured current consumption of scheme modes “originally published in Ref. [16], under a CC BY license”.
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signing using a shared source/destination key, Ks, that provides weak nonrepudiation as a
public key scheme is not yet available in our system.
• Forward security: In the reconfiguration of the scheme, new neighbors could not commu-
nicate directly before authentication process. The authentication process coordinates via a
leader node [16].
• Backward security: When a node is revoked from the network, the system ensures that the
node cannot receive any new data from the network [16].
8. Toward connecting Libelium Motes to IoT sensors via Intel Galileo
Currently, the system being proposed uses Libelium motes, which connect sensors to the Intel
Galileo board. Different Libelium motes show Arduino wireless modules that may be
connected to Intel Galileo. These modules are RFID, NFC, Bluetooth, BLE, Wi-Fi, GPRS, 3G,
and GPS, which may be connected as Libelium’s open hardware division. Now, the Intel
Galileo is based on the single core 32bit, 400MHz Quark SoC X1000 processor. In addition, it
supports 3.3 or 5 volt shields and has an Ethernet port and two USB ports. Moreover, Galileo
software is compatible with Windows, Mac OS and Linux, and the Intel Galileo development
board is a prodigious tool for quickly prototyping simple, interactive designs for different types
of IoT projects. According to the related works such as Refs. [18–20], it is noticeable that Galileo
board is a promising and great tool for any potential IoT projects. When integrating it with
sensors it can make big gains thereby bringing several IoT projects to life. Various IoT objects can
access and control components such as temperature sensors, humidity sensors, gas sensors and
light sensors, and so on. Essentially, sensors are considered the eyes and ears of potential IoT
objects by many engineers and researches. This paradigm is proposed to be an end-to-end two-
way communication that can be set-up with MQTT protocol as it is a secure solution for an end-
to-end IoT system via the cloud. This includes encrypted data in a cloud to keep the data safe in
the cloud.
9. Conclusion
This chapter presents an overview of existing key management distribution schemes of a WSN
running a symmetric encryption security scheme. A review of probabilistic and deterministic
basic key predistribution techniques has shown that the key management-based symmetric
encryption algorithm requires less computation and energy consumption; however, these
techniques have weaknesses in scalability, resistance value against node capture, and key storage
overhead. These weaknesses make them nonapplicable to large-scale wireless sensor networks.
Furthermore, different probabilistic and deterministic schemes’ basic key predistribution tech-
nique was compared in terms of key distribution technique (probabilistic/deterministic), scalabil-
ity, resistance value against node capture, key connectivity, and key storage overhead in order to
show an efficient symmetric-key based scheme for WSNs. In addition to the key management
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schemes for WSNs, Secure and Efficient Key Coordination Algorithm for Line Topology Net-
work (SEKCA) was also described. The algorithm tackled number of security services such as
that made the re-keying process a local operation and minimized the use of key memory storage.
The technique was implemented on theWaspmote platform in real time and analysed in terms of
a received single strength indicator (RSSI) and current consumption. As cloud computing
addresses the issues of data storage, it is also providing a secure solution for an end-to-end IoT
system; whereas, security keys could be generated and stored in the cloud.
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Abstract
This chapter investigates the secrecy-energy trade-offs for communication in wireless
networks. It is shown that privacy requirements for applications such as image or video
transmissions do not require perfect secrecy, and the level of privacy can be quantified
using a Rate-Distortion metric. Using information theoretic analysis, the chapter formu-
lates analytic secrecy trade-offs for various communication channel models. In particu-
lar we analyze the advantage of partial secrecy for the Gaussian and Rayleigh fading
channel models and the MIMO channel. The impact of secrecy requirements and the
inherent secrecy-energy-connectivity trade-offs are also analyzed for networks of wire-
less nodes.
Keywords: partial secrecy, physical layer security, information theoretic secrecy, one
point to one point communication, network level communication
1. Introduction
The secrecy of wireless communication was studied from an information theoretic perspective,
and equivocation rate was defined to characterize secrecy capacity. Equivocation rate mea-
sures the uncertainty that the eavesdropper decodes about the transmitted message with a
certain rate during a transmission. Perfect secrecy can be achieved if the equivocation rate is
equal to the transmitted rate. In this chapter, the notion of partial secrecy is introduced, for the
scenario that perfect secrecy cannot be achieve. The reason for studying partial secrecy is based
on the consideration about another key performance metric of communication systems, energy
efficiency. The energy savings can be obtained when a partial secrecy requirement is enforced.
For many practical applications, such as voice and image transmission, a certain percentage of
loss will be accepted, since decoded data is useless for the eavesdropper. The quality of the
© 2017 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
source data reconstruction for those applications is typically characterized by the rate-distortion
function. For example some certain scenarios will keep the eavesdropped message useless for the
eavesdropper, such as some images for which all the key objects in the image have been
transmitted with perfect secrecy, while the other objects and background in the image that are
not important are transmitted without secrecy constrains.
To characterize the partial secrecy, the physical layer and application layer secrecy requirement
was analyzed jointly. At the physical layer, the equivocation rate characterizes the uncertainty
remaining at the eavesdropper after receiving the transmitted message. At the application
layer, the application layer secrecy would be achieve if there is a close to no message which is
decoded by the eavesdropper at application layer, and from the information theoretic view, the
application layer secrecy is characterized by the rate-distortion function. The application lay
metric is the rate-distortion function, and physical layer secrecy metrics is equivocation, which
directly translates to the secrecy capacity.
In the remaining, the energy-secrecy trade-offs was studied for one point to one point communi-
cation, such as the Gaussian fading channels, MIMO channel and network level communication.
In Section 2, the background was mentioned and in Section 3 systemmodel was introduced, and
in Sections 3 and 4 the partial secrecy in one point to one point communication and in network
level communication has been studied. In Section 5, the further work is depicted.
2. Background
In the chapter, the work is based on the rich literature about information theoretic results for the
secrecy capacity for various channel models. The perfect secrecy was in introduced and the
wire-tap channel model was also first introduced in Ref. [1]. Later, the classic Gaussian wire-tap
channel was introduced in Ref. [2], and the perfect secrecy capacity was first derived. The perfect
secrecy capacity was analyzed for fading channels and multiple antennas, for example, in Refs.
[3, 4]. An extension of the wire-tap channel model when a common message is transmitted was
first proposed in Ref. [5], and it is known as the Broadcast Channel with Confidential Messages
(BCC). In Ref. [5] capacity-equivocation region and the perfect secrecy capacity of the discrete
memory-less BCC was characterized, while in Refs. [6–8] a more general channel model for the
fading BCCwas considered. Further results of the secrecy capacity of the BCCwas studied [9–11].
Also more recently, multi-users extensions of the wiretap channel and broadcast channel have
been investigated in Refs. [1, 12]. The multi-receivers wire-tap channel was considered, and its
perfect secrecy capacity was derived for an arbitrary number of users in Refs. [13–15], and for
two users in Ref. [16]. The perfect secrecy capacity of the Gaussian scalar multi-receivers wiretap
channel, a degraded multi-receivers wiretap channel, was also derived in Refs. [17, 18]. Outage
capacity analysis was also proposed for Gaussian MIMO channel in several papers in the
literature, such as in Ref. [19].
About secrecy graph for network connectivity, based on a secrecy graph framework [20],
earlier work in the literature has proposed network connectivity models, based on this eaves-
dropper worse than receiver channel condition, showing that network connectivity can be
greatly affected by secrecy requirements, such as in Refs. [21, 22].
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3. System model
Partial secrecy can be achieved when energy per bit cost need to be reduced, and thus for
suitable applications the source may trade-off energy expenditure for secrecy rate. The com-
mon definition of secrecy capacity as the maximum rate at which the transmitted message can
be transmitted with perfect secrecy was adopted. For this scenario this chapter considers that
the initial stream of data can be split into private and non-private information sub-streams, but
without imposing the condition that the non-private sub-stream needs to correctly decoded by
the eavesdropper as in the previous work in Ref. [23]. R0 and Rs was denoted as the transmis-
sion rate of the non-private sub-stream and the private sub-stream, respectively, with the total
transmission rate being defined as Rt = R0 + Rs.
In partial secrecy, the equivocation rate may be smaller than the transmission rate at physical
layer. From information theoretic, transmission rate, R, is measured in bits per transmission, if
R bits information are transmitted by the transmitter. Assume that a maximum transmission
power P can be used by the transmitter, and that transmitter has limited battery energy. Hence
a performance metric, the energy per bit, is considered in partial secrecy. Therefore, the new
metric of partial secrecy is characterized by energy per bit, Eb. Although the actual transmis-
sion rate is related to the system bandwidth, energy per bit is beyond the scope of that
discussion. To characterize the energy efficiency of the transmission, the average energy per
bit consumption was defined as
ð1Þ
where P is the average power transmission constraint, and R is the number of bits per trans-
mission.
In partial secrecy, the minimum Distortion, Dmin, is the new metric at the application layer. The
new metric is measured the transmitted message, which can be guaranteed to achieve at the
eavesdropper. Also, the minimum Distortion is related to the transmission rate, and it accurately
represent the transmitted message. For illustration purposes, a very simple rate-distortion func-
tion was characterized the distortion in the source reconstruction of transmitted message at the
eavesdropper is defined as the ratio between the secrecy rate and the total transmission rate. The
minimum guaranteed distortion metric, Dmin, was defined as the percentage of the source rate
that achieves secrecy, and thus will not be available at the eavesdropper:
ð2Þ
4. Partial secrecy in one point to one point communication
In Gaussian fading channel model, the partial secrecy applied in two cases: the known full
channel CSI (Channel Statement Information) and known partial channel CSI, in which only
the main channel CSI is known and channel from source to eavesdropper is not known.
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Assume that the block length is large enough such that coding over one block can achieve a
small probability of error. The channel input-output relationship is given by
ð3Þ
where X is the channel input, and Y and Z are channel outputs at the legitimate receiver and
eavesdropper, respectively. The channel gain coefficients h1 and h2 are proper complex random
variables. We assume that hi is a stationary and ergodic random process. The noise processes
W and V are zero-mean independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) proper complex Gauss-
ian random variables with variances μ2 and σ2, respectively. The input X is subject to the
average power constraint P. This chapter assumes different noise power levels and different
constant fading gain coefficients for the intended receiver and the eavesdropper. In the previ-
ous work [23], the ergodic partial secrecy capacity for this channel model is characterized as:
ð4Þ
where 1�β is the fraction of the total power allocated to the common message, and β is the
fraction of the power budget that is allocated to the confidential message, which can be
determined optimally [23], such as to maximize the partial secrecy capacity Eq. (4).
As in Ref. [23], given the power budget P, β can be optimized to achieve the secrecy-capacity
boundary, under the observation that the secrecy-capacity region is convex:
ð5Þ
ð6Þ
For β ∈ [0,1], the condition should be satisfied
ð7Þ
The choice of the ratio γ1/γ0, characterizes the energy-secrecy trade-off, by influencing both the
achievable Rs, as well as the achievable Rt.
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For applications more sensitive to transmission delay constraints, the outage partial secrecy
capacity was investigate, defined as the maximum transmission and secrecy rate that can be
supported for a given outage probability constraint, under the assumption that both the
transmitter and the receiver have perfect channel-state information for both the regular trans-
mission, as well as for the eavesdropper channel. Here the assumption is that the transmitter
will defer transmission for the states that are associated with outage, and hence incur trans-
mission delay.
was used to represent a target rate pair. The non-private sub-stream is transmitted at
the rate R0, while the private sub-stream is transmitted at the rate Rs. If the target rate pair is
not achieved, an outage is claimed. The outage probability was defined as
ð8Þ
where is the secrecy capacity region for the channel with fading state, and
is the transmission power used by the source node. The transmission power is adapted to
the CSI. The outage probability is considered under a long-term average power constraint P, so
we have
ð9Þ
For this scenario, the Rayleigh-fading broadcast channel with confidential messages was
considered. Therefore |h1|
2 and |h2|
2 are exponentially distributed with parameters δ1 and
δ2, respectively.
From the partial secrecy capacity region Eq. (4) we have the following two conditions:
ð10Þ
Rewriting these conditions to reflect the constraints on the link gain values, such that the
required transmission rate (R0) and secrecy rates (Rs) are achievable, we obtain
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ð11Þ
Hence, the outage probability can be computed as the probability that the above conditions
hold,
ð12Þ
where and .
Similar as the known full channel CSI case, the partial secrecy-capacity region for the
guaranteed partial secrecy channel can be determined as:
ð13Þ
where p0 is the power allocated to the no-private message, and p1 is the power allocated to the
private message. This partial secrecy channel region relies on the assumption of large coher-
ence intervals and ensures that when h2 < h1. And the transmitter is under the power con-
straint
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E P h1j jð Þ2
h i
≤P: ð14Þ
For this scenario, the Rayleigh fading channel was considered. Therefore, in the Rayleigh
fading channel, the partial secrecy capacity region could be changed to
ð15Þ
It is easy to check that the objective function is concave in p1 and hence, by derivation approach
for maxing Rs, we get the following optimality condition
ð16Þ
For any main channel fading state is , and eavesdropper channel state is
. The optimal transmit power level p1 is determined from the above equation. If
the obtained power level turns out to be negative, then the optimal value of p1 is equal to 0.
In the Rayleigh fading channel, the condition can be rewrite as
ð17Þ
If there is no positive solution to this equation for a particular, then we set p1 = 0.
Energy-Secrecy Trade-offs for Wireless Communication
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.69247
155
From the partial secrecy capacity region formula, the two conditions is abstained as following:
ð18Þ
Rewriting these conditions to reflect the constraints on the link gains values such as given
transmission rate (R0) and secrecy rates (Rs) are achievable, we obtain:
ð19Þ
Hence, the outage probability could be computed as the probability that the above conditions
Eq. (19) do not hold.
ð20Þ
In order to determine the partial capacity region for the MIMO fading channels, this chapter
start from the results derived in Ref. [24] for perfect secrecy he MIMO Gaussian broadcast
channel with non-private and confidential message. It expands the analysis in Ref. [24] to
account for the fading model presented in partial secrecy, and consider that the private sub-
stream will be transmitted as a private message (with rate Rs) and the no-private sub-stream
will have no secrecy constraints and only the constraint that it will be correctly received by the
intended receiver. The non-private stream will be transmitted with rate R0.
The partial secrecy capacity formula can be then be determined as:
ð21Þ
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where (�)H denotes the Hermitian transpose. In a full-rank system, Eq. (21) can be simplified
by using singular value decomposition as
ð22Þ
where λi(H1H1
H) or λi(H2H2
H) are the eigenvalues of H1H1
H and H2H2
H. At the ith antennas,
the power allocation is (1�βi)P for the non-private sub-stream, and the power allocation is βiP
for the private sub-stream.
As in Eq. (22), given that the power budget P, βi can be optimized to achieve the secrecy-capacity
boundary, and under the observation that the secrecy-capacity region is convex, we have the
optimization condition:
ð23Þ
By taking the derivative and setting it to 0 we get the optimal power allocation between the
non-private and private sub-streams:
ð24Þ
When there are stringent delay constraints, the transmitter cannot defer transmission and
consequently, for some states of the channel, and outage may occur. Outage the event is
defined as which the secrecy rate Rs is not contained in the partial secrecy capacity,
ð25Þ
In case of an outage, the private sub-stream is not secured against eavesdropping. The proba-
bility of this event happening is referred to as the secrecy outage probability.
Formula (22) shows the partial secrecy capacity, as a function of the eigenvalues of matrix
HkHk
H, which are random variables. The joint probability density function (pdf.) of these
eigenvalues, after being ordered according to their amplitude, has been shown in Ref. [19] to be
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ð26Þ
where KM,N is a normalizing factor.
Using the pdf in Eq. (26), the secrecy outage probability could be derived as follows
ð27Þ
where tr(A) denotes the trace of A, and is the expectation of
. P[x,a] is the normalized incomplete gamma function defined as
ð28Þ
5. Partial secrecy in network level communication
In the wireless network, the partial secrecy-capacity region for transmission between nodes i
and j, with eavesdropper e* is given similarly as Eq. (4)
ð29Þ
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Similar as Eq. (4), μ2 and σ2 represent the channel noise levels at the receiver and eavesdropper,
respectively. Also, P represents the transmission power, with a power fraction β which is
power allocation fraction to the private stream.
The average link gain in Eq. (29) can be determined based on the distance between the
receiving and the transmitting nodes:
ð30Þ
where α is the amplitude loss exponent.
Then e* is denoted the eavesdropper with the nearest to the transmitter i,
ð31Þ
To better analyze the privacy requirements on the network connectivity, we define the distance
ratio ξ, as the ratio of the distance between the transmitter and eavesdropper versus the
transmitter and receiver, as
ð32Þ
R is the maximum distance for transmission achievable between transmitter and receiver at
given rate and secrecy constraints. r is the minimum distance requirement between transmitter
and eavesdropper.
Using Eqs. (29) and (30) in conjunction with Eq. (32), we rewrite the partial secrecy capacity as
follows
ð33Þ
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The legitimate nodes and potential eavesdroppers are randomly located in the space according
to a Poisson Point Process. To capture Eq. (29), the distance between the transmitter to closest
eavesdropper node is further than the distance from transmitter to the receiver, which is
equivalent to a geometrical condition: r ≥ R.
The distance was derived to meet the constraints about the transmission rate, energy and
secrecy requirement, according to Eqs. (29) and (32). A family of graphs is characterize by the
secrecy and rate requirement.
Let denote the set of legitimate nodes, and denote the set of
eavesdroppers. We define the rate secrecy family of graphs , characterized by
energy per bit and secrecy rate requirements, as the graph with vertex set and edge set
ð34Þ
where Cps is the partial secrecy capacity of the link between the transmitter xi and the receiver
xj, such as in Eqs. (29) and (30). η0 is a threshold of the minimum required transmission rate for
the communication link, and η0D is a threshold is the required minimum secrecy rate for the
communication links.
The condition of the edge in Eq. (34) can be rewrote as a geometrical relationship between the
requirements for the distance from transmitter to receiver, and to the eavesdropper, as a
function of distortion and energy per bit based on Eqs. (29) and (33), with η = η0/2:
ð35Þ
Figure 1 shows the dependence of the achievable secrecy rate, the overall transmission rate, the
non-private stream rate and the distortion at the eavesdropper, as functions of the distance
ratio metric. Numerical results were obtained for α = 2 and μ2 = σ2 = 1. Unless otherwise
specified, R = 1.
Figure 1 shows us that the highest transmission rate, yielding the most energy efficient
transmission, is obtained for the case in which the eavesdropper is more further than the
legitimate receiver, larger ξ. This case also related to perfect secrecy, but it will enforce more
stricter constraints for the link availability at the network level. Hence it will negatively impact
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connectivity. If the eavesdropper is closer to the transmitter, the network connectivity is
improved, while the higher energy expense is also much higher.
As in Ref. [20], the Poisson rate-secrecy graph is defined. In the Poisson rate-secrecy graph, Π,
ΠE are mutually independent, homogeneous Poisson point processes with densities λ and λE,
respectively, and consider λ = 1. But the rate-secrecy graphs are redefined by the transmission
range and the distance ratio requirements by incorporate energy and secrecy constraints.
The edge condition in Eq. (35) is rewrite based on definition Eq. (34):
ð36Þ
Eq. (37) shows that a rate-secrecy capacity feasibility condition can be obtained by requiring to
be positive, and it is given by
ð37Þ
The bounds in Eqs. (36) and (37) hold for β ∈ [0,1].
Eq. (37) gives a bound on the maximum transmission range that can be achieved, given
transmission rate, energy per bit consumption, and eavesdropper’s distortion constraints. For
a given transmission rate and distortion requirements, the range of transmission can be made
infinitely large by allowing infinitely large transmission power, with the energy per bit con-
sumption going to infinity.
Figure 1. Secrecy-energy-connectivity trade-offs.
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From Eqs. (36) and (37), it shows that secrecy can be achieved when we impose a range and a
distance ratio constraint. The connectivity of the network is analyzed by determining the out-
degree distributions of the nodes, and the probability of out-isolation, and the average out-degree
for an arbitrary node in the network are studied.
There are two cases, which are worth to study: (a) the range limited case – for which distance
from transmitter and receiver, R, is limited to a maximum value; (b) the unlimited case -
, which corresponds to the unlimited transmission power case.
For the range limited case, unlimited transmission power and no range transmission limit is
imposed. To calculate the out-degree of a vertex, we follow a derivation similar to that in
Eq. (35), where it replaces the condition R < r. The out-degree probability can be wrote as:
ð38Þ
The probability that the origin node cannot communicate with another node in
(out-isolation) is then determined to be
ð39Þ
When a transmission power constraint is imposed, a maximum transmission range R can be
determined as in Eq. (37).
As in Ref. [20], this thesis distinguishes two cases:
1. There is no eavesdropper inside a circle with radius r = ξR. This case occurs with proba-
bility
ð40Þ
For this case, the number of good nodes inside the radius R is given by a Poisson
distribution, with the mean, πR2.
2. There is an eavesdropper at the distance, ρ. Then the number of good nodes is given by a
Poisson distribution restricted to a radius R0 = ρ/ξ, with the mean of πR02 = πρ2/ξ2.
Averaging cases (1) and (2) and making the change of variable r = ρ2/ξ2, we obtain an out-degree
probability expression similar to that in Ref. [20], but for an enhanced equivalent arrival rate for
the eavesdropper, :
ð41Þ
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in which a is πR2(λ*E + 1), and R is transmission range radius. Also, Γ(.,.) is the upper
incomplete gamma function.
Hence, the probability of out-isolation is derived as
ð42Þ
The mean out-degree or in-degree can be determined to be
ð43Þ
To achieve numerical results, we assume λ = 1 m�2 and λE = 0.08 m
�2. Figure 2 analyzes the
out-degree probability on different secrecy level, D. The secrecy level is selected for perfect
secrecy (D = 1) and for a value of distortion that gives a good level of privacy (D = 0.6). In
Figure 2, the significant impact on network connectivity works when the secrecy constraint
imposes. Note also that ξ = 1, which is the secrecy constraint imposed in Eq. (33), yields
non-secrecy (D = 0), when transmission rate and energy constraints are also imposed.
In Figure 3, it shows the probability of out-isolation and the mean out degree distribution at the
case of limited transmission range. When the secrecy level increases, the probability of out-
isolation significantly increases. At the perfect secrecy situation, under transmission rate require-
ments, a minimum value of ξ, 2.5, is required (see Figure 1). And at the perfect secrecy, it leads to
a 3.4 times increasing in the out-isolation probability and a 58% decreasing in the average mean
Figure 2. Out-degree probability—unlimited range scenario.
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degree, compared to the perfect secrecy studied in Ref. [20]. We also note that by relaxing the
secrecy requirements, the out-isolation probability will reduce and the mean out-degree will
improve. For example, choosing a distortion at the eavesdropper of D = 0.6 (obtained for ξ = 2),
there is a 73% decreasing for the out-isolation probability and a 72% increasing in the mean
out-degree, compared to the case of perfect secrecy (obtained for ξ = 2.5).
6. Further works
The partial secrecy could also applies in the multi-nodes communication, such as relay-
eavesdropper channel. In the no relay case, the source and receiver cannot have secure com-
munication when the eavesdropper’s channel is the same or better than the receiver’s channel
holds. In the relay case, although the source and receiver cannot have secure communication,
while they can achieve the partial secrecy. Assuming the nodes of eavesdropper is the ran-
domly distributed in the area, the probability of achieving at least a secrecy level of medium
secrecy level could be characterized based on the properties of the random distribution.
Also, for the network level, the partial secrecy could be studied in different distribution of
nodes. For example, the case that users are uniformly distributed in area could be considered.
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Implementation of a Multimaps Chaos-Based
Encryption Software for EEG Signals
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Abstract
In the chapter, we adopted a chaos logic map and a quadratic map to develop the chaos-
based multi-maps EEG encryption software. The encryption performances of the chaos-
based software were studied. The percent root-mean-square difference (PRD) is used to
estimate the accuracy of a correctly decrypted EEG signal with respect to the original
EEG signal. Pearson correlation coefficient (PCC) is used to estimate the correlation
between the original EEG signal and an incorrectly decrypted EEG signal. The seven
encryption aspects were testing, the average PRD value of the original and correctly
decrypted EEG signals for the chaos-based multi-maps software is 2.59 x 10-11, and the
average encryption time is 113.2857 ms. The five error decryption aspects were testing,
the average PCC value of the original and error decrypted EEG signals for the chaos-
based multi-maps software is 0.0026, and the average error decryption time is 113.4000
ms. These results indicate that the chaos-based multimaps EEG encryption software can
be applied to clinical EEG diagnosis.
Keywords: EEG encryption software, multiple chaotic maps, logic map, quadratic map
1. Introduction
Chaos-based encryption is an important research topic in the field of multimedia information
communication and storage [1–8]. Compared to the advanced encryption standard (AES), data
encryption standard (DES), and the Rivest, Shamir, & Adleman (RSA) algorithm, chaos-based
cryptography can exhibit higher levels of security and strong anti-attack ability [7, 8]. The use
© 2017 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
of chaos-based encryption schemes has expanded steadily over the last few years. Sankpal and
Vijaya [9] provided the insights on chaos-based image encryption. Chaotic encryption mecha-
nisms with infinite precision and unpredictability are sensitive to initial conditions and chaotic
parameters. Complex chaotic maps have higher levels of security. Chaos-based multimedia
encryption can be used in an open access network, and the internet. Zhou et al. [10] proposed a
cascade chaotic system using two one-dimension (1-D) chaotic maps in series. The 1-D chaotic
maps included logistic, tent, and sine maps. Compared to the use of one 1-D chaotic map, the
simulation results showed that the proposed cascade chaotic system had higher robustness
and randomness, more unpredictable parameters, and improved chaotic properties and cha-
otic performance.
Babu and Ilango [11] integrated chaos-based look-up tables using a higher-dimensional
Arnold’s cat map (ACM) to achieve high encryption sensitivity with respect to the secret key
space for audio encryption. The coefficients of the original and encrypted audio signals were
employed to evaluate encryption robustness. Mostaghim and Boostani [12] proposed a chaotic
visual cryptography (CVC) algorithm to increase steganography in security applications. The
key space, key sensitivity, and correlation coefficient of the proposed CVC encryption method
were demonstrated. Munir [13] proposed a chaos-based image encryption method using
discrete cosine transform (DCT) in the frequency domain. The size of the encrypted image
block was 8  8. The ACM was used to permute the encrypted image block and achieve visual
image encryption. The 2D Henon chaotic map and skew tent map play a significant role in the
design of permutation and diffusion image encryption mechanisms [14]. The Henon chaotic
map generates two different chaotic addresses to permute the row and column of encrypted
values in the shuffling process. Furthermore, the unimodal skew tent map was used to scram-
ble the pixel values of the encrypted image using exclusive or (XOR) operations in the diffu-
sion process. Liu et al. [15] proposed a pseudorandom bit generator (PRBG) using parameter-
varying logistic map. The change mechanism of the parameters was designed, and the pro-
posed PRBG displayed non-stationary behavior. The parameter-varying logistic map
disrupted the phase space of the chaotic system, and could overcome phase space reconstruc-
tion to withstand attacks.
Awad et al. [16] investigated chaos-based encryption and transformation approaches using
fuzzy keyword search for a mobile cloud storage system. The comprehensive tests showed
that the proposed technology obtained a significantly more efficient solution to the searchable
encryption problem compared to existing solutions. Huang et al. [17] developed an image
cryptosystem using permutation architecture with block and stream ciphers. Ricardo and
Alejandro [18] modified a 32-bit chaotic Bernoulli map PRBG using an 8-bit microcontroller.
The multiplication, accommodation, addition, and shifting operations were integrated. Jolfaei
et al. [19] indicated that permutation-only image ciphers have been used to protect multimedia
information in recent years. In the permutation-only image encryption algorithm, the multi-
media information is scrambled using a permutation mapping matrix generated by a PRBG. In
previous studies [20–23], a chaos-based visual encryption mechanism, 2D chaos-based visual
encryption scheme, C# based chaotic single map encryption system, and chaotic visual cryp-
tosystem using empirical mode decomposition algorithm for clinical electroencephalogram
(EEG) signals have been proposed. In the chapter, chaotic multimaps of one-channel clinical
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EEG encryption software were developed to enhance the encryption robustness. The rest of
this paper is organized as follows. The encryption algorithm focusing on the encryption
software is investigated in Section 2. Section 3 provides implementation and experimental
results of chaotic multimaps of visual clinical EEG encryption software. The conclusion and
future work are presented in Section 4.
2. Encryption algorithm
The encryption algorithm consists of two main components: chaotic permutation address index
approach (CPAIA) and chaotic clinical EEG signal generator approach (CCESGA) for the pro-
posed encryption software. The encryption parameters are inputted to CPAIA, and the chaotic
permutation address index sequence is generated. The chaotic permutation address index
sequence is integrated to CCESGA, and the chaos-based encryption clinical EEG signal is gener-
ated. The proposed CPAIA is shown in Figure 1. The CPAIA algorithm proceeds as follows:
Figure 1. The proposed chaotic permutation address index approach.
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Step 1: Input the encryption parameters, SPF rF LF nF δF , into the CPAIA.
SPF: The initial value of the chaotic logic map.
rF: The bifurcation parameter of the chaotic logic map.
LF: The length of encryption clinical EEG signal.
nF: The level of parameter 1 of security.
δF: The level of parameter 2 of security.
The chaotic logic map was adopted in CPAIA, described as following.
xn + 1 = rFxn(1 � xn)…………………………………………………………….(1)
xo = SPF
Step 2: Discard the first nF chaotic logic map values; the chaotic logic map sequence is
xnFþ1 xnFþ2 ⋯ xm xmþ1 ⋯ .
Step 3: If xm < δF, discard xm, m ∈ {nF + 1, nF + 2,⋯}
else
xp ¼ xm initinal p ¼ 0
Step 4:
Zp ¼ 1xp
 
mod LF Gr ¼ Zp r ¼ p ¼ 0 …………………………(2)
Step 5: If Zp∉G G ¼ G0;G1;⋯;Gr�1f g
Gr ¼ Zp r ¼ p 6¼ 0……………………………………………..................(3)
else discard Zp.
Step 6: If r ¼ LF LM ¼ G0,G1,⋯,GLF�1
LM is the chaotic permutation address index sequence.
else
m = m + 1;
p = p + 1;
r = r + 1; and go to Step 3.
The proposed CCESGA is shown in Figure 2. The CCESGA algorithm proceeds as follows:
Step 1: Input the encryption parameters, SPG rG LF , into the CCESGA.
SPG: The initial value of the chaotic quadratic map.
rF: The bifurcation parameter of the quadratic logic map.
LF: The length of encryption clinical EEG signal.
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The chaotic quadratic map was adopted in CCESGA, and described as follows:
qnþ1 ¼ 1� rG � q2n…………………………………………………………….(4)
qo = SPG
The generation the chaotic quadratic map sequence was Q,
Q ¼ q0 q1 ⋯ qLF�1
Step 2: Input the chaotic permutation address index sequence, LM.
Step 3: Generate the chaos-based encryption sequence, E.
E ¼ e0 e1 ⋯ eLF�1 ……………………………………….(5)
¼ Q G0ð Þ Q G1ð Þ ⋯ Q GLF�1ð Þ
¼ qG0 qG1 ⋯ qGLF�1
Step 4: Input the clinical EEG signal, eeg.
eeg ¼ eeg0 eeg1 ⋯ eegLF�1……………………………………………..(6)
Step 5: Generate the chaos-based encryption clinical EEG signal, eegE.
eegE ¼ eeg � E…………………………………………………………………....(7)
¼ e0qG0 e1qG1 ⋯ eLF�1qGLF�1
¼ eegE0 eegE1 ⋯ eegELF�1
Figure 2. The proposed chaotic clinical EEG signal generator approach.
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3. Chaotic multimaps visual clinical EEG encryption software
Figure 3 shows the developed chaotic multimaps visual clinical EEG signal encryption soft-
ware. The software was developed using C# language and Microsoft Visual Studio integrated
development environment (IDE). The software includes input, encryption, decryption, storage,
and display modules. One-channel clinical EEG signals were inputted in the software through
an input module, and were encrypted using an encryption module; these encrypted clinical
EEG signals were decrypted using a decryption module. Furthermore, the encryptions and
decryptions were stored and displayed using storage and display modules, respectively. The
ranges of encryption parameters SPF = x1, rF = R, SPG = x2, rG = α, nF, and δF are 0-1 real
numbers (RNs), 3.6-4 RNs, 0-1 RNs, 1.4-2 RNs, 0-100000 integrate number, and 0-0.2 RNs,
respectively. Figure 4 displays the original one-channel clinical EEG signal, whose length is 10
s, and sample rate is 256 samples/s.
Figure 5 shows the encrypted chaotic multimaps visual one-channel clinical EEG signal. The
medical features of the encrypted EEG signal were visually unrecognizable and could not be
applied to clinical EEG diagnosis. The encryption parameters SPF = x1, rF = R, SPG = x2, rG = α, nF,
and δF are 0.6, 4, 0.6, 1.4, 100, and 0.05, respectively. The robustness of the developed visual
chaotic multimaps encryption software was excellent. Figure 6 shows the correctly decrypted
Figure 3. The developed chaotic multimaps visual clinical EEG signal encryption software.
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one-channel clinical EEG signal. The percent root difference (PRD) value is adopted to evaluate
the difference between the original and correctly decrypted clinical EEG signals and is defined as
PRD ¼ 100�
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiXLF
i¼1 EEGori ið Þ � EEGdec ið Þð Þ
2XLF
i¼1 EEG
2
ori ið Þ
vuuut (8)
EEGori: amplitudes of original clinical EEG signal.
EEGdec: amplitudes of decrypted clinical EEG signal.
The parameter LF is 2560. The PRD value of the original and correctly decrypted clinical EEG
signals is 3.87 � 10�11. Table 1 lists the encryption parameters, PRD values of correct decryp-
tion, and encryption time of the proposed chaotic multimaps visual encryption mechanism for
a clinical EEG signal. Seven encryption aspects were tested, and the average PRD value of
original and correctly decrypted clinical EEG signal is obtained as 2.59 � 10�11 and with the
encryption time as 113.2857 ms. From Figure 6 and Table 1, the accuracy of a correctly
decrypted EEG signal was excellent, and the correct decryption speed was acceptable. Figure 7
shows the decrypted one-channel clinical EEG signal with error decryption parameters; the
encryption parameters SPF = x1, rF = r, SPG = x2, rG = α, nF, and δF are 0.6, 4, 0.6, 1.4, 100, and
Figure 4. The original one-channel clinical EEG signal.
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0.05, respectively. In addition, the decryption parameters SPF = x1, rF = r, SPG = x2, rG = α, nF,
and δF are 0.6, 4, 0.60001, 1.4, 100, and 0.05, respectively. The Pearson correlation coefficient
(PCC) was adopted to evaluate the difference between the original and error decryption
clinical EEG signals and is defined as
r ¼
XLF
i¼1
EEGori ið ÞEEGerrdec ið Þ �
XLF
i¼1
EEGori ið Þ
XLF
i¼1
EEGerrdec ið Þ
LFffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
XLF
i¼1
EEG2ori ið Þ �
XLF
i¼1
EEGori ið Þ
 !2
LF
0BBBBB@
1CCCCCA
XLF
i¼1
EEG2errdec ið Þ �
XLF
i¼1
EEGerrdec ið Þ
 !2
LF
0BBBBB@
vuuuuuuuut
(9)
EEGori: amplitudes of the original clinical EEG signal.
EEGerrdec: amplitudes of error decrypted clinical EEG signal.
Figure 5. The encrypted chaotic multimaps visual one-channel clinical EEG signal.
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Table 2 lists the decryption parameters, PCC values of error decryption, and error encryption
time of the proposed chaotic multimaps visual encryption mechanism for the clinical EEG
signal. For this, five error decryption aspects were tested, the average PCC value of original
Figure 6. The correctly decrypted one-channel clinical EEG signal.
Encryption PRD Encryption time (ms)
x1 r x2 α nF δF
0.6 4 0.6 1.4 100 0.05 3.8734  1011 113
0.60001 4 0.6 1.4 100 0.05 1.2630  1011 113
0.6 3.9999 0.6 1.4 100 0.05 1.2362  1011 115
0.6 4 0.601 1.4 100 0.05 3.3033  1011 114
0.6 4 0.6 1.399 100 0.05 1.1655  1010 113
0.6 4 0.6 1.4 200 0.05 3.2141  1011 113
0.6 4 0.6 1.4 100 0.15 4.0856  1011 112
Table 1. The encryption parameters, PRD values of correct decryption, and encryption time of the proposed chaotic
multimaps visual encryption mechanism for clinical EEG signal.
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and error decrypted clinical EEG signal was obtained as 0.0026, and the error decryption time
was 113.4000 ms. From Figure 7 and Table 2, the original and error decrypted clinical EEG
signal was extremely uncorrelated, and the error decryption time was accepted.
Figure 7. The decrypted one-channel clinical EEG signal with error decryption parameters.
Encryption PCC Error decryption
time (ms)
x r xn α nF δF
0.60001 4 0.6 1.4 100 0.05 0.0020 112
0.6 3.9999 0.6 1.4 100 0.05 0.0061 113
0.6 4 0.601 1.4 100 0.05 0.0020 114
0.6 4 0.6 1.4 200 0.05 0.0015 114
0.6 4 0.6 1.4 100 0.15 0.0015 114
Table 2. The decryption parameters, PCC values of error decryption, and error encryption time of the proposed chaotic
multimaps visual encryption mechanism for clinical EEG signal.
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4. Conclusion
This chapter described the proposed chaotic multimaps visual encryption mechanism for one-
channel clinical EEG signals. Chaotic logic and chaotic quadratic maps were employed in
CPAIA and CCESGA, respectively. The proposed software was implemented using C# lan-
guage and Microsoft Visual Studio IDE. The PRD and PCC values were used to evaluate the
accuracy of the correctly decrypted clinical EEG signals and the robustness of error decryption
clinical EEG signals, respectively. The testing results showed that the proposed chaotic
multimaps visual encryption software is an excellent encryption software. In the future, the
chaotic maps with 2-D, i.e., Henon map, can be adopted to enhance the encryption robustness.
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